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History, and Life of Classical Antiquity

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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

Volume XLV

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## "SINCERITY" AND THE ROMAN ELEGISTS

ARCHIBALD W. ALLEN

### I

LEGIA quoque Graecos provocamus, cuius mihi tersus atque elegans maxime videtur auctor Tibullus. Sunt qui Propertium malint. Ovidius utroque lascivior, sicut durior Gallus."<sup>1</sup> Among modern critics there has been general agreement with the preference which Quintilian showed for both Tibullus and Propertius over Ovid, although the number of those *qui Propertium malint* has perhaps increased at the expense of Tibullus. Postgate's opinion represents the prevailing attitude toward Ovid: "His calm surface is most rarely disturbed by genuine feeling. With Tibullus and Propertius love was at any rate a passion. With Ovid it was *une affaire de coeur*."<sup>2</sup> Despite the apparent agreement between the ancient and the modern critic, it should be observed that the criteria by which they reached their judgments are significantly different.

The terms *tersus*, *elegans*, *lascivus*, and *durus*, which Quintilian used in describing the elegists, are all technical terms of stylistic criticism. The qualities which he found most admirable in Tibullus were his formal perfection and his sureness of taste. These are qualities which we should expect to be admired by Quintilian, who

said of the rhetorical style which most persuasively reveals the character of the orator: "proprie, iucunde, credibiliter dicere sat est."<sup>3</sup> It is evident that in such a style it is not the peculiar character of a unique individual that is revealed, but rather a general type of character to which the speaker conforms or seems to conform. If we look beyond Quintilian we find that these are not simply the criteria adopted by a teacher of rhetoric. Poets also used such terms of stylistic identification when they wished to characterize in a single word the essential quality of another poet. When Ovid praised his predecessors in elegy, he characterized Catullus as *doctus* (*Am.* iii. 9. 62), Tibullus as *cultus* (*Am.* i. 15. 28 and iii. 9. 66) and *comis* (*Tr.* v. 1. 18), Propertius as *tener* (*A.A.* iii. 333) and *blandus* (*Tr.* ii. 465 and v. 1. 17). Martial found Propertius *lascivus* (viii. 73. 5) and *facundus* (xiv. 189. 1). Propertius, in urging his friend Lynceus to turn from epic to elegiac verse, wrote:

Incepe iam angusto versus includere torno,

Inque tuos ignes, dure poeta, veni [ii. 34, 43-44].

The writing of elegy can, as here, be described either as writing in a polished style or as writing of one's own love. As an epic poet Lynceus was *durus*, but if he

would turn to elegy and the theme of love he would become a *tener poeta*.<sup>4</sup> From this point of view the personality of the poet himself, in so far as he is a poet, is determined by the style in which he writes.

While Quintilian was concerned with the style of the elegists and not with their personality as it might exist apart from their style, Postgate was concerned with the style as it reveals the personality of the poet. He found in Tibullus and Propertius proof of the sincerity and genuine passion which he evidently regarded as a prime requisite of poetry. They, rather than Ovid, awakened in him the impression that a passionate feeling inspired their verse. Finding them superior to Ovid in the quality of their feeling, he considered them superior also as poets. The ethical standard for him was prior and determined literary judgment.

This point of view is no longer so widely held in literary criticism as was the case a few years ago, but it has had a very considerable influence in classical scholarship. In criticism of the Roman elegists, so much of whose work is of a personal and ostensibly confessional nature, the question of the relation between poetry and the personality of the poet has assumed particular importance. A consideration of the general critical point involved would lie outside of the scope of the present discussion.<sup>5</sup> We can, however, consider the difference between the ancient and modern views of the nature of poetic sincerity, and seek to avoid the danger of applying misleading standards of judgment to the Roman elegists. The interest in individual personality which is characteristic of modern thought has led to the development of a concept of artistic sincerity which is basically different from that which the contemporaries of the elegists considered relevant. Instead of being regarded as a function of style, sincerity has come to be

regarded as a function of personality. Before judging a Roman poet by modern standards we must be careful to understand him by the standards of which he was himself conscious, and take care that other preconceptions do not cause us to misunderstand him.<sup>6</sup>

In classical literary criticism this problem did not receive the amount of attention that it has in modern criticism, but it was not ignored. Since the theory of rhetoric was more carefully considered and fully developed than a corresponding theory of poetic, it is in the rhetoricians that we find the matter most systematically treated.<sup>7</sup> Rhetorical theory recognizes that the orator faces the practical requirement that he must get people to believe what he says; therefore he requires not only to convince an audience by his argumentation, but also to persuade them of his sincerity. *Fides* is the word which in Latin comes nearest to expressing the idea contained in our word "sincerity,"<sup>8</sup> but there is an important difference. *Fides* contains simultaneously the ideas of "sincerity" and "persuasiveness." Its precise meaning was studied by Heinze,<sup>9</sup> who showed that it contains an essential notion of a relationship existing between an individual and others who assume a particular attitude toward him:

*Fides*, die . . . notwendig mit der Anerkennung durch andere zusammenhängt, ist ein Stück Persönlichkeit, das deren Wert in den Augen anderer ganz wesentlich bestimmt, aber eben noch davon abhängt, ob diese Augen anderer sie sehen und ob sie sie als gross oder klein, gut oder schlecht sehen.<sup>10</sup>

*Fides* therefore includes both a subjective element (ein Stück Persönlichkeit) and an objective element (Wert in den Augen anderer); in its former aspect the closest English equivalent is sincerity, while in the latter it is persuasiveness. The *fides* of an orator depends on the conviction which

he arouses that he possesses the qualities which he claims. *Fides* involves a relationship between the speaker and his audience; it means both good faith on the part of a speaker and the acceptance by an audience of his pretension to speak in good faith. If the speaker is to create a belief in his sincerity he must, as Quintilian says, himself either possess or seem to possess the good qualities which he praises in others: a bad speech is one which fails properly to present the character of the speaker.<sup>11</sup> The proper solution for the orator is simply that he should speak in such a manner as will present his character in the light he desires, and the style of his discourse is the means by which he presents his character to the audience.<sup>12</sup> An excess of adornment destroys belief in the sincerity of the speaker's emotion,<sup>13</sup> but on the other hand charm of manner is in itself a means of persuasion.<sup>14</sup> The successful orator is one who understands the art of charming his listeners, without falling into excess and affectation, and so can convince them of the soundness of his character and the justice of his case. His *fides*, the impression of sincerity resulting from persuasiveness, is, according to this doctrine, a product of style.<sup>15</sup> Sincerity, then, as we find it in ancient criticism, involves a relation between the artist and the public; it is established by the style of the work of art. The personality of the artist, except as it appears to the public in the work of art, is irrelevant to the question of sincerity.

In modern critical theory, on the other hand, the real personality of the artist is an essential factor in the concept of sincerity, which is regarded as lying in the relation between the artist and the product of his art. In their recent study of the basic principles of modern literary theory, Wellek and Warren define sincerity in poetry as "a sincere expression of the

poem, i.e., the linguistic construct shaping in the author's mind as he writes." Since the terms of this definition are "the linguistic construct" and "the author's mind," it is evidently in the relation between these that they look for sincerity, rather than in the relation between the finished work of art and the readers or audience.<sup>16</sup> The objective element in the classical *fides* has thus disappeared.

When there has been established for the judgment of poetry a standard so subjective as the relation between the artist and the product of his art, it is not surprising that critics have looked for proof of sincerity not chiefly in the artistic illusion created by the poem itself but rather in the relation existing between the poem and the external facts of the poet's life. Indeed some critics have gone further, and from a forceful impression of sincerity have inferred a necessary existence of the external facts. The current judgment concerning Propertius and Ovid illustrates this habit of mind. Since the poetry of Ovid is deliberately "conventional" many critics deny him sincerity, and as a corollary assume that his poetry is pure fancy supported neither by true feeling nor by real experience. This is the judgment of Schanz-Hosius on the *Amores*:

[Corinna] existierte aber nur in dem Geiste des Dichters, um seine Phantasiestücke individuell zu beleben. So muss Corinna die Figur für eine Reihe erdichteter Situationen abgeben. . . . Keines dieser Lieder verrät eine tiefere Empfindung, es sind leichte Spiele der Phantasie. . . . Ein Band zwischen Leben und Dichtung besteht nicht.<sup>17</sup>

It is easy to see the method of reasoning: we do not receive from the elegies of Ovid an impression of sincerity; we may therefore conclude that there exists in them no connection between life and poetry. For Propertius the situation is simply re-

versed; we are convinced of the reality of his passion:

Tiefe und starke Gemütsbewegung und eine überwältigende Leidenschaft, lebhafte Phantasie eines erregten Herzens machen sich in leuchtenden Gemälden der Freude und des Leides Luft; Glut der Empfindung lodert überall.<sup>18</sup>

And it follows, for these critics, that Cynthia has a role in the biography of Propertius which is denied to Corinna in that of Ovid. Butler and Barber likewise find in the quality of Propertius' poetry a guarantee of its biographical truth:

It is with Cynthia we must begin. The story of their love is in outline simple enough. . . . There is no need to be unduly sceptical about the poet's story of his love. Many of the poems, it is true, seem to follow conventional forms; the details may often be fictitious; but underlying all there is such fire and vehemence that we can scarcely doubt the general truth of the story that emerges as we read.<sup>19</sup>

The propriety of testing the sincerity of a Roman elegist by relating his poems to the external facts of his life is fortunately subject to some measure of objective verification. We can both examine "the story that emerges" from his elegies to determine whether it is coherent and convincing; and we can consider whether the statements of the Latin poets themselves justify such a method of interpreting their work. If we find this method invalid, it will remain to investigate whether sincerity, regarded simply as a function of style, offers a more useful criterion.

## II

Many critics have thought that in the elegies of Propertius they can trace the story of his romance with Cynthia. Since the first necessity in preparing an adequate biography is the establishment of a chronology, it will be convenient to gather the passages which have been used

as historical data in constructing an account of Propertius' relations with Cynthia. There are seven which are sufficiently precise to seem useful:<sup>20</sup>

Et mihi iam toto furor hic non deficit anno,  
Cum tamen adversos cogor habere deos  
[i. 1. 7-8].

"Vix unum potes, infelix, requiescere mensem,  
Et turpis de te iam liber alter erit"  
[ii. 3. 3-4].

Ergo iam multos nimium temerarius annos,  
Improba, qui tulerim teque tuamque domum?  
[ii. 8. 13-14].

Septima iam plenae deducitur orbita lunae,  
Cum de me et de te compita nulla tacent  
[ii. 20. 21-22].

Sic ego non ullos iam norim in amore tumultus,  
Nec veniat sine te nox vigilanda mihi:  
Ut mihi praetexti pudor est elatus amictus  
Et data libertas noscere amoris iter,  
Illa rudes animos per noctes conscia primas  
Inbuit heu nullis capta Lycinna datis.  
Tertius haut multo minus est cum ducitur annus:

Vix memini nobis verba coisse decem.  
Cuncta tuus sepelivit amor, nec femina post te  
Ulla dedit collo dulcia vincla meo  
[iii. 15. 1-10].

Peccaram semel et totum sum pulsus in annum  
[iii. 16. 9].

Quinque tibi potui servire fideliter annos  
[iii. 25. 3].

In the first of these passages, which occurs in the elegy that introduces Book i, Propertius says that the madness of love has possessed him for a whole year. ii. 3. 3-4 are probably to be understood as the words of a friend, addressed to the poet shortly after the publication of Book i. ii. 8. 13-14 are from an elegy complaining of his mistress' infidelity. ii. 20. 21-22 presumably refer to the period which has passed since publication of Book i. iii. 15

is the only elegy in which Lycinna appears. In iii. 16. 9 memory of a year of banishment occurs to the poet when he is debating whether to obey a midnight summons of his mistress: her order is dangerous to obey, but more dangerous to disobey. iii. 25, in which Propertius claims to have served Cynthia faithfully for five years, is the concluding poem of the book and an epilogue to his love poetry.

The first effort to apply historical method to the interpretation of these passages was made by F. G. Barth, who arranged according to the years of the poet's life the events of his affairs with Cynthia and her predecessor Lycinna.<sup>21</sup> Relying on the statement in iii. 15, he assumed that the first love affair of Propertius was with Lycinna, and that it began shortly after he put on the *toga virilis*. About two years later he fell in love with Cynthia and his love for her lasted for five years (iii. 25. 3). Since the usual age for assuming the *toga virilis* was sixteen, Barth supposed that the love affair began when the poet was about seventeen years old. By assigning two years to the affair with Lycinna and five years to the affair with Cynthia, he found that the events which form the subject of the first three books of Propertius extended over a period of seven years, from his seventeenth to his twenty-fourth years. This chronology was adopted by Lachmann, but with one important modification.<sup>22</sup> He drew attention to the year of separation which Propertius mentions in iii. 16. 9 and identified this year with the *toto anno* of i. 1. 7. He felt that Propertius could not have included this year of separation—the *annus discidii* as it has generally been called since Lachmann—among the *quinque annos* of faithful service. He therefore reckoned the five years of iii. 25. 3 as having begun only with the resumption of relations after the *annus discidii*. He further

suggested that the elegy in which Lycinna appears (iii. 15) was written immediately before the separation. A period of two years has already elapsed since love for Cynthia has erased all thought of Lycinna from his mind. Lachmann therefore arranged the chronology of the love affairs as follows: one year for Lycinna, two for the earlier period of relations with Cynthia, one for the separation, and five for the second period of relations with Cynthia. Thus the seven years in the chronology of Barth became nine in that of Lachmann.

Despite the apparent precision of Barth's conclusions, as modified by Lachmann, they have since shown themselves open to attack at every point. The identification of the year of i. 1. 7, with that of iii. 16. 9—which Lachmann believed to be the most important contribution of his chronological system to the interpretation of Propertius and which he made the keystone of his system—is extremely doubtful, since it requires the assumption that i. 1 was written at the end of the *annus discidii*, and therefore three years after Propertius' relations with Cynthia began. This assumption led Lachmann to regard i. 1 as a farewell to love,<sup>23</sup> a complete misconception of the elegy.<sup>24</sup> Further, the composition of iii. 16 was assigned to a period before the publication of Book i.<sup>25</sup> The reckoning of years is also much less certain than Lachmann indicated. The year assigned to Lycinna is a mere guess, and there is no satisfactory means of determining whether the five years mentioned in iii. 25 do or do not include the year of separation and the previous period of relations between Propertius and Cynthia. These difficulties are further complicated by the differences between the short periods of time mentioned in ii. 3. 3 and ii. 20. 21 and the *multos annos* of ii. 8. 13. The result of the numerous flaws which



have been found in Lachmann's theory is that many efforts have since been made to reconcile the chronology of Propertius' romance with the chronology of his poems. It will be sufficient to indicate the methods which have been followed by Birt<sup>26</sup> and by Butler and Barber,<sup>27</sup> since their attempts are typical.

The solution offered by Birt is the more radical. He believed that expressions of time have in general only a subjective meaning for the poet: they signify only that a given period of time has seemed long or short. Birt found it possible to argue that when Propertius says three years (iii. 15. 7) he really means exactly the same length of time as when he says five years (iii. 25. 3).<sup>28</sup> He could also argue, on the same basis, that when Propertius says a year he really means a month, and when he says a month he really means a year:

Schreibt nun also Properz III. 16, 9: *Peccaram semel et totum sum pulsus in annum*, so genügt es, da Properz sich möglichst stark ausdrücken will, nicht ein Jahr, sondern einen Monat der Trennung zu verstehen; schreibt er dagegen II. 3, 3: *vix unum potes, infelix, requiescere mensem, et turpis de te iam liber alter erit*, so ist das in diesem Fall eine ganz offenbare Uebertreibung in das Minus, und wir dürfen wiederum ruhig als Abstand zwischen der Monobiblos des Properz und dem Beginn seines sog. zweiten Buches den Zeitraum eines vollen Jahres ansetzen.<sup>29</sup>

All things are, in fact, possible under this method, even Birt's conclusion that Propertius really loved Cynthia for only three years, and then spent seventeen years in writing poetry about her. But since such conjectures are no more susceptible of disproof than of proof, they are entirely beyond critical control.

The method of Butler and Barber seems more circumspect. They deny chronological importance to ii. 3. 3, to

ii. 8. 13, and to ii. 20. 21, reject the *annus discidii* from their reckoning, and take the *toto anno* of i. 1. 7 simply as indicating the period of composition of Book i. They are then left with only two passages from which to determine the chronology of Propertius' love story; but each of these offers particular difficulties. The first of these passages is that in which Lycinna is mentioned (iii. 15. 1-10). It was she, Propertius says, who initiated him into the experience of love, but his later love for Cynthia has made him forget her, and in almost two years they have scarcely exchanged ten words. Butler and Barber, who date the beginning of Propertius' love for Cynthia in 29 B.C. and the composition of Book iii in the years 25 to 22 B.C., are troubled by the poet's statement that it is only two years since he left Lycinna for Cynthia. They therefore follow Lachmann in suggesting that these lines actually were composed earlier than the rest of the book:

III. xv, though its date is uncertain, cannot well be later than 27 B.C. It is, that is to say, as far as 1-10 at least are concerned, an early poem which would naturally have found a place in Book II. It is possible that 1-10 represent an early fragment, which was later made use of to introduce the story of Dirce and Antiope, which, like the story of Hylas in I. xx, is in reality the main theme of the poem.<sup>30</sup>

A similar difficulty is raised by the *quinque annos* of iii. 25. 3. These five years cannot be counted from the publication of the book, for they would then carry us back only to 27 or 28 B.C., when the first book had already appeared. Butler and Barber therefore offer the following explanation:

If the liaison was broken at the end of 25 B.C. or early in 24 B.C., and Bk. III was published in 22 B.C. (and it cannot at most have been more than a few months earlier), at least two years must be assumed to have elapsed between the composition of the Cynthia poems

in this book and their publication. In this there is nothing impossible. Ell. xxiv and xxv may well have been composed and sent to Cynthia at the time of the rupture. Propertius kept them by him and when the time came for publishing saw that they would give an artistic conclusion to the volume.<sup>31</sup>

The upshot of this is that the evidence for the chronology of the romance has been reduced to two passages, each of which, it is admitted, cannot mean what it seems to mean. It is sheer caprice which chooses to explain iii. 15. 7 and iii. 25. 3 as literally true while regarding the *multos annos* of ii. 8. 13 as "no doubt exaggerated"<sup>32</sup> and leaving ii. 3. 3<sup>33</sup> and ii. 20. 21<sup>34</sup> uncertain.

The analysis of the chronological evidence on which the biographical critics of Propertius have built their story of his romance compels two conclusions. The first is that no hypothetical reconstruction of the story can ever be convincing, since it must rest upon conjectures which are not capable of verification. Propertius does not give us the facts we need. The second conclusion, which necessarily follows from the first, is that Propertius did not intend that his elegies should be read as a story. It is an essential quality of a story that it present a sequence of events; without progression in time a story cannot exist. And there is no progression in time in the elegies. The opening elegy is an introduction to love, and the last elegy of the third book is a valediction to love. Between these two are elegies which treat all the aspects of love, fruition and loneliness, renunciation and renewal, hope and despair, jealousy and penitence. But there is no plot which unites them and determines the order in which they shall appear. Propertius is not concerned to tell a story, but rather to impart the quality of an experience. Explicit statements of time, place, person, and circumstance have meaning not as references to a pri-

vate sphere of the poet's own experience, into which the reader is only occasionally and, as it were, by chance allowed an entrance; they have meaning rather as details which serve to enforce perception of the essential and typical aspects of experience in love.

The effort to transfer the elegiac treatment of love from the poetry in which it was written into the form of an historical biography has failed; it was inevitable that no two scholars who attempted to retell the story of the romance should reach quite the same conclusions, since they can never quite agree on their data. Biography is a branch of historical study, and history demands facts, which Propertius does not give us. The particular events of his own life were not for him a given framework to whose imperious rigidity he must adapt his poetry. He created, changed, or ignored particular facts as best served his purpose. Cynthia was his first love (i. 1. 1) and the only woman he ever cared for (iv. 1. 139-46); but if his poetic intention required a personal occasion for telling the story of Dirce and Antiope, Lycinna could appear for the moment (iii. 15) and then disappear from his verse. He could claim to have served Cynthia faithfully for five years (iii. 25. 3) and yet meanwhile have called upon his own experience to prove the advantage of having two mistresses at one time (ii. 22) or have declared that he was resorting to girls of the street (ii. 23 and 24). He could even regard Cynthia in his elegies sometimes as a courtesan and sometimes as a woman of social position.<sup>35</sup> Such contradictions cannot be resolved; they must be recognized, and the method of our interpretation must be adapted to the kind of poetry we are reading.<sup>36</sup>

We set out to determine whether the quality of Propertius' poetry can be regarded as proof of its biographical truth. It is now apparent that the theory fails to



pass the first test: there is no coherent story which emerges from the elegies. All the circumstantial accounts that have been written about the relations of Propertius with Cynthia are based on dubious interpretations of a few passages whose relation to biographical fact we have no means of determining.

There remains the second test, the statements of the poets themselves. In the verses to Lynceus quoted above (p. 145), Propertius urged his friend not only to write in the polished style, but also to write of his own love. Concerning Propertius himself, Ovid wrote: *Saepe suos solitus recitare Propertius ignes* (Tr. iv. 10. 45). These statements, both by and about Propertius, have sometimes been thought to support a belief that such poetry as his is autobiographical, and that it should contain the kind of truth which consists in a correspondence between poetry and the particular facts of experience. Nevertheless we have concluded that in the elegies in which Propertius writes of love he has so invented or suppressed particular circumstances that it is impossible to learn the events of his life from the evidence of his verse. There is, however, no contradiction between this conclusion and the words of Propertius and Ovid, if we regard their statements as referring to poetry written in a personal form without further implication as to its factual accuracy.

Catullus, in lines which were often quoted or imitated by later writers, declares that there must be a complete distinction between the poet and his poetry:

Castum esse decet pium poetam  
Ipsum, versiculos nihil necessest;  
Qui tum denique habent salem ac leporem  
Si sunt molliculi ac parum pudici

[xvi. 5-8].

The poet himself should be *castus*; not so his verse, since the essential quality of such verses as Catullus is writing is that

they should be *molliculi ac parum pudici*; only so will they properly accord with their literary type. The same contrast appears in Ovid:

Crede mihi, distant mores a carmine nostro:  
Vita verecunda est, Musa iocosa mea  
[Tr. ii. 353-54].

and again in Martial:

Lasciva est nobis pagina, vita proba  
[i. 4. 8].<sup>37</sup>

Martial also, in another epigram, insists that he is bound by the law governing the kind of poetry he writes:

Lex haec carminibus data est iocosis,  
Ne possint nisi pruriant, iuvare  
[i. 35. 10-11].

The verses of Catullus are quoted by the Younger Pliny, who appears to have been disturbed by criticism of his poems. He has left two letters in which he defends himself. In the first he declares that his actual fault is that, through timidity, he has abstained from the really outspoken language which Catullus had proclaimed as proper to such verse.<sup>38</sup> In the other letter he defends himself against the more specific criticism that such poetry ought not to be written by a man in his position.<sup>39</sup> He places the writing of *versiculos severos parum* on a level with attending mimes and comedies, and with reading the poetry of others. His own writing he justifies by the authority of the good and illustrious men who have done the same. By asserting that men whose *sanctitas morum* is unquestionable have not abstained from *lascivia rerum* in their verse, he answers the question whether poetry need have a basis in real experience—whether it is necessary to write of actual facts when, in verse, *iocamur, ludimus, amamus, dolemus, querimur, irascimur*. Apuleius also had occasion to quote the verses of Catullus, in his *Apology*, when he found it necessary to defend himself

against the charge that his erotic epigrams were an indication of his personal immorality.<sup>40</sup> He preserves for us a line of the emperor Hadrian, for inscription on the tomb of the poet Voconius: *lascivus versu, mente pudicus eras*. Hadrian would never have so written, Apuleius reminds his accusers, *si forent lepidiora carmina argumentum impudicitiae habenda*. Recalling this passage of Apuleius, Ausonius neatly summarizes the distinction between poetry and poet: *Apuleium in vita philosophum, in epigrammatis amatorem*.<sup>41</sup> Thus we find this doctrine constantly repeated: erotic poetry, though its form may be personal, cannot be taken as an indication of the conduct of the writer. This does not mean that erotic poets were never in love, but it does mean that classical literary doctrine did not assume any specific and normal connection between personal poetry and the actual experience of the poet. The doctrine insisted upon the independence of the poet, and his right freely to choose fitting material wherever he might wish, provided only that it accorded with the kind of poetry he was writing. Doubtless there were always hunters of gossip who pretended that they could judge the deeds of a poet from his verse, but we have seen that the writers themselves explicitly rejected such interpretation.<sup>42</sup> When we are tempted to take the statements of a poet as indicating the actual facts of his life, despite the warnings of Catullus and those who followed him in the course of Roman literature, we have a fair warning in Apuleius' remark about his accusers—that they *tam dure et rustice legere ut odium moverent*.<sup>43</sup>

### III

The Roman elegists used personal terms of poetry written in a personal, or "subjective" manner. It was, however, the opinion of competent Roman critics

that such poetry must not be interpreted as autobiographical. Between Ovid and Propertius there are marked differences both in style and in the attitudes toward love which appear in their work. The two elegists are different kinds of lovers. Postgate saw in this difference between the poets primarily a difference between them as men: Propertius loved a real Cynthia, Ovid wrote love poetry to an imaginary Corinna. We have had to reject this explanation as unproved and incapable of proof. The classical conception of *fides* suggests that we restrict our attention to the elegists as poets, and concern ourselves with the effect of their style. The sincerity which we can look for in them is the kind of sincerity which lies in a consistency between the style of their poetry and the emotional condition their elegy depicts. The question we should ask is not "Did the elegists really feel this?" but rather "Is it reasonable that the lover whose character appears in the elegies should speak in this manner?"

This question is in fact raised in Prop. ii. 24. 1-2:

"Tu loqueris, cum sis" iam noto fabula libro  
Et tua sit toto 'Cynthia' lecta foro?"

The reference here is to the previous elegy, in which Propertius had assumed the role of a moralist in the tradition of the popular philosophers, and had sententiously declared that the man who will be free must not yield to love.<sup>44</sup> Elegies ii. 23 and 24 form a contrasting pair. In 23 Propertius steps out of character as the distraught lover, while in 24 he is recalled to his usual role. The two poems differ as markedly in style as they do in the point of view expressed, a fact which we may properly connect with the rhetorical doctrine that style should reveal the speaker's character. This point has not been noted by commentators, and it will be

necessary to consider the two elegies somewhat closely.

They are related in subject, since both deal with the idea that relations with common prostitutes are a lesser evil than entanglement with a married woman or a fashionable *meretrix*. The classical moralists constantly bring against the latter type of affair the criticism that it compels the lover to undergo loss of *libertas*, *res*, and *fama*. Lucretius, for example, in his arraignment of love, makes these three charges in lines which succeed each other like clauses in a judicial indictment:

Adde quod alterius sub nutu degitur aetas;  
Labitur interea res et Babylonica fiunt,  
Languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans.<sup>46</sup>

The lover surrenders to another the control of his life, his wealth is lost in the purchase of exotic luxuries, and by neglecting his responsibilities he loses the respect of other men. Elegies 23 and 24 are concerned with these dangers as they threaten a man who allows himself to fall in love with a *meretrix* (or perhaps a married woman) rather than satisfy himself with the *parabilem Venerem facilemque* recommended by Horace and Lucretius.<sup>47</sup> In 23 the danger to be avoided is loss of liberty, in 24 it is loss of reputation, and in both the waste of money involved is mentioned. These traditional themes are adapted by Propertius to elegiac treatment, but the manner in which he treats the conventional elements and the degree to which he gives personal form and intensity to traditional material vary widely in the two poems. In each case the style accords with the attitude assumed by the poet.

This is the text of ii. 23:

Cui fuit indocti fugienda haec semita vulgi,  
Ipsa petita lacu nunc mihi dulcis aqua  
est.

Ingenuus quisquam alterius dat munera  
servo,

Ut promissa suae verba ferat dominae,  
5 Et quaerit totiens: "quaenam nunc porticus illam

Integit?" et "campo quo movet illa  
pedes?"

Deinde, ubi pertuleris quos dicit fama labores

Herculis, ut scribat, "muneris eequid habes?"

Cernereve ut<sup>48</sup> possis vultum custodis amari,

10 Captus et immunda saepe latere casa,  
Quam care semel in toto nox vertitur anno!<sup>49</sup>

Ah pereant, si quos ianua clausa iuvat!

Contra reiecto quae libera vadit amictu

Custodum et nullo saepa timore, placet,

15 Cui saepe immundo Sacra conteritur Via  
socco,

Nec sinit esse moram, si quis adire velit;

Differet haec numquam nec poscet garrula,  
quod te

Astrictus ploret saepe dedisse pater,

Nec dicet: "timeo: propera iam surgere,  
quaeso;

20 Infelix, hodie vir mihi rure venit."

Et quas Euphrates et quas mihi misit  
Orontes,

Me iuverint: nolim furta pudica tori;

Libertas quoniam nulli iam restat amanti:

Nullus liber erit, si quis amare volet.

Here Propertius speaks from the point of view of accepted morality, and the conventional material of the elegy appears in an ordered, indeed a schematic form. It is treated in a general discussion formally enclosed in a frame of personal statement (vv. 1-2, 21-22) and is restated in a final sententious distich (vv. 23-24). The general discussion itself falls into two parallel sections presenting first the disadvantages of serving a mistress and then the advantages of patronizing girls of the street. Each of these sections contains ten lines, which balance each other distich for distich: a mistress is surrounded by servants

who must be flattered and bribed, while the approach to a prostitute is direct and unimpeded (vv. 3-4, 13-14); a mistress must be sought for, a prostitute is always at hand (vv. 5-6, 15-16); a mistress first demands every sacrifice and then her greed is insatiable, but a prostitute comes at call and her price is low (vv. 7-8; 17-18); the unpleasantness and danger involved in serving a mistress is absent from relations with a prostitute (vv. 9-10; 19-20). The first section closes with a rejection of the mistress (vv. 11-12), the second with a welcome to the prostitute (vv. 21-22). This ordered balance of arrangement and this subordination of immediate personal feeling to the clear rhetorical development of a conventional theme distinguish this elegy from those in the usual manner of Propertius, just as the attitude of superiority to passion is unusual in him.

A tone such as this in the elegies of Propertius was an obvious violation of consistency and artistic decorum. Who was Propertius that he should preach such doctrine? All Rome knew of his passion for Cynthia; by undertaking to express the precepts of accepted morality he made himself ridiculous. ii. 24 presents his sudden realization of the effect love has had on his reputation:

"Tu loqueris, cum sis iam noto fabula libro  
Et tua sit toto 'Cynthia' lecta foro?"  
Cui non his verbis aspergat tempora sudor?  
Aut pudor ingenuus, aut reticendus amor!  
Quod si tam facilis spiraret Cynthia nobis,  
Non ego nequitiae dicerer esse caput,  
Nec sic per totam infamis traducerer urbem:  
Urer et quamvis, nomine verba darem.  
Quare ne tibi sit mirum me quaerere viles:  
Parcius infamant; num tibi causa levis?  
Et modo pavonis caudae flabella superbae  
Et manibus dura frigus habere pila  
Et cupit iratum talos me poscere eburnos  
Quaeque nitent Sacra vilia dona Via.  
Ah peream si me ista movent dispendia; sed  
me  
Fallaci dominae iam pudet esse iocum.<sup>50</sup>

The elegy is a difficult one because the sequence of ideas is not controlled by a reasoned progression of argument, as in elegy 23. Instead, it reflects the sudden disturbance of the poet's mind caused by the realization that his character as the slave of love is firmly established in men's eyes. The initial question is presented as spoken by a reader of the previous elegy, who scoffs at such sentiments from Propertius. This criticism he immediately recognizes as justified; sweat breaks out on his forehead, revealing the shame with which he realizes his situation. His fault is that he has followed neither of the two permissible courses of action: "either decent restraint or a love affair on the quiet."<sup>51</sup> Shame quickly yields to a desire for self-justification, and the blame is laid on Cynthia. It is not a noble defense, but we should not look to an elegist for noble sentiments. If Cynthia were more kind he would not be called the type and pattern of folly, and be an object of shameful ridicule to the whole city. Though he burned with passion he would deceive men under cover of a good reputation.<sup>52</sup> Therefore he has turned to the cheap girls of the Sacred Way; they are a means of escape from his present disgrace. Another of Cynthia's faults is her habit of constantly demanding gifts. But in the closing lines these complaints are suddenly brushed away; the real cause of his unhappiness is the shame his faithless mistress causes him when she makes open sport of him. Thus the end of the elegy returns to the beginning, to the shame which love for Cynthia has brought upon him. Shame is now mingled with jealousy, since Cynthia is *fallax*, and it is doubtless before his successful rival that she holds Propertius up to public ridicule.<sup>53</sup> The situation of the poem is treated as a purely personal one. The maxim which Propertius states in v. 4 appears as a rule based simply on his own experience, rather than

on such general reflections as justified the maxim which concluded elegy 23. The complaints about Cynthia's extravagance in vv. 11-14 are entirely personal and specific, in contrast to the generalized *muneris ecquid habes?* of 23. 8. The lack of clear connection between v. 10 and v. 11 has led some editors to assume a lacuna at this point. It is possible that they may be right in doing so, but such sudden transitions reveal the distraught state of the lover's mind. Although more clearly marked grammatically, the emotional transitions at v. 5 and v. 15 are even more violent.

In this elegy, unlike the preceding one, the conventional elements are entirely subordinated to personal feeling. The elegy is not concerned with the faults of the typical mistress, but of Cynthia, a figure to whom Propertius has already given vivid life and being. The central point of both elegy 23 and elegy 24 is a general statement, but there is a difference: in one case the general statement is presented as a conclusion reached by ordered argument and a reasoned balancing of facts drawn from common experience, while in the other it is offered as a course of personal conduct, the propriety of which has been learned by the poet from the facts of his own immediate situation. In contrast with 23, 24 seems spontaneous and directly inspired by personal feeling and experience, although it is actually no less conventional in the ideas it contains and no less influenced by the traditional material of erotic commonplace. A dramatic vividness results both from the introduction of another speaker in the opening lines and from the successive changes in the mood of the poet as his defense proceeds. The arguments seem to arise immediately from the situation rather than to follow a pre-determined course. In 23 reason is in control and the style is clear and evidently

disciplined to present reasoned argument, while in 24 the poet has surrendered to his situation and reveals his distracted condition of mind. In each of these elegies, if considered in isolation, *fides* is maintained, since the style is proper to the sentiments expressed. But, because of its departure from the usual character of the Propertian lover, 23 seems insincere. It is recognition of this apparent insincerity which provides the theme of the following elegy.

In Ovid's *Amores*, which are so frequently accused of insincerity, we find a style similar to that of Propertius, ii. 23. It is both more lucid and less passionate than the usual style of Propertius. Greater clarity of language, more orderly progression of ideas, and smoother verse structure combine to suggest a lover who is more in control of his emotion than Propertius. Ovid seems less concerned to present the impact of love upon an individual than to reveal its typical working; he treats conventional elements in such a way that their general truth will be established. The lover who appears in the elegies of Ovid differs from the normal Propertian lover primarily in that he is more in control of his own attitude toward love. The attitude that we find in Propertius is actually more conventional and more firmly established in literary tradition than that of Ovid. Propertius writes entirely within the psychological theory that love is the most ungovernable of passions, a state of the soul in which it is completely impervious to reason. Professor Fränkel has pointed out how much more complex than this is Ovid's presentation of the nature of love, and describes Ovid as "proposing that it was love which gave man a feeling soul in addition to his body, and that it was sexual love which taught him to know and understand and like his fellow human beings, so that he would build up a society."<sup>54</sup> Love itself, if it



is to be this civilizing force, must be subject to control; so we find in the *Amores* the constant suggestion that passion, although it can and should not be denied, must in some manner be mastered and placed under restraint by the lover. This may require that he deceive himself or beg his mistress to hide from him her infidelities, but it is a deliberate and necessary kind of deceit. This is a complex and new interpretation of love, for which the style of Propertius would be altogether unsuitable, but which finds effective form in the sure and controlled style of Ovid. In it convention can be presented so nakedly because the attitude expressed is so unconventional.

The particular function of Roman love elegy was to give personal form to typical experience, as both Propertius and Ovid themselves declared.<sup>55</sup> Their elegies tell of their experience in love, but they are also an anatomy of love; in the poet's experience every lover can recognize the pattern of his own love. It is true that Roman love elegy is "subjective"; in it the poet writes as one declaring what he himself has felt and thought and done. But of the peculiar circumstances and the facts of purely private significance he tells us almost nothing. He writes only of that which he knows will be interesting to others because it is part of common experience. To modern taste the individual style of Propertius appeals as giving proof of sincere and genuine feeling. The modern reader has been trained to find in the particular, in the individual and the unique, an intrinsic importance and value. He seeks in the work of a poet those features of the poet's experience which are his unique and personal possession. The presence of conventional and generalizing elements appears as a sign of insincerity, a flaw which may sometimes be excused but can scarcely ever be admired. It seems to him a para-

dox that all the Roman elegiac poets had the same experiences, though each wrote of his own experience. Yet the ancient reader expected this conformity of individual with general experience. When the elegist took for his material traditional commonplaces of erotic literature, he did so because those commonplaces were the repository of a practised attitude toward love and because through them the poet established a community of experience with his readers.

The excellence which we are accustomed to find in Propertius lies in such lively personal realization of convention as we find in ii. 24 rather than in ii. 23. The characteristic effect of his poetry is one of personal immediacy. The violence of language which results from the density of particular detail in his verse and the abruptness of the transitions which accompany the swift changes in his mood are the means by which he achieved this effect. (They are also the source of his difficulty, which therefore arises from the same source as his excellence.) They create an impression of passionate feeling, but we should not forget that this impression is a product of Propertius' style and that, as we have seen, he could also write in a different style. If sincerity is considered a function of style, both Propertius and Ovid, writing in their characteristic manners, are sincere because each employs a style which accords with the character his elegies portray. When we regard the elegists in this way we have a more firm, if perhaps narrower, approach to understanding them than when we attempt to find in the elegies a reflection of the real character and experience of their authors. We may still prefer Tibullus or Propertius to Ovid, as Quintilian did, but we shall be able to do so in terms pertinent to poetic style rather than in terms of uncertain inferences drawn from style.

## NOTES

1. Quint. x. 1. 93.
2. J. P. Postgate, *Select Elegies of Propertius* (London, 1881 and frequently reprinted), p. lxxix.
3. Quint. vi. 2. 19.
4. Cf. Cat. xxxv. 1, *poetae tenero* and the note of Kroll (*C. Valerius Catullus*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1923) *ad loc.*: "tener wird oft von Liebesdichtern gebraucht (Ovid. *Rem.* 757 u. ö.), ist aber nicht auf sie beschränkt und kann alle nach Feinheit der Technik strebenden Dichter, also namentlich auch Angehörige des neo-terischen Kreises bezeichnen." E. Reitzenstein, "Zur Stiltheorie des Kallimachos," *Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1931), pp. 23-69, shows that *tener* is a Latin equivalent of *hērēs*, which characterized the style of Callimachus.
5. This is one aspect of the wider problem of the intrusion of purely historical interests into classical literary studies, which has been discussed by H. Cherniss, "The Biographical Fashion in Literary Criticism," *Univ. of California Pub. in Class. Philol.*, XII (1943), 279-91.
6. A.-M. Guillemin, *Pline et la vie littéraire de son temps*, "Coill. d'Ét. Lat.," IV (Paris, 1929), pp. 61-62, discusses the effect of introducing modern psychological ideas into the study of ancient authors: "Il semble, à première vue, qu'elle (sc. la critique littéraire antique) ait été vide et pauvre. Elle ignore de l'œuvre d'art les aspects que nous trouvons les plus intéressants. D'abord la personnalité de l'auteur. On connaissait la psychologie du Romain; celle de l'homme en général, peu; celle de l'individu, pas du tout. Il est vrai que l'individu n'existait guère, ou, ce qui revient au même, ne se montrait guère. En nous mettant à sa recherche, nous autres modernes, nous avons multiplié les contresens, accrochant nos tendances récemment écloses à des expressions déformées ou à des phrases comprises à rebours." The difference between the ancient and modern ideas of sincerity seems to be connected with this changed psychological interest; ancient criticism tended to regard the finished work of art as the complete subject of critical concern, while modern criticism tends to regard the work of art genetically, as a creative process. In the one case the work of art is a final and sufficient object of study; in the other case the work of art is only a partial expression of the artist's experience, and the nature of this original experience becomes an object of interest to criticism.
7. J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London, 1931), pp. 129-33; 536-40, discusses the classical view of the relation between style and sincerity in a manner colored by his own conviction that the modern point of view alone is valid. In discussing *decorum* he complains of the narrowness he finds in the classical attitude: "The question might be raised how far the Ancients took into account individuality in style in our modern sense; how far they recognized a style that was the direct outcome of an author's peculiar habits of thought and mental outlook. They, of course, took into account certain superficial idiosyncrasies which quickly betray a writer. But the real problem goes deeper, and is concerned with the style that can be regarded as a faithful reflex of a man's distinctive intellectual and emotional life" (*op. cit.*, p. 537). D'Alton apparently assumes that "the real problem" concerns "style in our modern sense," an assumption of doubtful value when it leads us to look in ancient works of literature for characteristics which they were not designed or expected to contain.
8. So, for example in Cic. *Or.* lxii. 209 (where Cicero is speaking of excessive use of a periodic style): "al enim semper utare, cum satietatem affert tum quale sit etiam ab imperitis agnoscitur; detrahit praeterea actionis dolorem, aufert humanum sensum auditoris, tollit funditus veritatem et fidem." Professor H. M. Hubbell translates this in the Loeb edition: "If you use it constantly, it not only wearies the audience, but even the layman recognizes the nature of the trick; furthermore, it takes the feeling out of the delivery, it robs the audience of their natural sympathy, and utterly destroys the impression of sincerity."
9. R. Heinze, "Fides," *Hermes*, LXIV (1929), 140 ff, reprinted in *Vom Geist des Römertums* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1938), pp. 25-58.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
11. Quint. vi. 2. 18: "quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator, si fieri potest, approbare, utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur, sic proderit plurimum causis quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem, nam qui, cum dicit, malus videtur, utique male dicit."
12. *Op. cit.*, vi. 2. 13: "summa virtus ea est, ut fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur utque mores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodam modo agnoscantur."
13. *Op. cit.*, ix. 3. 102: "ubi vero atrocitate, invidia, miseratione pugnandum est, quis ferat contrapositis et pariter cadentibus et consimilibus irascentem, fientem, rogantem? cum nimia in his rebus cura verborum deroget affectibus fidem, et ubicumque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videatur"; cf. also ix. 4. 143.
14. *Op. cit.*, iv. 2. 119: "[iudex] nescio quomodo etiam credit facilius quae audienti iucunda sunt, et voluptate ad fidem ducitur." Cf. also v. 14. 35: "quoque quid est natura magis asperum, hoc pluribus condendum est voluptatibus; et minus suspecta argumentatio dissimulatione, et multum ad fidem adiuvat audientis voluptas." Here it is interesting that *dissimulatio* is recommended as a means of achieving *fides*.
15. Hence the importance of the doctrine of *decorum* throughout ancient literary criticism, since, as Aristotle states, it is appropriate style that produces conviction: "πρῶτοι δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οὐσία λέγειν παρανοήστες γὰρ ἢ ψυχῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντες, οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ὁστ' αἰστανται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὐτως ἔχει, ὡς δὲ λέγουσιν, τὰ πράγματα οὐτως ἔχειν." (*Rhet.* iii. 7. 4).
16. R. Wellek and A. Warren, *Theory of Literature*, New York, 1949, p. 215. Wellek and Warren themselves doubt the value of sincerity, thus defined, as a criterion of literature, and state further that "the frequently adduced criterion of 'sincerity' is thoroughly false if it judges literature in terms of biographical truthfulness, correspondence to the author's experience or feelings as they are attested by outside evidence." (*op. cit.*, p. 74).



17. *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur*, II<sup>4</sup> (Munich, 1935), 212-13.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

19. H. E. Butler and E. A. Barber, *The Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford, 1933), p. xi. A similar concern with the truth of the story appears in J. Fontenrose, "Propertius and the Roman Career," *Univ. of California Pub. Class. Philol.*, XIII (1949), 371-88. In discussing the relations of Propertius and Cynthia, Fontenrose writes (p. 381): "To me Propertius appears to be telling the truth in his protestations, throughout his first book, of exclusive attachment to Cynthia." The remark which immediately follows indicates, however, the difficulty of holding consistently to this point of view: "But even if he is not completely truthful, the point that I make is not affected: namely that he is not likely in his prologue to give away the case that he makes throughout his book." This is a decisive argument in support of Fontenrose's point (that *nullo vivere consilio* in Prop. I. 1. 6 cannot be a confession of sexual promiscuity), but it substitutes a standard of artistic consistency for one of biographical accuracy.

20. Quotations of Propertius are from the Teubner text of Hosius (3d ed.; Leipzig, 1932) except as noted.

21. *Sez. Aurel. Propertius Varietate Lectionis et Perpetua Adnotatione Illustratus*, Leipzig, 1777, pp. lxxviii-lxxxviii.

22. K. Lachmann, *Sez. Aurelii Propertii Carmina*, Leipzig, 1816, pp. xxiii-xxvii.

23. *Op. cit.*, p. xxv: "sane libri primi prooemio amori valedecibat."

24. I have discussed the interpretation of this elegy in "Elegy and the Classical Attitude toward Love: Propertius I, 1," *Yale Classical Studies*, Vol. XI.

25. This suggestion is dubious though not absolutely impossible. The four books of Propertius were published in chronological sequence. This is clear both from the gradual development of style from one book to another, and from the incidental references to contemporary events which serve approximately to date the various books. (Cf. Butler and Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. xii-xvii, xxv-xxviii, lxii-lxvi.) It is possible that an occasional elegy was rejected by Propertius in publishing an earlier book and included in a later, but it would be a malign coincidence which caused the elegy which contains the most precise chronological statement to appear so far out of its proper chronological order. The technique of iii. 15 is, moreover, that of Book iii rather than of Book i.

26. T. Birt, "Die Fünfzahl und die Properzchronologie," *Rh. M.*, LXX (1915), 253-314.

27. H. F. Butler and E. A. Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. xx-xiii. The account of Propertius' life given by P. J. Enk in his recent edition of Book i of Propertius (*Sez. Propertii Elegiarum Liber I*, Vol. I [Leyden, 1946], 3-16) does not differ materially either in method or conclusions from that of Butler and Barber.

28. *Op. cit.*, pp. 259-60.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

30. Butler and Barber, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. xxii-xxiii.

32. *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

33. "It is unlikely to indicate with any precision the interval between the publication of Bk. I and the commencement of Bk. II" (*op. cit.*, p. 195).

34. "Perhaps the seventh month from the publication of Book I. But there can be no certainty" (*op. cit.*, p. 225).

35. Some critics therefore insist that Cynthia was a married woman, e.g. F. Plessis, *La Poésie Latine* (Paris, 1909), p. 385: "Cynthia n'était ni une courtisane, ne une affranchie, mais une femme mariée"; while others declare that she was a courtesan, e.g. P. J. Enk, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

36. Propertius' subordination of interest in the particulars of biographical fact to his interest in revealing the precise qualities of emotional experience has been discussed by E. Reitzenstein, "Wirklichkeitsbild und Gefühlsentwicklung bei Propertius," *Philologus*, Suppl. XXIX, Heft II (Leipzig, 1931). Reitzenstein points out that the same indifference toward external *Wirklichkeit* which can be seen in the "subjective" elegies is also evident in the epistle of Aethusa to Lycotas (Prop. iv. 3), and emphasizes that Propertius' work can only be judged fairly when this feature of his style is recognized (*ibid.*, p. 17).

37. Cf. xi. 15. 13: *Mores non habet hic meos libellus*.

38. Plin. *Ep.* iv. 14. 2-5.

39. Plin. *Ep.* v. 3.

40. App. *Apol.* 11.

41. Aus. *Cento Nuptialis*.

42. Quintilian (*Inst. Or.* x. i. 100) says of the comic poet Afranius: *utinam non inquinasset argumenta puerorum foedis amoribus, mores suos fassus*. It may be that this is an example of the kind of criticism against which poets objected. It is also possible that the fact about Afranius was known to Quintilian from a source external to his works. Afranius appears to have departed from the accepted convention of comedy by his emphasis on homosexual love. Perhaps critics were accustomed to explain his departure from the normally heterosexual erotic themes of comedy by reference to a known fact about the writer. This would of course not be the same as inferring the character of the writer from his works. It should be noted that Quintilian, in his comment on Tibullus, makes no reference to the Marathus elegies.

43. App. *Apol.* 9.

44. *sic*, a variant reading in P, is a Renaissance correction of *sit*. If *sit* were to be retained in v. 1 its repetition in v. 2 would be otiose. The point of the (rhetorical) question is not that Cynthia is notorious (cf. Rothstein, *ad loc.*, "Cynthia ist Subjekt zu *fabula sit* und zu *lecta sit*"), but that Propertius himself is; a verb in the second person is therefore required. For the idea, Rothstein rightly compares Hor. *Epod.* xi. 7-8: *Heu me per urbem, nam pudet tanti mali, Fabula quanta fui!*

45. Prop. ii. 23. 23-24:

*Libertas quoniam nulli iam restat amanti,  
Nullus liber erit si quis amare voleat.*

46. Lucr. iv. 1122-24. Horace emphasizes loss of *res* and *fama* in *Sat.* i. 2, and in *Sat.* ii. 7 he ridicules the slavery of the lover. The Roman elegists themselves particularly developed the theme of loss of *libertas* as a consequence of love, as has been shown by F. O.

Copley, "Servitium amoris in the Roman Elegists," *TAPA*, LXXVIII (1947), 285-300.

47. Hor. *Sat.* i. 2. 119; Lucr. iv. 1071. In ii. 23, Propertius assumes the same attitude as Horace and Lucretius. The resemblance of ii. 23 to *Sat.* i. 2 is so close that Propertian imitation of the satire was suggested by P. Lejay, *Q. Horati Flacci Satirae* (Paris, 1911), p. 34, and has recently been argued by L. Alfonsi, "Note Properziane," *Aevum*, XIX (1945), 367. This is not, however, a necessary assumption. There are no certain verbal reminiscences of the satire in the elegy, and there is nothing common to the two poems that cannot be paralleled elsewhere. The sources of *Sat.* i. 2 have been studied by G. C. Fiske, "Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation," *Univ. of Wisconsin Stud. in Lang. and Lit.*, No. 7 (Madison, 1920), 248-74. The similarity between Propertius and Horace is adequately explained as resulting from their writing within a common social tradition and drawing upon a common store of literary material, each adapting this material to his own kind of poetry.

48. The MSS read *cernere uti*. Their reading has been accepted by editors; but the asyndeton between *ut scribat* (v. 8) and *uti possis* is harsh and without point. The correction which I have proposed assumes that *cernere ut* was corrupted to *cernere ut, eueu* having been reduced by haplography to *eu*; the later change of *ut* to *uti* obscured the corruption by correcting the meter.

49. I have departed from Hosius' punctuation in vv. 6-11 and followed essentially the punctuation of Rothstein. Hosius places commas after vv. 6 and 8, and a question mark (presumably a full stop) after v. 10. This punctuation obscures the syntax of the passage. The question which begins in v. 3 ends with v. 6. In v. 7—with *deinde* and the shift to the second person—there begins a new sentence which extends through v. 11. The exclamatory v. 11 provides the main clause of the sentence beginning with *deinde*.

50. The MSS do not begin a new elegy after v. 16, but editors generally do so. Professor Godolphin has argued that no division should be made after v. 16 (*AJP*, LV [1934], 64-65); but the MSS are an uncertain guide in this matter, and vv. 17-52 have no connection with the loss of *fama*, the theme of vv. 1-16. F. Jacoby, "Drei Gedichte des Properz," *Rh. M.*, LXIX (1914), 427-42, has shown reason both for making a separation after v. 16 and for rejecting

Rothstein's joining of elegy 24, 1-16 to elegy 23. Cf. also W. Abel, *Die Anredeformen bei den römischen Elegikern* (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1930), pp. 44-46.

51. Rothstein, *Die Elegien des Sektus Propertius* (Berlin, 1920), *ad loc.*, connects *ingenuus* and *amor* ("Ingenuus amor ist die Liebe zu einer freigebohrenen Frau. . . Es gibt eine Art zu lieben, in der man sich nicht als Sklave zu fühlen, die man deshalb auch nicht zu verheimlichen braucht"), but this connection is highly artificial, while *pudor ingenuus* and *reticendus amor* form natural units both in sense and in the metrical structure of the verse. Abel (*op. cit.*, p. 45, n. 52) explains *pudor ingenuus* as "das Verhältnis zu Cynthia" and *amor* as "das Sinnliche betonende Liebe zur Dirne." This reverses the actual meanings. *Pudor ingenuus* did not forbid discreet relations with common prostitutes, while *amor*, as pointed out by B. O. Foster, *CP*, II (1907), 215, refers to "liaisons with demi-mondaines, such as Cynthia, and [is] not regarded by Propertius as applicable to chance intercourse with women of a yet lower stratum, like the daughters of Euphrates and Orontes."

52. *nomine* (v. 8), in the sense "good fame" or "reputation" (cf. Prop. i. 20. 5 and ii. 20. 19) provides admirable sense and there is no need to consider emendation.

53. Cf. ii. 9. 19-22:

At tu non una potuisti nocte vacare,  
Impia, non unum sola manere diem.  
Quin etiam multo duxistis pocula risu;  
Foris et de me verba fuere mala.

54. Hermann Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), p. 62.

55. Prop. i. 7. 13-14; 21-24:

Me legat assidue post haec neglectus amator,  
Et prosint illi cognita nostra mala. . .  
Tum me non humilem mirabere saepe poetam  
Tunc ego Romanis praeferar ingenilis;  
Nec poterunt iuvenes nostro reticere sepulcro:  
"Ardoris nostri magne poeta laces."

Ovid, *Am.* ii. 1. 5-10:

Me legat in sponsi facie non frigida virgo  
Et rudis ignoto tactus amore puer.  
Atque aliquis iuvenum quo nunc ego saucius arcu  
Agnoscat flammae conscia signa suae,  
Miratusque diu "Quo" dicat "ab indice doctus  
Composuit casus iste poeta meos?"

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## ALEXANDER THE GREAT OR ANTIPHON THE SOPHIST?

PHILIP MERLAN

IN HIS most recent publication Tarn repeats his assertion that Alexander the Great was the first to enounce, in theory, not only by implication through deeds, the principle of the brotherhood of man and the unity of mankind.<sup>1</sup> It is the purpose of this paper to disprove this assertion, together with some other statements, incidental to it. I begin with the latter, which all refer to ideas of Zeno the Stoic.

### I

a) In *De Alex. virt.* i. 6. 329A-B (cf. *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed. Arnim, Vol. I, Frag. 262) Plutarch says that the theory of a world-wide state (a cosmopolis) was enounced by Zeno in his greatly admired *Politeia* (a work belonging to Zeno's first, Cynical phase) and that Alexander the Great supplied the deed to Zeno's word. Tarn sets out to prove that Plutarch could not have meant this particular *Politeia*. His proof is based on two main arguments.

1. Plutarch refers to the *Politeia* as "greatly admired." But the *Politeia*, because of its shocking content (defense of cannibalism, promiscuity, incest, etc.)<sup>2</sup> had excited such an animadversion that Plutarch could not have meant this *Politeia* when he spoke of a book "greatly admired" (Tarn, *Al. the Gr.*, II, 419).

It is difficult to understand Tarn. Does he not confuse the concepts "repute" and "good repute"? Does he not judge by Victorian standards what a Greek could or could not have admired? The reference of Plutarch is precise enough; Tarn's argument hardly outweighs this precision.

But, what is more, it seems that Tarn

misses the point. Why does Plutarch refer to Zeno's *Politeia* as "greatly admired"? Only to say: If Zeno's *Politeia*, which was, after all, only a dream and an image, is so greatly admired, how great should be the admiration for Alexander the doer? In other words, to make his point, Plutarch must present Zeno's *Politeia* as being very famous, and it would be unfair indeed to ask him whether he really thought that it deserved its fame.

Thus there is no reason to change our opinion as to the content of Zeno's *Politeia*. Plutarch's excellent summary stands unimpeached.

2. The *Politeia* as quoted by Plutarch advocated a cosmopolis. But, according to Tarn, we know from another passage in Plutarch, namely, *Lycurgus* 31, that the basis of Zeno's *Politeia* was Lycurgus' Sparta, a small community, not at all a world-state; thus the *Politeia* could not have advocated a world-state (Tarn, *Al. the Gr.*, II, 418; cf. "Alexander, Cynics, and Stoics," *AJP*, XL [1939], 44 and 62 f.)

However, when we look up the *Lycurgus* passage, we find that Plutarch does not say at all what Tarn (perhaps misled by Arnim in *St. vet. fr.*, I, 261 and 263) makes him say. He rather says: Lycurgus was of the opinion that happiness in both the single man and the state depends on *arete* and *homonoia*; he therefore wanted his citizens to be nonbanausic, self-sufficient, and self-possessed. And now Plutarch continues:

ταύτην καὶ Πλάτων ἔλαβε τῆς πολιτείας  
ὑπόθεσιν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ πάντες  
δοσοι τι περὶ τούτων ἐπιχειρήσαντες εἰπεῖν

ἐπαινοῦνται, γράμματα καὶ λόγους ἀπολιπόν-  
τες μόνον. δὲ οὐ γράμματα καὶ λόγους ἀλλ'  
ἐργῶ πολιτείαν ἀμίμητον εἰς φῶς ἐξεργάμε-  
νος . . . εἰκότως ὑπερῆρε τῇ δόξῃ τοὺς πώποτε  
πολιτευσαμένους ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι. (Cl. Lind-  
skog and K. Ziegler, Vol. III, Part 2  
[1926], p. 52. 1-16).

In other words, Plutarch says: This basic assumption regarding the state, namely, that its happiness will depend on ἀρετὴ and ὁμόνοια of its citizens (this is the ὑπόθεσις τῆς πολιτείας) was adopted also by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, and all other famous theorists of constitutions (the πολιτευσάμενοι). He does not mention Zeno's (or anybody else's) *Politeia*; he does not say that Sparta was Zeno's (or anybody else's) model or basis; he does not use the word "politeia" to designate the title of a book by Zeno (or anybody else). Tarn misinterpreted the whole passage completely.<sup>3</sup>

It is worth while to notice that Tarn contradicts even himself. If Sparta was the basis for Zeno's *Politeia*, how can Tarn explain that in it Zeno defended (or advocated) promiscuity? In Lycurgus' Sparta the institution of marriage was highly respected.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, if Sparta was anything like Zeno's *Politeia*, how could Plutarch praise Lycurgus for having done in practice what the *Politeia* advocated in theory? If Tarn finds it impossible that Plutarch could have referred to the *Politeia* as "greatly admired," how can he find it possible that Plutarch praised a state and a statesman who inspired the *Politeia*?

Thus, also, the second proof of Tarn breaks down. Sparta was not the model of Zeno's *Politeia*.<sup>5</sup>

Now, as we saw, Plutarch says that, by having done what the theorists had merely advocated in words, Lycurgus deservedly achieved a greater fame than they. This leads us to another assertion of Tarn.

b) In *De Alex. virt.* Plutarch says that

Zeno's was the word, Alexander's the deed. Tarn finds it difficult to explain what Plutarch meant when he referred to Zeno's ideas as *logos* (Tarn, *Al. the Gr.*, II, 421, 423). It is not easy to see where the difficulty is. Here, as so frequently, the formula λόγῳ-ἐργῶ stands for what we express by opposing (mere) theory to practice.<sup>6</sup> The passage from *Lycurgus* quoted above shows that it is Plutarch's formula used by him also to describe the relation between Lycurgus, the statesman, and (mere) philosophers like Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, etc. Nobody can misunderstand it; therefore, nobody should find it difficult when applied by Plutarch to the relation between the (mere) philosopher Zeno and Alexander the Great.

c) Tarn tried to prove that Zeno, Frag. I, 262 Arn. does not belong to his *Politeia*. He tries to prove the same for Frag. I, 270 Arn. (Tarn, *Al. the Gr.*, II, 419 f.). His argument is: In Frag. 270 Zeno says that the wise will marry. In Frag. 269, however, Zeno advocates promiscuity. Thus the two fragments contradict each other, and, as we do know that in the *Politeia* Zeno advocated promiscuity, Frag. 270 must belong to a later phase of Zeno's philosophy and to another work.

As Frag. 270 is quoted by Diogenes Laertius vii. 121 explicitly as being from Zeno's *Politeia*, Tarn's theory does not seem convincing. Is there no other way to explain the seeming contradiction? Indeed there is. We find it in Frag. III, 611 Arn., assigned by Arnim tentatively to Chrysippus<sup>7</sup> but which we now find in Festa's collection as Zeno's Frag. II, 28.<sup>8</sup> Once more we find repeated that the wise will marry, only we find this assertion preceded by the word συγκαταβαίνειν.<sup>9</sup> Thus what Zeno said was obviously that the wise man who lives in a conventional society will *con-descend* to certain of its standards. This could have been said in the *Politeia*. There is no difficulty in assuming that Zeno

criticized existing institutions as unnatural and described what would be the ideal condition of society, while at the same time giving advice to the wise concerning how to live under actually prevailing conditions. After all, Zeno is the founder of a school which found it possible to reconcile its rigorism with the more latitudinarian demands of actual life, a school which added to the concepts of "good," "evil," and "indifferent" the concepts *προηγμένον* and *ἀποπροηγμένον*, thus making possible decisions in the field of matters indifferent. It is quite possible that there were some seeds of this ambivalent attitude even in Zeno's *Politeia*. This seems easier to assume than to blame Diogenes Laertius for having quoted a passage belonging to another book as being from Zeno's *Politeia*. It is certainly strange to see Tarn assuming precisely the same mistake in Plutarch and in Diogenes Laertius.

Tarn's reasoning is partly based on, and partly leads him to, the assumption that there was a great difference between the early and the later Zeno. According to Tarn, the early Zeno must have been much closer to the Cynics than the later. But it seems that Tarn underrates the cynicism of the later Stoa in general and therefore also Zeno's later cynicism. Zeller's discussion of this problem (III, 1<sup>5</sup> [1923], 286-92) shows convincingly that even the later Stoics did not give up any of the most shocking doctrines of cynicism. While a certain development toward greater respectability might have taken place in Zeno after he wrote his *Politeia*, the change should not be exaggerated.<sup>10</sup>

To sum up, none of Tarn's reassignments of Zeno's fragments and none of his interpretations of Zeno are tenable.

## II

But all these are only minor points. We now come to Tarn's most startling assertion: that Alexander the Great was the

first to proclaim the brotherhood of man and the unity of mankind. The answer to this assertion is as follows:

There is direct and unmistakable testimony proving that this idea,<sup>11</sup> the idea of the equality of all men, Greeks and barbarians alike, was proclaimed a century before Alexander the Great.<sup>12</sup> This testimony is provided by a passage from *Truth* by Antiphon, the Sophist, a passage first published as part of *P. Oxy.*, 1364 (B. F. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XI [1915], 99 f., No. 1364, ll. 266-99) and which can now be read as Antiphon, Frag. 44B Diels.<sup>13</sup>

The fragment reads as follows:

### FRAGMENT B

COL. 1 (232-66 H.)

35 [τοὺς ἐκ καλῶν πατέ-]

COL. 2 (266-99 H.)

ρων ἐπ[αιδοῦ-  
μεθά τε κ[αὶ σεβόμεθα,  
τοὺς δὲ [ἐκ μὴ κα-  
λοῦ οἰκ[ου ὄντας

5 οὔτε ἐπ[αιδοῦμε-  
θα οὔτε σεβόμε[εθα.

ἐν τούτω[ι δὲ  
πρὸς ἀλλή[λους  
βεβαρβαρώ[με-

10 θα, ἐπεὶ φύσει  
πάντα πάντ[ες  
ὁμοίως πεφύκ[α-  
μεν καὶ βάρβα-  
ροι καὶ Ἕλλην[ες

15 εἶναι. σκοπεῖν

δὲ παρέχει τὰ  
τῶν φύσει [ὄντων  
ἀναγκαί[ων  
πᾶσιν ἀν[θρώ-

20 ποῖς· π[ορίσαι  
τε κατ[ὰ ταῦτα  
δυνα[τὰ πᾶσι,  
καὶ ἐν [πᾶσι τού-  
τοις οὔτε β[άρβα-



- 25 *pos áφώρισ[ται*  
 {δ} ἡμῶν ρ[ύδεις  
 οὔτε "Ελλην [·] ἀ-  
*ναπνέομέν*  
*τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἀ-*
- 30 *έρ[α] ἅπαντες*  
*κατὰ τὸ στόμ[α*  
*κ]αὶ κατ[ὰ] τὰς δι-*  
*νας κ[αὶ ἐσθιο-*  
*με]ν χ[ερσὶν ἀ-*
- 35 [*παντες ? . . .*]<sup>14</sup>

What Antiphon says clearly is: It is the sign of ignorance or a dullard<sup>15</sup> to base social distinction on one's being or not being well-born. For, we all, Greeks and barbarians alike, by nature have the same nature in every respect (*ὁμοίως πεφύκαμεν εἶναι*). This can be seen from the fact (*σκοπεῖν παρέχει*) that the natural necessities (breathing, eating) are the same for all men and can be provided for by all men in the same way (we all breathe by mouth and nose and eat with our hands) and in none of these respects (i.e., neither as to our needs nor as to our ways of satisfying them) is there a difference between Greek and barbarian.

I think the passage is clear enough.<sup>16</sup> However, Tarn interprets it in a peculiar way. According to him, all that Antiphon tried to prove in it was that all men belong to the same physical species. But, says Tarn, "to say that all men belong physically to the same species *Homo sapiens* is not to say that they are brothers."<sup>17</sup>

How is it possible to interpret the fragment in this way? Tarn manages it by not mentioning the introductory clause (that there is no reason to base social distinction on birth)<sup>18</sup> and by omitting from his interpretation the Greek words from *σκοπεῖν* to "Ελλην (with the additional result that he has to deal with the juxtaposition "Greek and barbarian alike" only once), thus creating the impression that Antiphon

speaks of the physical similarity of all men for its own sake, while actually Antiphon does it only to prove by it (*σκοπεῖν παρέχει*) the all-inclusive human equality.

In short, the Antiphon fragment anticipates the slogan "fraternity, equality." If Tarn refuses to see this, one is left wondering: What more should a Greek of the fifth century have written to convince Tarn that he was professing the principle of the unity of mankind?

One aspect of Antiphon's doctrine deserves particular attention from the historian of ideas. In Antiphon the conviction of the equality of man has an entirely secular and naturalistic character. If he was the first to hold or to express it, we shall have to say: the idea of brotherhood of man originated without the idea of the fatherhood of God as its counterpart. It originated as a nonreligious idea, as a protest against prejudice in the name of nature—this nature being conceived, as far as we can see, without any divine quality.<sup>19</sup> The equality of biological functions is the all-important factor in interhuman relations. It is obvious that a correct interpretation of the Antiphon fragment is of great interest.<sup>20</sup>

### III

Once we appreciate fully the Antiphon fragment, other well-known passages related to our problem can be interpreted with greater confidence. The most famous of these passages is probably the one by Alkidamas:<sup>21</sup> all were sent into being by God as free men, no one was created by nature as a slave (Baier-Sauppe, *Or. Att.*, II, 154). With the sound of the Antiphon fragment in one's ears it will be difficult to accept Tarn's dictum that, when a Greek before Alexander talked of all men, he meant all Greeks, while the barbarian did not count (Tarn, *Al. the Gr.*, II, 401). It cannot be ruled out that Alkidamas meant only Greeks, but it certainly is not sure.

And even the discussion of the slavery topic in Aristotle's *Politics*<sup>22</sup> appears in a somewhat different light. The whole of chapters 5 and 6 of *Politics* i is one criticism of the assertion found in chapter 3: only by convention is one man a slave, another free; by nature (i.e., actually) there is no difference between them (A 3. 1253b. 21-22). This criticism Aristotle brings to a conclusion by saying: The difference of opinion as to whether freedom and slavery (identified frequently with the concepts "Greek" and "barbarian") are natural institutions is justified to this extent: it cannot be said that all men who (actually) are free are so by nature or that all men who (actually) are slaves are so by nature (A 6. 1255b. 4-5). In other words, Aristotle admits that conventional and natural slavery or freedom do not coincide. Aristotle still insists, however, that there is such a thing as natural slavery. This, in Aristotle, may well mean: All barbarians and some Greeks are slaves by nature. But nothing prevents us from assuming that the author referred to by Aristotle in chapter 3 meant: Nobody, neither Greek nor barbarian, is a slave by

nature.<sup>23</sup> In other words, it may well be that, when Aristotle wrote his *Politics*, ideas similar to those of Antiphon were still alive.

I should not like to leave the reader with the impression that Antiphon was a bold innovator.<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, he obviously presents only one component of the *physis-nomos* discussion so characteristic of the fifth century. It would have been strange if nobody had applied this pair of opposites to the problems free-slave and Greek-barbarian, to come to Antiphon's conclusions. Herodotus is hardly a revolutionary spirit; but in the famous story concerning the different ways in which Greeks and barbarians dispose of the corpses of their ancestors (iii. 38) Herodotus obviously implies that the difference of mores between Greeks and barbarians is only a matter of convention. How far is it from here to the assertion that all differences between them are so?<sup>25</sup>

But, innovator or only a representative of his age, long before Alexander the Great thought of it or did anything about it, Antiphon the Sophist had proclaimed that all men, Greeks and barbarians, are alike in every respect.

## NOTES

1. W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* (2 vols., 1948); "Brotherhood and Unity," II, 399-449. Previous publications: W. W. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XIX (1933), 123-66, and "Alexander, Cynics, and Stoics," *AJP*, LX (1939), 41-70, the latter being an answer to M. H. Fisch, "Alexander and the Stoics," *AJP*, LVIII (1937), 59-82, 129-51.

2. On the possible meaning of this "defense" cf. D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (1937), p. 108, n. 1.

3. This has already been said by Fisch, *op. cit.*, p. 69, but obviously not incisively enough. As a result, Tarn did not react to this criticism of Fisch.

4. By Plutarch's own standards, that is: *Lycurgus* 15. They did certainly differ from ours; cf., e.g., W. Erdmann, *Die Ehe im alten Griechenland* (1934), pp. 102, 298, but see also E. Kessler, *Plutarch's Leben des Lykurgos* (1910), pp. 64-70, esp. 67, n. 3, and 69.

5. It is worth mentioning that Philodemus blamed Zeno for having drafted in his *Politeia* constitutions for

nonexisting men, neglecting men in existence (W. Crönert, *Kolotes and Menedemos* [1906], p. 57, col. XVIII, ll. 9-11). Could Philodemus have said this unless Zeno's *Politeia* was entirely utopian in character?

6. Cf. F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (1945), pp. 43-46.

7. We should not forget that under "Chrysippus" Arnim lumped together all passages which are not ascribed by our sources to any particular Stoic, indicating, however, by smaller print, that he, after all, had no particular reason for assigning them to Chrysippus.

8. N. Festa, *I Frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, Vol. I: *Zenone* (1932), esp. pp. 13 f., 23 f. The passage assigned by Festa to Zeno occurs in an excerpt from Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, II, 94. 8-15 W., entitled "Doctrines of Zeno and the Other Stoics" (Stob., II, 57. 13 W.), such other Stoics being quoted by name, whenever Arius Didymus considered a doctrine to be peculiar to them. It is therefore reasonable to suppose



that doctrines for which no other name is quoted belong to Zeno. Arius Didymus and Diogenes Laertius probably used the same source for their presentation of Stoic philosophy (see on this problem H. Strache, *De Arii Didymi in morali philosophia auctoribus* [1909], p. 78), and, if a passage is assigned to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, another very similar in Arius Didymus (καὶ γὰρ οὖν [scil. τὸν σοφὸν] ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παύσειν [Diog.]; καὶ . . . συγκαταβαλεῖν [scil. τὸν σοφὸν] καὶ εἰς γάμον καὶ εἰς τεκνογονίαν [Stob.]) is quite likely to be Zeno's, too. But even without this assignation of III, 611 Arn. to Zeno the reconciliation of I, 262 Arn. with I, 270 Arn. seems to be rather easy (cf., e.g., A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* [1891], p. 205).

9. On this word and the problem involved see also A. Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa* (1897), pp. 236 with n. 2 and 237.

10. As already Philodemus noticed: W. Crönert, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-57 with n. 261.

11. Which I should prefer to express as being the idea of equality of man, meaning simply that the inequalities taken for granted at a certain time exist only by convention.

12. Cf. S. Luria, "Zur Geschichte einer kosmopolitischen Sentenz," *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des sciences de l'URSS*, 1925, pp. 78-81; W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (1942), pp. 370, 377-81.

13. H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th ed. revised by W. Kranz (3 vols., 1934-37), II, 352 f. I print the fragment as it is printed in Diels. All restorations seem to be safe and sound, but, even without them, the sense is perfectly clear.

14. The translation of this fragment in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (1948) is completely wrong. Miss Freeman should have followed the translation in the *Oxyrh. Pap.*, Vol. XI, p. 103, bottom.

15. For this interpretation of βεβαρωμεθα cf. S. Luria, "Noch einmal ueber Antiphon in Euripides' Alexandros," *Hermes*, LXIV (1929), 491-97, esp. 494,

n. 1. The Heraclitus passage (Frag. 107 Diels) and the Aristophanes passage (Nu. 492) listed in Liddell-Scott, s.v. βεβαρωμεθα, are decisive. Cf. G. Nenci, "La Filobarbarie di Ecateo nel giudizio di Eraclito," *Rivista di filologia classica*, LXXVII (1949), 107-17, esp. 112-14.

16. See on it, e.g., *Oxyrh. Pap.*, Vol. XI, p. 94; J. Mewaldt, "Das Weltbürgertum in der Antike," *Die Antike*, II (1926), 177-89, esp. 179 f.; E. Bignone, *Studi sul pensiero antico* (1938), pp. 58, 68-97; W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I (1939), 323-28. It certainly does not sound like an "occasional phrase which looks like a groping after something better than the hard-and-fast division of Greeks and barbarians" (Tarn, *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XIX [1933], 124).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 149, n. 6.

18. Could it be that Tarn never paid much attention to all the emendations of the text since it was first published in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*? Cf. the literature listed in Diels, II, 346.

19. Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon*, 2d ed. (2 vols., 1920), I, 84.

20. For the psychological problem involved cf. M. Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte* (2 vols., 1919), "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," I, 43-236, esp. pp. 125 f., 142 f., 170, 192 f., and, above all, 161-65.

21. See on it all the literature listed in nn. 16 and 18.

22. See on it, e.g., E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (1946), Index, s.v. "Slavery."

23. *Ibid.*, commentary a.i.

24. Cf. E. Bickerman's review of Tarn's *Alexander the Great*, *CP*, XLV (1950), 41-45, esp. 44.

25. On Herodotus and the sophists see Schmid-Stählin, I/2 (1934), 572-77; on his (original) philobarbarism, *ibid.*, p. 566, n. 1; on his egalitarianism, *ibid.*, p. 579 f.

SCRIPPS COLLEGE AND  
CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL

# ON THE 'Οδυσσεὺς αὐτόμολος OF EPICHARMUS

W. B. STANFORD

THE purpose of this article is to show that the current interpretation<sup>1</sup> of the ten-line Vienna papyrus which has been reasonably attributed to this play of Epicharmus is highly questionable, if not untenable. According to this current interpretation Odysseus is presented as a coward, afraid to execute a dangerous mission. If this were true it would be a notable innovation in the Odysseus legend, the first clear charge of cowardice made against Odysseus in all literature.<sup>2</sup> But it is not, I think, true.

It will be necessary to print the mutilated fragment in full:

[γθὼν τεῖδε θωκησῶ τε καὶ λεξού[  
[ῖμειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς δεξιωτέροι[  
[ἐμὶν δοκεῖτε πάγχυ καὶ κατὰ τρόπ[  
[ότως ἐπέυξασθ' αἷ τις ἐνθυμείν γ[  
[γ' ὥφειλον ἐνθε.ν ὕσπερ ἐκελήσ[  
  
[τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὰ προτιμάσαι θ[  
[δύνον τελέσσαι καὶ κλέος θείον[  
[ν μολῶν ἐς ἄστυ πάντα δ'εὖ σαφα[  
[νος δίοις τ' Ἀχαιοῖς παιδί τ' Ἀτρεὺς φί[  
[εἶλαι τὰ τῆνεί καὶ τὸς ἀσκηθῆς[

This is Kaibel's text, without his supplements, as accepted by Page and Olivieri. It should be noted that *δοκεῖτε* in line 3 is dubious. The scholium gives *ἐπεὶ ἐδόκ . . . ἐκείνοι ε* (or *σ*), which may be restored as *ἐδόκουν*, or possibly, I suggest, despite the accent, *ἐδόκει ἐκείνοις*. In either case a second person plural form is not indicated, and we should probably read *δοκεῖ τε* with Gomperz in the text, or possibly *δόκει τε* (unaugmented imperfect).

The fragment is accompanied by some mutilated scholia. The first says that

*δεξιωτέροις* is a *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* for *καὶ τοῖς .μπ.ηττομ* (*ἐμπληττομένοις*, Gomperz). The second states that something "is said with reference to the tragedians" (*πρὸς τοὺς τραγικοὺς*). The third is quoted in the preceding paragraph here. The fourth suggests a lacuna somewhere after line 3. The next part is obscure, but the words *ἀκηκοέναι . . . ἀναστρέφειν . . . ὥφειλον* suggest that Odysseus expressed a wish that he had already gained some required information and that he was on his way home. Then comes a reference to something *μέτριον ἢ ἀνθρώπινον*, and finally the crucial words, *πόρρω[ι] καθεδούμ(αι) καὶ προσποιήσομ(αι) πάντα διαπεπράχθ(αι)*, which are generally taken to refer to the first line of the fragment, though it is not easy to reconcile *πόρρω* with *τεῖδε*.

On the basis of this highly problematical evidence Kaibel deduces a scene in which Odysseus, stricken with cowardly fears,<sup>3</sup> decides in a soliloquy (Kaibel, Page), or in a speech addressed to the spectators (Olivieri), to shirk his mission of entering Troy as a spy, and considers (Kaibel), concocts (Olivieri), or rehearses (Page), a lying speech to be delivered later to the Greeks. This is the interpretation which I propose to criticize.

First objection: there is no clear evidence in either the fragment or the scholia that any speech is being considered, concocted, or rehearsed. The readings *δοκεῖτε* in line 3 and *ἐκελήσασθ'* in line 5 are hypothetical and tendentious. Even if it is conceded that a speech is being considered, as is possible, there is no indication that it is a speech to the Greeks. On the

contrary, the reference to the Greeks and Agamemnon in line 9 rather weighs against this. Odysseus may well be considering what he will say to the Trojans when he enters the city as a spy, the last half of the fragment (after a lacuna) being his own final wish "If only it were all over and I were on my way home again" (cf. scholium).

Secondly, if τοῖς δεξιωτέροις is, as the scholiast says, a παρά προσδοκίαν in place of something like "the stupidest," it is quite inept on Kaibel's view. Odysseus's policy would not be to invent a speech that will seem true to "the stupidest" among the Greeks but, literally, to "the most intelligent." If the scholiast is right, δεξιωτέροις cannot refer to the Greeks, or the Trojans either, in this way.

Thirdly, if Odysseus did shirk his duty like this, what was the plot of the play and why was it called "Odysseus the Desert-er"? To meet this difficulty Olivieri interprets the αὐτομολία as referring to Odysseus's avoidance of the dangerous mission: "nel meglio si è sentito venir meno il coraggio e 'diserta' la causa." This strains the Greek unattractively. The noun αὐτόμολος and its verb normally mean "to go off on one's own" from some person or group or persons in the full sense of desertion, not simply "evasion of duty" as Olivieri's theory demands. Besides it would make a thin plot for a play if all that happened was this: Odysseus is told to enter Troy as a spy; he goes away and invents a fictitious account of his adventures, returns with his mission unfulfilled, and tells his lies to the Greeks with or without success. The only alternative (according to Kaibel's view) would be even more futile, that Odysseus after considering a lying speech should recover from his panic and do his duty after all.<sup>4</sup>

Fourthly, to present Odysseus as a coward who shrank from performing this

mission is entirely contrary to the whole tradition of the πῶχλεια from *Odyssey* iv. 242-58, to Quintus Smyrnaeus v. 278-81. Elsewhere the comic and satyric tradition represents him as gluttonous, erotic, vulgar and suffering vile humiliations,<sup>5</sup> but never as a calculating coward. In Euripides' *Cyclops* Odysseus retains his heroic valour notably.

To sum up the case against the presentation of Odysseus as a coward here: there is no accusation or clear implication of cowardice in the text or the scholia; both the title and the plot suffer unless Odysseus actually deserts according to his instructions; the whole literary tradition runs counter to any evasion of duty in this incident.

Can a better alternative be suggested? The text and scholia are so susceptible of tendentious restorations that it is impossible to be confident here. Much turns on the meaning of the scholium πόρρω καθεδούμαι καὶ προσποιήσομαι πάντα διαπραῆχθαι. The first phrase, all agree, means that Odysseus intends to retire to a sequestered place and reflect. The rest is literally "And I shall pretend that everything has been completed"; here is the crux. Assuming—a big assumption—that πάντα means his whole mission, to whom will he pretend it has been accomplished? The syntax seems to imply that the pretence will be made then and there, in the distant place. If so, it cannot be made to either the Greeks or the Trojans. To interpret it, with the authorities cited above, as "I shall concoct a speech in which I shall pretend . . ." is implausible. Who is left? Odysseus himself and the spectators.

Does it make sense to say "I shall pretend to myself (or to the audience) that everything has been completed"? Yes, if it is allowed that προσποιήσομαι can mean "assume, suppose" here. It seems a pos-

sible extension of the basic meaning, but I can find no exact analogy. If it is granted, the scene may be interpreted in this way. Odysseus, having received his orders<sup>6</sup> to make a pretended desertion to the Trojans to spy out their condition, goes away by himself to reflect on the implications of his venture, its dangers, advantages and disadvantages. He weighs the κακά and the ἀγαθὰ, the κίνδυνος and the κλέος involved. He wishes the whole affair was over and he was safe back (ἀσκηθῆς) again. He "pretends" to himself and to the audience that it has all been accomplished—his mood, I take it, is similar to that in the familiar καὶ δὴ construction with the perfect in tragedy.<sup>7</sup> What will he get out of it personally? Is the fame worth the risk?

This moment of reflection before undertaking a perilous task is typical of Odysseus. In *Iliad* xi. 404–9, he soliloquizes for a moment on the relative benefits of retreat on the one hand and, on the other, standing fast with the risk of being captured alone. The *Odyssey* is full of similar

forethought. In the prologue to Euripides' *Philoctetes* (according to Dio Chrysostom lii. 16) Odysseus cynically reflects in this way on the disadvantages of being a reputation-seeking πανούργος. This last, I suggest, is nearest to the situation here. Odysseus with characteristic self-confidence assumes that everything is as good as accomplished and with equally characteristic insight wonders if the game is worth the candle. At the end of our scene, he presumably with a shrug of his shoulders sets off to do his work in cool self-knowledge, as in Euripides' *Philoctetes*. This presentation seems to me worthier of the Epicharmus who wrote νᾶφε καὶ μένασ' ἀπιστῶν. ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν<sup>8</sup> than that of an Odysseus "pauroso e poltrone." And it gives scope for subtler ethical humour than could any picture of mere cowardice. Also, as has been shown, it removes an anomaly from the traditional characterization of Homer's favourite hero. In any case Kaibel's "Odysseus the poltroon" has no basis in what survives of Epicharmus' "Odysseus the deserter."

## NOTES

1. Cf. A. Olivieri, *Frammenti della Commedia Greca*<sup>2</sup>, 1946, p. 36; D. L. Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 195; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy*, 1927, pp. 380–81; G. Kaibel, *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 1899, p. 109.

2. His failure to help Nestor in *Il.* viii. 97 ff. was not pressed against him till later. His attempt to evade conscription for the Trojan War (Kinkel, *Epic. Graec. Frag.*, p. 18) is never attributed to cowardice in early literature. The natural explanation (well brought out by Ovid, *Metamorphoses* xiii. 296 ff. and Robert Bridges in *Achilles in Scyros*) was that the home-loving Odysseus wished to avoid leaving his beloved Ithaca. The fact that Achilles also tried to remain a neutral prevented any sweeping charge of cowardice against either of them. Even in later fifth-century writers Odysseus is never accused of deliberate calculating cowardice. His evasive actions away from Ajax and Philoctetes are of a quite different nature and may fairly be called prudent rather than frightened.

3. "... Metu praepeditus" (Kaibel), "pauroso e poltrone" (Olivieri). Pickard-Cambridge and Page use milder phrases, but to the same effect.

4. Nothing certain can be deduced from the other fragments of the play.

5. Cf. my article on "The Denigration of Odysseus" *Hermathena*, LXXIII (May, 1949), 33–51, for references.

6. Cf. ἐκλήσ(αυτο) possibly in l. 5: but most likely Odysseus, the πολυμήχανος, first thought of the ruse himself.

7. "denoting imaginary realization, 'suppose that so and so happens'": Denniston, *Greek Particles*, p. 253, with many examples.

8. We owe the quotation primarily to Polybius (xviii. 40), himself an ardent admirer of Odysseus.

## EMPEDOKLES, ORPHIKER UND PHYSIKER\*

KARL REINHARDT

**W**ALTER KRANZ, der bekannte Herausgeber und Interpret der *Vorsokratiker*, den so viele von uns so gern wieder in Deutschland hätten —er lehrt gegenwärtig in Konstantinopel —hat uns ein ebenso fesselndes, lebendiges wie praktisches neues Werk geschenkt. Der Gedanke, Empedokles in die Mitte einer Betrachtung zu rücken, welche Antike, Mittelalter und Moderne, Orient und Europa, Dichtung und Philosophie, Geschichte der Wissenschaft und Macht des orphischen Ur-Gedankens, archaisches Griechentum und deutsche Romantik, den Menschen Empedokles in seiner Zeit und Umwelt und den Helden Hölderlins miteinander verbindet, voneinander abgrenzt und eins aus dem anderen erhellt, spannt schon als Thema unsere Erwartung, und die Ausführung geht in der Tat über das Übliche, was man in Büchern vom Fortleben der Antike findet, weit hinaus. Kranz bemerkt zwar, sein Kapitel von den Nachwirkungen sei nur eine ausgeführte Skizze, aber ich wüsste keinen von den Heutigen, der auch nur in vorläufiger Weise die hier gähnende Kluft so hätte überbrücken können.

Die beiden Hauptteile sind der Empedokles- und der Hölderlin-Interpretation gewidmet. Das Buch möchte aber zugleich ein Lesebuch sein, darum bietet es die Texte. Denen des Empedokles voran steht eine Einführung von ca. 100 Seiten, denen Hölderlins von ca. 70 Seiten. Neu übersetzt sind die Empedokles-Biographie des Diogenes Laertius und die wörtlich

erhaltenen Fragmente der beiden Empedokleischen Dichtungen, die letzteren hexametrisch und in neuer Ordnung. Die Nuancen im Sinne des Interpreten treten z.T. noch schärfer hervor als in der Prosaübersetzung der Diels-Kranz'schen *Vorsokratiker*. Die Hölderlintexte beruhen auf der historisch-kritischen Ausgabe von Hellingrath, Seebass und von Pigenot, 3. Auflage. Aber überall ist neueste Literatur herangezogen, sind die Texte und ihre Erklärung auf die neuesten Beiträge hin revidiert. Wenn Kranz auch zu seinen Hölderlin-Erklärungen bemerkt: "Wir betrachten Hölderlins Werk nur unter dem einen, einzigen Gesichtspunkt seines Verhältnisses zur Antike, und dies ist nur einer unter den vielen möglichen," so treten doch zugleich die inneren Stadien in der Folge der Entwürfe anschaulich hervor, dem Auftauchen des mystisch-eschatologischen Moments wird nachgegangen. Kranz glaubt—und, ich meine, mit gewissem Recht—durch die verschiedenen Fassungen hindurch eine zunehmende Wiederannäherung an den orphisch-pythagoreischen Urgedanken zu erkennen. So biegt ungesucht das Ende zum Anfang.

Für den Philologen beunruhigend bleibt, dass in manchen nicht unwichtigen Fällen immer noch nicht sich hat feststellen lassen, was für Texte in was für Ausgaben Hölderlin in Händen hatte (Vgl. Kranz, S. 175 und S. 195).

Angesichts der Fülle der auftauchenden Einzelfragen wird man es verstehen, dass ich mich auf Bemerkungen zum griechischen Text beschränke.

Um sich zu einer, wenn nicht äusseren,

\* *Empedokles: Antike Gestalt und romantische Neuschöpfung*. By Walter Kranz. ("Erasmus Bibliothek," ed. Walter Rüegg.) Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 1949. Pp. 393 + 5 pls.



worauf er verzichtet, so doch inneren Biographie den Weg zu bahnen, lässt Kranz die *Katharmoi* als ein Frühwerk dem Lehrgedicht als dem Werke der Reife vorangehen. Damit greift er auf einen seiner Aufsätze (*Hermes*, LXX [1935], 111 ff.) zurück. Doch ist das, wie er selbst hervorhebt, nicht das Übliche. Für die umgekehrte Lösung hatte zuletzt Wilamowitz sich entschieden ("Die *Katharmoi* des Empedokles," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissensch.*, 1929, S. 625 ff.). Da sich psychologisch einleuchtende Gründe ebenso für das eine wie für das andere anführen lassen, hängt die Entscheidung an den Konkordanzen.

Auszugehen empfiehlt sich von den drei erhaltenen Proömien, den beiden aus den *Katharmen* (Fr. 112 und 131 Diels) und dem zum Lehrgedicht (Fr. 3 Diels-Kranz). Aber da ist erst eine Vorfrage zu klären: hat Empedokles sich selbst vergottet?

Im Altertum hat man nicht daran gezweifelt. Die ironische Legende vom Sprung in den Aetna deutet darauf hin, Timaios hat sich über die "prahlerische Selbstbesessenheit" der Verse Fragm. 112 aufgehalten (Diogenes L. viii. 67), und Sextus, d.h. sein stoischer Gewährsmann, sucht ihn zwar vom üblichen Vorwurf rein zu waschen, aber nicht, indem er die Selbstvergottung in jenen Versen bestritte: nicht aus Eitelkeit habe Empedokles sich einen Gott genannt, sondern in dem Bewusstsein, dass nur er seinen Geist rein, ohne Schuld und ungetrübt bewahrt habe, um mit dem Gotte in ihm (dem stoischen Logos) den Gott ausser ihm zu erfassen (Sextus *Adv. math.* i. 303).

Kranz ist anderer Meinung (S. 26): "Wie ein Gott erscheine er ihnen. . . Wie ein Taumel hat es sie ergriffen. . . Aber dass er selbst sich schon auf Erden für einen Gott gehalten habe, besagen diese Verse nicht." Die Frage ist, wie hat man

Fr. 112. 5 die Worte: *μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα* zu verstehen? Diels hatte übersetzt: "So wie es mir zusteht." Kranz in der vierten Auflage der *Vorsokratiker*: "Unter allen geehrt, so wie ich ihnen dünke." Die persönliche Konstruktion von *ἔοικα* lasse die Deutung: "wie mir geziemt," nicht zu. Meine Zuversicht ist geringer. Im Epos wechselt *ὥς ἐπεικέας* am Versende (*Ilias* xix. 147) mit *ὥς ἐπέουκεν* (*Odysse* xxiv. 481) in der Bedeutung "wie es ziemt." Aber *Ilias* ix. 392 steht persönlich: "er möge sich einen anderen der Achäer wählen, der ihm ziemt": *ὅς τις οἷ τ' ἐπέουκε*. Ebenso daselbst *εἰκύναν ἀκοῖτιν*, "ziemend". Mit dem gleichbedeutenden *οὐ . . . ἀεικές* (vgl. *Il.* ix. 70) ist es das Gleiche: unpersönlich *Il.* xix. 124 und persönlich *Ilias* xxiv. 594: *οὐ . . . ἀεικέα . . . ἀποινα*. Wogegen ich für den absoluten Gebrauch von *ἔοικα* "ich bin wahrscheinlich" keinen Beleg im Kopfe habe. Denn was ich bei Liddell und Scott aus den Tragikern zitiert finde, *Soph. El.* 516 *ἀνεμύνῃ μὲν, ὥς ἔοικας, αὐ στρέφῃ*, *Trach.* 1241 *ὦμοι, τάχ', ὥς ἔοικας, ὥς νοσεῖς φράσεις*, und ähnlich *Eur. Hel.* 498, ist doch gar zu anders. Da schliesst sich das *ὥς ἔοικας* engstens an das betonte Wort an, mit einem schon fast ironischen Unterton, und ferner ist zwischen *ὥς* und *ὥσπερ* nun doch ein gar zu grosser Unterschied. Auch fehlt das für den gewünschten Sinn so unentbehrliche "ihnen": "wie ich ihnen scheine." Da sich die ganze Frage doch nur um den Sprachgebrauch dreht, wer traute sich zu, den Empedokleischen Gebrauch so sicher zu wissen? Ob z.B. Parmenides Fr. 8. 60 *διάκοσμον εἰκότα πάντα* "geziemend," was das näher Liegende wäre, oder "wahrscheinlich" zu verstehen ist, ist auch noch die Frage. Die Welt der *Doxa* als die Welt der *εἰκότα* zu betrachten, ist doch auch nur eine Auskunft einiger Interpreten. Geht man aber vom Zusammenhang, vom Satzgebilde

und von den epischen Parallelen aus, so verdient bei weitem die Bedeutung "wie sich gehört" den Vorzug. Sieht sich doch Kranz, indem er der anderen folgt, in seiner neuesten Übersetzung veranlasst, den Zusammenhang der beiden Glieder: *μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος ὥσπερ ζῶκα* zu zerreißen (S. 129): "Ich wandle hier als unsterblicher Gott euch, nicht mehr als Mensch unter allen geehrt: so dünke ich ihnen." Damit der Leser sich nicht zu sehr verwundere, muss er in den griechischen Text schauen und verstehen: "nicht mehr als Mensch sondern als Gott verehrt." Doch wenn gesagt werden soll, dass einer *wie* ein Gott geehrt wird, ohne es zu sein, pflegen die Formeln anders auszusehen, vgl. *Ilias* ix. 297, 302 usw. Die Übersetzung in der letzten Ausgabe der *Vorsokratiker* lief freilich auf eine Platitude hinaus: "unter allen geehrt, so wie ich ihnen dünke." Dass die Menschen einen ehren, so wie man ihnen dünkt, zu dieser Mitteilung bedurfte es kaum erst dieser Selbstvorstellung. Jedoch auch wenn ihr Dünken sich auf das beziehen soll, was sie selbst alle doch tun, weiss ich mir nicht zu helfen. Man mag sagen: "sie ehren mich als einen Gott," oder: "ich dünke ihnen ein Gott." Vereinigt man aber beides, so kommt heraus: "Ich dünke ihnen, als sei ich geehrt von ihnen wie ein Gott."

Wilamowitz hat es gut, der interpretiert: "Er geht umher nicht wie ein Gott, sondern als ein Gott. . . . Er empfängt die gebührenden Ehren, wovon die Binden und Kränze Zeugnis ablegen, mit denen ihn die zuströmende Menge schmückt. Darin—so fährt er freilich fort—liegt keineswegs, dass sie ihm wie einem Gotte huldigen, denn . . . so werden auch siegreiche Athleten und schöne Knaben bekränzt." Umso empedokleischer, im Falle er es sich so auslegt. Aber entscheidend scheint mir nun doch die Erhebung in die Sphäre des Sakralen.

Wäre es nicht noch hübscher und mehr noch im Sinne von Kranz selbst, wenn Hölderlin dasselbe nicht falsch sondern richtig übertrüge: "Ihr ehret mich und tuet recht daran" (Kranz, S. 195)?

So überkommt mich manchmal ein Gefühl, als müsste ich den einen Kranz gegen den anderen Kranz in Schutz nehmen. Die Selbstvergötterung des Wunderarztes, eines Heilands in noch anderem Sinn, als sie vermuten, im Moment höchster Erhöhung, der Epiphanie des Ewigen in ihm durch alles Sterbliche hindurch, beglaubigt durch kultische Ehren, die ihm, mögen sie's auch anders meinen, gebühren, verbunden zugleich mit dem Bewusstsein eines ungeheuren Fluches, unter dem die Geister, deren er selbst einer ist, auf Erden leben: wäre das so unvereinbar mit demjenigen Empedokles, den Kranz auf anderen Seiten seiner Buches uns so fesselnd schildert?

Doch nun zur Frage der Priorität. Wenn Wilamowitz die *Katharmen* als das ältere Werk betrachtete, so war für ihn entscheidend ihr zweites Proömium. Er erkannte darin eine Bezugnahme auf das Lehrgedicht und dessen Widmung an Pausanias. Kranz folgt Wilamowitz, insofern auch er in dem genannten "Sterblichen," anders als Diels, eine Person erkennt, lehnt aber Wilamowitz' Deutung auf Pausanias ab. Der "Sterbliche," um des willen (*ἐνεκεν*) es der Muse gefallen habe, unsere Bemühungen sich durch den Sinn gehen zu lassen, könne jener deswegen nicht sein, weil diesem hier genannten Sterblichen das jetzt bevorstehende *Thema*, einer Theologie (*ἀμφὶ θεῶν λόγος*), entgegengesetzt sei. Das hier gemeinte frühere Gedicht müsse von einem Sterblichen *gehandelt* haben, etwa von dem grossen Manne der Vorzeit, von dem Fragment 129 rätselt. Schlüssig wäre dieser Einwand höchstens formal logisch, und ich weiss auch das nicht. Er beruht



auf der geforderten Gleichung: *ἐνεκεν* gleich *ἀμφις*. Ein Thema bedinge das andere. Gesetz, dem wäre so, so müsste es ein Gedicht gegeben haben, das zum einzigen oder vorwiegenden Thema einen "Sterblichen" gehabt hätte, oder vielmehr, genauer, "irgend einen der Sterblichen," *ἐφημερίων . . . τινος*. Aber wer wird in solchen Worten von einem Helden reden, den er besang? Und doch muss das Thema machtvoll genug gewesen sein, um mit dem gegenwärtigen verglichen zu werden. Kranzens Auskunft, jener grosse Mann z.B., schiede schon darum aus, weil von ihm nur beiläufig die Rede war. Ein Zeitgenosse? Heros ginge schon gar nicht.

Ferner müsste Empedokles in jenem selben Gedicht, in dem er "einen der Sterblichen" verherrlicht hätte, zugleich auch die Muse angerufen haben. Also ein Gedicht mit Musen-Anruf über das Thema: "Der Sterblichen einer." Und hierauf bezöge sich: "So stehe auch jetzt dem Betenden wieder bei," wie damals, als ich meine dichterischen Bemühungen (*μελέται*) auf das Thema: "der Sterblichen einer," richtete. Doch auch damit noch nicht genug. Von Esoterik ist in den *Katharmen* keine Spur, alles ist für die Öffentlichkeit. Berief sich hier Empedokles nach gutem Dichterbrauch in der Gebetsform auf den Präzedenzfall, die gelungene Leistung, so war jenes andere Gedicht bekannt und hatte seinen Ruhm begründet. Für das Lehrgedicht würde das stimmen, denn das war, trotz seiner Esoterik, von einer sehr bald verspürten Wirkung. Aber ein Gedicht über das Thema: "Der Sterblichen einer"?

Weiter. In demselben Gedicht wurde die Muse angerufen. Musenanruf hängt mit Gattungen zusammen. Musenanruf, z.B. in der grossen Predigt gegen den Fleischgenuss mit ihrem wiederholten "Wehe, Wehe," wäre unwahrscheinlich. Aber noch mehr: die Muse wurde angerufen

um eines der Sterblichen willen. Wo gibt es das sonst? Hesiods *Erga* bringen nach dem Musenanruf die Warnungen an den Bruder, allerdings mit hartem Übergang. Das Proömium der Theognideen schliesst mit einem Gebet an Musen und Chariten. Wieder danach der Übergang zum Adressaten und dessen Belehrung. Dass die Muse um des Adressaten willen bemüht wird, wird in beiden Fällen nicht ausdrücklich hinzugefügt. Umso ausdrücklicher geschieht das im Empedokleischen Lehrgedicht.

Nun scheint man sich freilich nicht recht klar darüber, was hier dem Empfänger, was der Muse zukommt. Nach Kranz und einigen anderen würde die Muse verwarnen, sich nicht durch Ehrungen von seiten der Sterblichen bestechen zu lassen, frechdreist mehr zu sagen, als was Frömmigkeit erlaube, um danach auf den Höhen der Weisheit zu thronen. Was müsste das für eine Muse sein! Wie könnte der Dichter zu einer solchen beten: "Lenke den folgsamen Wagen zu mir aus dem Reiche der Frommheit!"? Offenbar besagt die Bitte nicht: "Vergreife dich nicht in der Wahl deines Gespannes!" Nicht: du könntest nämlich auch aus anderen, weniger lauterer Quellen mich bereichern, sondern: tu das Deine, denn das Deine ist: Erfüllung, die nicht anders kann als fromm sein. Also gilt die Warnung nicht der Muse, sondern dem Schüler. Carstens und Wilamowitz haben recht verstanden, mit Vers 6 beginnt eine neue Anrede, gerichtet an Pausanias. Ein Futurum mit *μηδέ* ist, wenn wir attischem Sprachgebrauche folgen, eine Verwarnung heftiger Art, z.B. Euripides *Bakchen* 344: *μηδ' ἐξομόρξῃ μωρίαν τῇν σὴν ἐμοί*. Wenn ich von einer "Ehre von Seiten der Sterblichen" höre, kann ich nicht umhin zu ergänzen: "Ehre von Seiten der Götter." Götter und Muse wurden zusammen angerufen. Versteht man aber, um auch das noch zu er-

wägen, ungeachtet des *μηδέ*, Vers 6 ff. nicht als Warnung, sondern als getroste Zuversicht: du wirst mir ja doch nicht . . . bei dir, Muse, dürfte das ausgeschlossen sein: so wird aus einer naheliegenden Gefahr ein fern liegendes auf die Schulter Klopfen.

Also ist das Anliegen ein doppeltes. Die Muse wird herbeigebeten, und der Jünger wird verwahrt. "Abwehren mögen die Götter die Raserei jener (wahrscheinlich der Eleaten) von meiner Zunge und leiten reinen Quell aus lauterem Munde. Und dich, Muse, Jungfrau usw."—die Prädikationen sind höchst ehrfürchtig, welch abwegiger Gedanke, diese Muse könnte auf einmal haltlos sich verführen lassen!—"flehe ich an: so viel Sterblichen zu hören erlaubt ist"—das ist eine Einschränkung: die Sterblichen dürfen nicht alles hören—wir würden erwarten: das künde du uns!, aber statt dessen folgt: "des lenke du zu uns aus dem Reiche der Frömmigkeit das gehorsame Gespann!" Die Verpflichtung, die das Gebet dem Jünger auferlegt, wird durch das betonte "du" hervorgehoben: "Du wenigstens" (mögen die andern es anders halten)! (Wie passend von der Muse!) Muse und Jünger sind aufeinander bezogen. Am Geheimnis des zu Übermittelnden ist sie entscheidend mitbeteiligt. Gegensatz der Reinheit ist Profanation. Eine zweite Gefahr ist die des Unglaubens. Auch ihr zu begegnen wird die Muse angerufen, Fr. 4: "Wie die Bürgschaften meiner Muse dich heissen; lass erkennend dir die Lehre bis in's Eingeweide dringen!" So wird in Fr. 23, nach der Aufzählung der ganzen Mannigfaltigkeit, zuletzt der "langlebigen Götter," der Jünger auf's neue bedeutet: "So soll dir kein Trug den Sinn bezwingen, aus anderer Quelle (als den Elementen) strömten die sterblichen Dinge, unzählige, soviel ihrer offenbar geworden, sondern wisse das

genau, es ist das Wort der Göttin, was du hörst!"

Ich kenne in der Tat kein anderes Gedicht, in dem "um eines Sterblichen willen" die Muse so oft und so eindringlich bemüht würde. Und nun steht in jenem Proömium der *Katharmen* (Fr. 131): "Denn wenn (d.h. so wahr) es dir gefiel, unsterbliche Muse, um eines Sterblichen willen dir unser (dichterisches) Bemühen (*μελέτας*) durch den Sinn gehen zu lassen, so stehe auch jetzt, Kalliopeia, dem Betenden wieder bei, da ich von den seligen Göttern eine gute Lehre künde." Vorausgegangen sein mag einer der vielen möglichen Gebetseingänge, Bitte um Nahen der Gottheit oder Bitte um Reinheit, worauf jene Begründung folgte. Mir scheint, die Beziehung auf das Lehrgedicht liegt hier so nahe, und alle Versuche, etwas anderes sich statt dessen auszudenken, führen so in's Abwegige, dass ich nicht zögere, Wilamowitz recht zu geben: der hier berufene Präzedenzfall ist die Erhöhung in *περι φύσεως*. Folgen wir Kranz und denken an den grossen Mann, was würde aus dem Präzedenzfall? Ist doch schon durch die Art der Einführung: "Doch es lebte unter jenen ein Mann . . ." der Musenanruf zu dem Folgenden ausgeschlossen.

Nun das zweite Argument: die negative Theologie in Fr. 134 der *Katharmen*, verglichen mit der negativen Theologie in Fr. 29 des Lehrgedichtes, findet Kranz, erweise sich als das Ursprüngliche. Fr. 134 habe am Anfang einen unentbehrlichen Vers mehr. Fr. 29 sei Verkürzung aus Fr. 134. Das Lehrgedicht sei folglich das Spätere. Aber der Unterschied besteht nicht nur in einem Mehr und Weniger. In Fr. 134 ist der Gegensatz: nach Menschenart gebildeter Gott oder Geistgott. Daher steht hier gut Xenophanisch die Verwerfung *menschlichen* Gebildes, an-

gefangen mit dem Haupt (*ἀνδρομένη κεφαλή*), voran. Ein menschliches Gebilde wäre der Gottheit unwürdig. Daher am Ende: "nicht behaarte Scham, sondern unsagbar heiliger Geist." Die Aufzählung Fr. 14 hat dagegen statt der "behaarten Scham" die "zeugende Scham." "Behaarte Scham" passt besser in den Kontrast in Fr. 134. Denn was ist der Unterschied? Der Unterschied ist, dass in Fr. 29 jedes der Glieder mit einer Bewegung und Funktion versehen ist: "Da schiessen nicht zwei Zweige aus dem Rücken, nicht Füße noch schnelle Knie noch zeugende Scham, sondern es war Kugel von allen Seiten selbst gleich." Weshalb Kranz anstatt "Zweige" "Flügelzweige" übersetzt, ist mir nicht klar, noch weniger klar die Anmerkung: "Auch die archaische Kunst gestaltet in Gemälde wie plastischer Kunst Flügel als Zweige." Sollte Kranz an Ranken oder Voluten denken? Aber dann wäre die Frage allgemein zu stellen. Empedokles liebt in seinem Lehrgedicht die Vertauschung zwischen Pflanzlichem und Menschlich-Animalischem, das Ohr heisst ihm "ein fleischiges Reis" (Fr. 99), die Bäume "brüten Eier" (Fr. 79) usw. Er liebt den naturphilosophischen *γρίφος*. Hat sein Vitalismus mit der bildenden Kunst zu tun? Hier kann ich nicht mehr mit. Wo bleiben denn neben den Beinen dann die Arme?

Von den "Gliedern" ist noch öfter die Rede. "Nicht Zwist noch unbilliger Streit ist in seinen Gliedern" (Fr. 27a). Denn Bewegung kommt in den Kugeltott erst durch den "Streit" (Fr. 31): "Da wurden der Reihe nach die Glieder des Gottes erschüttert." Vordem waren "weder der Sonne schnelle Glieder zu unterscheiden noch der Erde zottige Kraft (wieder jene Vertauschung) noch das Meer; so fest gehalten ruhte in dem gewaltigen Verliesse der "Harmonia" (gleich Aphrodite) der

runde Sphairos im Genusse seines rings umgreifenden Beharrens." In der Theologie des Lehrgedichtes ist also der Gegensatz: Einförmigkeit und Differenzierung, Ruhe und Bewegung, Kugelgestalt und "Glieder." Die Welt im Anfang ist noch nicht gegliedert, sondern Sphairos. In den *Katharmen* ist der Gegensatz: nicht menschengestaltig, sondern Geist. Der Gegensatz von Ruhe und Bewegung, Einförmigkeit und Differenzierung oder "Gliedern" hat da keinen Sinn mehr. Bewegung eignet dem Geistgott im höchsten Masse: "mit schnellen Gedanken durchstürmt er den ganzen Kosmos." Eine Vermengung der Antithesen: "nicht menschengestaltig, sondern Sphairos," wäre ebenso fehl am Ort wie: "nicht gegliedert, sondern Geist." Mit anderen Worten: der Anfangsvers von Fr. 134: "Auch ist er (der Gott) nicht mit menschlichem Haupte an den Gliedern versehen," ist in Fr. 28 des Lehrgedichtes nicht etwa nur fortgelassen, er wäre da überhaupt nicht am Platz.

Nun aber die Frage: was ist das Frühere? Wo sitzen die beiden sich wiederholenden Verse in ihrem ursprünglichen Gefüge? Ich muss gestehen, dass ich da sehr viel weniger zuversichtlich bin als Kranz. Ich sehe mit Sicherheit nur so viel: die "zeugende Scham" passt besser in den Sinn des Lehrgedichtes, die "behaarte Scham" besser in den der *Katharmen*, und die "beiden Zweige" sind Beispiel einer Metaphorik, die im Lehrgedicht mit der Konzeption des Ganzen eng zusammenhängt, wogegen ich in den *Katharmen* nichts dergleichen finde. Die negierenden Prädikate passen nicht schlecht in den Gegensatz von Ruhe und Bewegung. Ich sehe auf der anderen Seite nichts, wodurch die beiden Verse aus dem Rahmen des Lehrgedichtes herausfielen.

Dritte Übereinstimmung ist das Vers-

ende: "Götter an Ehren reichste," einmal in den *Katharmen* (Fr. 146) und zweimal im Lehrgedicht (Fr. 21 und 23). Im Lehrgedicht steht beide Male der Vers: "und langlebige Götter an Ehren reichste," am Ende einer Aufzählung alles Organischen: Bäume, Menschen, Tiere, Vögel, Fische. Sie "entspriessen" der Mischung der vier Elemente, wie von Malerhand aus der Mischung der Grundfarben ihre Abbilder hervorgehen. Ohne die Götter wäre das Malergleichnis unvollständig und unmöglich. In den *Katharmen* spriessen die erlösten Geister, am Ende ihrer Kreisläufe, zu Göttern empor, "an Ehren reichsten." Kranz meint, letzteres stehe ursprünglicher als Abschluss einer Stufenleiter der irdischen Ränge. Auf der anderen Seite ist das Überraschende nicht zu verkennen: dass sogar die höchst verehrten Götter, die langlebigen (denn ewig freilich können sie hier nicht sein) den Elementen entspriessen. Die Formel scheint mir nicht hinzureichen zu Rückschlüssen auf das chronologische Verhältnis.

Ist aber das Lehrgedicht das Frühere, die *Katharmen* das Spätere, so hört die Möglichkeit auf, in der religiösen Dichtung eine noch nicht abgeworfene Bindung an die Tradition, eine noch unüberwundene Befangenheit in Orphiker- und Pythagoreer-Denkweise, ein Erbe aus der Zeit des Theron zu erkennen. Das aufgeklärte Lehrgedicht ergibt sich nicht als folgerichtiger Fortschritt gegenüber den *Katharmen*. Kein gläubiger Mystiker wird in Empedokles vom Philosophen überwunden, die Erscheinung wird verwickelter, bedenklicher.

Der Unterschied ist allerdings zugleich ein Unterschied der Themen: dort der Kosmos, hier die Seele. Und zum Teil dadurch bedingt ein Unterschied der Haltungen: die Welterklärung esoterisch, exoterisch die Verkündigung vom Heil. Aber Modernes darf uns nicht zu sehr ver-

leiten. Das Pythagoreisch-Orphische bedeutet keine Tradition vergleichbar einer Kirche, ist nicht etwas, was man vordergründlich anerkennen könnte, auch tritt bei Empedokles der Heilsgedanke mit einer Wucht auf, dass nichts gegen ihn aufkommt. Mag die Heilsgeschichte in der Drastik ihrer Bilder zum Teil allegorisch zu verstehen sein, wäre ihr Hintersinn doch dann erst recht von der Naturphilosophie verschieden.

Kranz betrachtet die Entwicklung auf Grund seiner Hypothese als vereinfacht. Man könnte sie auch verwickelter finden. Empedokles charakterisiert den Sphairos durch eine Fülle Parmenideischer Prädikate: er ist ein  $\epsilon\nu$  im Gegensatz zum Vielen (Fr. 17), oder ein  $\epsilon\nu$  *kal*  $\pi\alpha\nu$  (Fr. 26), nach eleatischer Formel, er genießt sein "Beharren," er ist "überall gleich" (Fr. 28 und 29), und wenn nach Parmenides Fr. 8. 30 die gewaltige Anangke das kugelhähnliche Seiende in den Fesseln der Grenze hält, die es umschliesst, so liegt der kugelförmige Sphairos fest verwahrt im sicheren Verliess der "Harmonia," nach Empedokles Fr. 27. Auch der Gedanke des Sphairos geht wie so vieles andere aus der Bewältigung Parmenideischer Aporien hervor, und Kranz ist der letzte, das zu bestreiten. Aber zugleich soll derselbe Gedanke nun eine ganz andere Abstammung erhalten, in ihm soll der Geistgott der *Katharmen* wieder auferstehen. Kranz (S. 48): "Gleich als wollte der Philosoph die Erweiterung seiner früheren Lehre besonders betonen, wendet er die Verse, welche damals die Erscheinung des Sphairosgottes der menschlichen Gestalt entgegenstellten in den *Katharmen*, jetzt noch einmal auf die Einheit des geistig-körperlichen Sphairosgottes an" (im Lehrgedicht). Aber wo stände, dass der Geistgott der *Katharmen* Sphairos wäre? Und was würde aus einer Kugel, die "mit schnellen Gedanken den ganzen Welten-

bau durchstürmte?" Gleichviel, der Sphairos-gott des Lehrgedichtes soll zugleich eleatischer, zugleich orphischer Zeugung sein. Unter den Geschöpfen des Geistes mögen mancherlei Kreuzungen möglich sein, aber erheblich würde die doppelte Abstammung doch nur, wenn sie im Sphairos-gott sich auch verriete. Ist z.B. der Sphairos-gott dem Empedokles heilig? Warum nicht? Eben weil er kein Geistgott ist. Geistgott, versteht sich, im prägnanten Sinn. Gleichwohl erscheint nach Kranz die Theologie der *Katharmen* im Lehrgedicht "erweitert."

Ferner: Liebe und Hass regieren die Kreisläufe der Weltperioden wie den Kreislauf der "Dämonen" durch Verstossung und Erlösung. Wieder betrachtet Kranz das Letztere als die Vorform für das Erstere. Aus den *Katharmen* entwickle sich das Lehrgedicht. Aber wieder haben Liebe und Hass im Kosmos zugleich eine kosmologische, Parmenideische Vorgeschichte. Parmenides liess in der "Welt der Sterblichen" Makro- und Mikrokosmos aus der "Mischung" oder "Paarung" zweier Gegensätze, Licht und Nacht, hervorgehen, ebenso die Wahrnehmungen (Fr. 16); Empedokles lehrt die "Mischung" oder "Paarung" (Fr. 90) ausgedehnt auf die vier Elemente, ebenso das Entstehen der Wahrnehmungen (Fr. 105 und 106), mit Parmenideischen Reminiscenzen. Und wie bereits Parmenides zu seinen beiden Mischungselementen eine Anzahl kosmisch-geistiger Potenzen, Mächte des Entstehens und Vergehens hinzufügt, Eros unter anderem auf der einen Seite, "bellum" und "discordia," aber auch Mächte der Auflösung, des Todes auf der anderen Seite (A 37), so lässt auch Empedokles seine konträren beiden Mächte über Mischungen und Sonderungen regieren. In der Theorie kennt er kein Sterben, praktisch kommt er nicht ganz um den Tod herum, die

"Liebe" zeichnet für das Leben, "Neikos" für den Tod. Nach Kranz wären zwischen beide Lehrgedichte wieder die *Katharmen* in die Entwicklung einzuschalten. Nun werden auch "Liebe" und "Hass" doppelter Abstammung, zugleich Parmenideischen, zugleich orphischen Ursprungs (S. 49): "Es ist wie in den 'Katharmoi' die Entstehung und der Zustand unserer jetzigen Welt, die Empedokles schildert, die 'Welt des Hasses,' wie Aristoteles (A 42) sie mit Recht nennt, nämlich im Vergleich mit der einstigen Welt der alleinigen Liebe." Aber Aristoteles vergleicht doch nur die Zwischenzustände zwischen den Extremen und bemerkt das Gegenteil: die Welt im jetzigen Zustande des Streites verhalte sich *gleich* wie im vorigen Zustande der Liebe. Es gibt zwei Arten von Dualismus: Kosmogonischen Dualismus und Erlösungs-dualismus. Letzterer beruht auf innerer Erfahrung und Selbstinterpretation der religiös ergriffenen Seele. Im Lehrgedicht gibt es keine Erlösung, auch nicht des Alls. Der Dualismus des Lehrgedichtes ist unpathetisch, nichts von religiöser Ergriffenheit. . . . Sein Pathos gilt keinem mundanen Dualismus, sondern dem Geheimnis des in allen Dingen gleichen Allgeschehens und Allwerdens. Ist das Letztere aus dem Ersteren abzuleiten?

Auf's Ganze hin gesehen, hat Kranz bei seinem Versuche einer inneren Empedokles-Biographie einer Idee des Fortschritts stattgegeben. In der Tat, wir können bei Versuchen solcher Art uns des Gedankens eines Fortschritts kaum erwehren. Leben, das sich differenziert, erscheint uns als ein Fortschreiten. Kranz findet das Lehrgedicht entwickelter, will sagen: rational entwickelter als die *Katharmen*. Aber Fortschritt braucht nicht immer rational zu sein. Man kann auch die *Katharmen* als das Entwickeltere betrachten. Wo und wie z.B. kündet das



Ich sich an im Lehrgedicht, und was wird daraus in den *Katharmen*? Wenn wir denn schon von "Entwicklung" reden wollen. Im übrigen sei hierzu auf W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), S. 154 verwiesen.

Ausgezeichnet dünkt mich bei Kranz die Würdigung des Lehrgedichtes in der Herausarbeitung seiner rationalen und irrationalen, philosophisch analytischen und dichterisch emotionellen Elemente. Aber wieder stört mich im Gesamtbild ein Detail. Nach Kranz hätte Empedokles als erster eine Partikel-Theorie gelehrt (S. 45), er hätte die Elemente auf letzte kleine Einheiten zurückgeführt. In den wörtlichen Zitaten findet sich nichts dergleichen. Die "Teile" bedeuten Verhältnisse und Mischungsquanten. Auch z.B. die "Schnitzel" von den "Gliedern des Wildes," an denen die Hunde die Spur aufnehmen. Auch zur Lehre von den "Poren" und "Abflüssen" bedarf es keiner Elementarpartikeln. Auch Fr. A 37 (Aristoteles *Metaph.* 985 a 21) sind die "Teilchen" (*moria*) keine Atome oder dergleichen, geschweige die "Samen" in Fr. 92. Nirgends wird auch nur ein Problem sichtbar, zu dessen Lösung es einer solchen Hypothese bedürfte. "Elemente vor den Elementen," "Pröta" werden dem Empedokles erst zugeschrieben bei Galen und bei Aetius. Und da ist ihre Bedeutung klar: es gilt den Unterschied zwischen den vier Elementen im Empedokleischen und im stoischen Sinn. Die Frage ist stoischen Ursprungs. Die Empedokleischen Elemente sind unwandelbar, die stoischen in fortwährendem Übergang. So gleichen die stoischen Elemente in ihrer mikrokosmischen Vereinigung dem "Vierlingsmittel," der Tetrapharmakos, der später bekannten Droge, darin die vier Ingredienzien, die sie ergeben, verwandelt sind und eine neue "Qualität" ergeben. Die Empedokleischen vier Elemente dagegen

gleichen der Mischung eines "Pulvers," dessen kleinste Teilchen nebeneinander liegen. D.h. es gibt bei ihnen keine "Verwandlung," keine stoische ἀλλοίωσις. Kranz hält an seiner Auffassung fest, vgl. *Hermes*, XLVII (1912), S. 24 ff. Meine Kritik daran in *Kosmos und Sympathie* (1926), S. 26 ff. hält er für irrig. Vgl. seine Anmerkung zu A 43 der *Vorsokratiker*. Die Gegen Gründe würde ich gern erfahren.

Bestimmend wurde hierbei, wie es scheint, für Kranz das Malergleichnis. Aber auch das Malergleichnis ist nicht eigentlich technischer Art. Nicht wie die Mischungsfarben aus den Grundfarben hervorgehen, ist die Frage, sondern wie die *Bilder* der Geschöpfe aus den gemischten Farben hervorgehen. Wie die Bilder unter den kunstvollen Händen der Maler aus den Farben hervorgehen, so gehen die Geschöpfe aus den Elementen hervor, das Kunstvolle aus dem scheinbar Un-Kunstvollen. Aber das ist eine ganz andere Art des Vergleichs als jene, die der wissenschaftlichen Veranschaulichung dient: gemischtes Pulver oder Tetrapharmakos. Das Malergleichnis gehört zur Vorstellung von Aphrodite als der Handwerkerin: Aphrodite (gleich Harmonia) "leimt" die Knochen (Fr. 96), "fügt die Augen zusammen" (Fr. 86), "zimmert sie mit Liebespflocken" und fertigt "mit ihren Händen" die Geschöpfe (Fr. 75.95.).

Ich kann mich des Eindrucks nicht- wehren, dass die Theorie der "Pröta" oder Partikeln mit der Empedokleischen Bildersprache schwer vereinbar ist. Wenn da z.B. das Süsse das Süsse "umarmt," das Bittere das Bittere "bespringt" das Saure auf Saures "steigt," das Heisse auf Heissem "reitet" (Fr. 90), oder wenn die Elemente dem Erkennenden zu Diensten sind oder ihn verlassen, je nach dem Grade seiner Hingabe und Lauterkeit, so werden sie allerdings in ihrer höchst lebendigen Kraft, in ihrer naturisch strömenden all-

durchdringenden Fülle geschaut, wie Kranz das selbst so schön beschrieben hat. Aber es würde mir schwer fallen zu glauben—von der Kritik an der Überlieferung abgesehen—dass für Empedokles, wenn er denn schon der Struktur der Elemente nachdachte, was ich bezweifle, ihre Struktur nach Analogie eines unverbundenen "Pulvers" vorzustellen wäre.

Etwas ganz anderes ist die Empedokleische Zurückführung z.B. der geistigen Charaktere auf die vier "Wurzeln," anders ausgedrückt die Frage nach der Bildung und Struktur des *Organismus* hinsichtlich seiner Zusammensetzung aus den Elementen (Theophrast *De sensibus, Vorsokratiker* A 86. 10 ff.). Da sind allerdings die "Elemente" (Theophrastischer Terminus) je nach den verschiedenen Begabungen bald locker und dünn, bald dicht und klein zerstückt, im letzteren Fall z.B. ist der so organisierte Mensch rasch und unbeständig, das Blut stürmt schnell

durch die Teile hindurch usw. Aber das hat mit Elementarpartikeln nichts zu tun. Die ausgeglichenen "Mischungen" in den verschiedenen "Gliedern," sei es in der Zunge, sei es in der Hand, ergeben die Begabungen, z.B. die des Redners oder die des Kunsthandwerkers usw. Da sind es die Elemente selbst, die nicht nur bildlich, sondern leibhaftig die Hand, die Zunge führen, da stürzt das Blut—denn das Herzblut ist der "Gedanke" selbst—durch den Unbeständigen in Kaskaden, da finden wir den Empedokles wieder, den Kranz selbst uns in so ausgezeichnete Weise nahe gebracht hat.

Freuen wir uns des Errungenen. Ich bin dem Verfasser für reiche Belehrung dankbar.

Druck und Ausstattung und fünf vorzügliche Abbildungen sind des Gehaltes würdig.

FRANKFURT AM MAIN

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### ARISTOTLE ON THE ELECTORS OF MANTINEA AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

By the electors of Mantinea is meant a body of men which, at a certain period in the history of the city, elected its magistrates. According to Aristotle (*Politics* 1318 b 23) this belonged to a time in the past when the masses did not have a share in the elections but left them to men who were *αἵρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων*, though the people did control deliberations. In other words, though there was a primary assembly which acted directly on other matters, it delegated the elections to a smaller body. Aristotle's words imply that the members of this body were themselves elected and that there was no special property or age qualification for membership other than those required for active citizenship. He does not give us any further information about the size of the body or about how the principle of rotation was applied in the selection of members. The form of government in question is classified as a species of democracy. It has been dated tentatively about 421 B.C.<sup>1</sup> Fougères, who has the fullest discussion, places it about 425 B.C. and connects it with the legislator, Nicodorus.<sup>2</sup>

We may wonder about this strange democracy in which the people retained the deliberative authority but delegated the power to elect. Sainte-Croix<sup>3</sup> called it a representative government, but this is hardly correct for a government in which the deliberative power was lodged in a primary assembly, but yet it has a bearing on the Greek experience with representation. The electoral college, if this expression may be pardoned, was itself a representative body, and the frank employment of representation here shows that the practice held no mysteries for the Greeks. At any rate, when Aristotle mentioned the Mantinean college, it already belonged to the past.

The discovery of this passage caused mingled feelings. To come upon evidence which

has been overlooked in discussions of important problems always brings a thrill. On the other hand, in this case it also brought a blush on behalf of the scholars and students of Greek political institutions, who have continued to think and say that Greek electoral assemblies always were primary assemblies in spite of direct evidence to the contrary in what is perhaps the most widely read book on Greek political institutions. The discovery also brought a very special blush on my own behalf. Recently, in arguing that we cannot take for granted that the elections in federal states always were conducted by primary assemblies, I had no evidence to cite except the *archairesiake ekklesia* of the Lycian League.<sup>4</sup> Aristotle supplies us with a better and earlier example and implies that it was not unique. To be sure, his example of delegation of elections is from a city-state, but, if it was possible in a city-state, it was, a fortiori, also possible in a federal state.

Though delegation of the power to elect as practiced at Mantinea and probably other Greek cities does not constitute representative government, Aristotle does refer to the latter form of government in another passage when he speaks of government in which the deliberative power is in the hands of an elected body as a species of oligarchy (1298 a 40). He has just spoken of moderate oligarchy with participation depending on a small property qualification and continues: *ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευέσθαι μετέχωσιν ἀλλ' αἵρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δ' ἄρχωσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν* (1298 a 40-b 2).<sup>5</sup> Here clearly the meaning is not merely that participation is dependent upon a property qualification but that of those so qualified some are elected to wield the deliberative authority. In other forms of oligarchy the membership is self-perpetuating through cooption or heredity. The entire passage, how-

ever, is a little difficult to interpret, partly because the sentence quoted is so compressed, and partly because *αἰετοί* has immediately before been used in connection with moderate oligarchy. At first glance it might look as if the meaning there too is that members are elected from among the citizens with the required property qualification, but, when we see the clause καὶ ἐξῇ κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν and find contrasted with this *ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευέσθαι μετέχωσιν*, then it becomes clear that there is a contrast between two forms of oligarchy. Under the first, all citizens with the necessary property are members of the deliberative body and anyone who acquires the required amount is automatically admitted; under the second, the members are elected from those eligible. In the first place (1298 a 36), *αἰετοί* means "eligible," as Newman renders it, or "elected" or "chosen" in the sense that everyone with the property qualification is thereby admitted into the body;<sup>6</sup> in the second place (1298 b 1), it means "elected by vote" in the sense that the members are elected from among the citizens with the required property qualification.<sup>7</sup>

To return to the general meaning of the passage, it is clear that Aristotle speaks of four types of oligarchy. In the first, all citizens with the required property qualification serve in the deliberative body; in the second, these citizens elect the members of the deliberative body; in the third, the members are co-opted; in the fourth, membership is hereditary. The first would be a normal moderate oligarchy like the one set up in Athens in 322 B.C.; the third would be much like Athens under the control of the Areopagus; the fourth would be an extreme oligarchy; the second, almost needless to say, would be a form of representative government.<sup>8</sup> That this is found as a form of oligarchy rather than democracy is not surprising.

To make it completely clear that the government Aristotle has in mind is a representative government, it may be well to point out that the deliberative body he has in mind is not a boule or a probouleutic council but the body which has the final say. The distinction between the first two forms of oligarchy is that under the one all active citizens share in the

deliberative authority; in the other, only elected representatives. The one is governed by a primary assembly; the other, by a representative assembly. The expression for sharing in the deliberative authority is *μετέχειν τοῦ βουλευέσθαι*, and in this part of the *Politics*, *τὸ βουλευέσθαι* includes most of the essential functions of government. Aristotle has just been describing the three elements in government as the deliberative, the magistracies, and the judicial, but of these three *τὸ βουλευόμενον* controls everything of importance. It has authority in questions of war and peace and alliances, in legislation, over capital trials, exile, and confiscation of property, and over the election and the holding to account of magistrates (1298 a 3). This must be the general definition he has in mind when in 1298 a 40 he speaks of the deliberative authority even if he may not have thought of every detail as applying. In the case of Mantinea, the power to elect, which is delegated to an electoral college, is a separate power distinct from *τὸ βουλευέσθαι*, but this passage occurs in another book, and a slightly different treatment of the same subject would surprise no student of the *Politics*. In any case, so much is included in the deliberative authority that any state in which this is entrusted to an elected representative body can be said to have a representative government.

Thus, what Aristotle had in mind, clearly was representative government. It is a pity that he did not give an example, as in the case of the electoral college of Mantinea, but we cannot believe that his discussion of forms of government is completely divorced from reality. Somewhere among the petty Greek *poleis* there must have been a city with a government approximately like the one which he presupposes. It is possible to suggest the government of the Five Thousand at Athens, under which one fourth of the active citizens had a right to make final decisions (*Ath. pol.* 30. 3-4), but it is unlikely that Aristotle had this in mind. Another suggestion is that the government of some cities in their evolution towards democracy went through a stage in which they possessed representative government,<sup>9</sup> but it is unlikely that he meant this either. It is more

likely that he had in mind some oligarchic government of his own time. At any rate, representative government did not seem strange or impossible to him. Again, it is a pity that it neither seemed strange enough nor important enough to deserve a fuller discussion. The omission of such a discussion is a measure of the extent to which direct government almost monopolized the political thought of the Greeks.<sup>10</sup> Yet it is well to remember that political thought depends much on style and taste and that we cannot measure the importance of an institution by the number of pages devoted to it by theorists.

André Aymard's brilliant and important article, "L'Organisation de la Macédoine en 167 et le régime représentatif dans le monde grec," which appeared in the April number of *Classical Philology*, reached me only after the above discussion had been written. The analysis of Livy's evidence for the organization of Macedonia in 167, in which Aymard so largely agrees with my own interpretation and, at times, even goes beyond it, naturally is most welcome. Yet almost more welcome is the part of the article in which he states his general view on representative government in antiquity and in which he does not agree with me. It is a reconstruction which has much in its favor. Not least valuable is the demonstration that even in the city-state the percentage of citizens attending primary assemblies was small. Consequently it cannot be taken for granted that the inevitably poor attendance at the meetings of primary assemblies in large federal states would cause offense and thus result in the formal transformation of primary assemblies into representative assemblies. Also the

view that representative institutions developed through the abandonment of primary assemblies as the result of a sort of lassitude after local governments had lost most of their power has much in its favor. Nevertheless, I do not believe the picture entirely correct, and the material presented above furnishes an additional reason for believing that the Greeks had more knowledge and experience of representative government than modern scholars usually have thought. This, to be sure, proves nothing about any particular organization of later times, but, in my opinion, other evidence suggests that the Greeks of the second century before Christ—even though one league founded in the period, that of the Magnetes, had a primary assembly—considered representative government as normal for federal states. Aymard's challenge to this position is probably most important for Thessaly, for which some very close interpretation of Livy is involved. If, at least for the time being, we count Thessaly out, this leaves, aside from the four Macedonian republics, only Lycia, but Lycia, if we follow the natural implication of the evidence, should continue to carry considerable weight. As for Macedonia, Polybius' *συνεδριακή πολιτεία* implies representative government, and, in the absence of any evidence for primary assemblies, we must conclude that the governments of the four republics in all likelihood lacked such assemblies and, in any case, were essentially representative. Finally, the implications of the language of Polybius in xxxi. 2. 12 are even more important—but on this point those who have considered the passage will either agree or disagree, and further discussion is useless.

## NOTES

1. Gilbert, *Staatsalterthümer*, II (1885), 126 and n. 2; Ernest Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (1946), p. 263, n. 3.

2. Gustave Fougères, *Mantinée et l'Arcadie orientale* (1898), pp. 335–38.

3. *Des anciens gouvernements fédératifs* (ed. of 1804), pp. 167 f.

4. *CP*, XLIV (1949), 88.

5. In his edition Immsch has substituted ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς for ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ.

6. There apparently has been a debate on the question whether admission into the deliberative body or *aditus ad rem publicam* is meant (cf. Newman's commentary). It matters little. If *aditus ad rem publicam* means active citizenship, the meaning would be practically the same; cf. the statement below concerning the deliberative authority.

7. It was apparently to avoid the awkwardness of having the same word used in two different meanings in two places so close together that Immsch substi-



tuted *πρόκριτοι* in 1298 b 1. This does not greatly alter the meaning, but it is a questionable procedure. In the first place, *πρόκριτοι* is not as good a word as the one it replaces but commonly is used to refer to a larger body chosen in advance to be later reduced by the use of lot. In our passage the word could not possibly have this meaning but would have to mean something like "elected in advance [of their service in the deliberative body]" or just plain "elected"—meanings not even mentioned by Liddell-Scott-Jones. Moreover we find *ἀληγοῖ* . . . *ἐκ προκρίτων* in 1298 b 9. Thus, all Immisch has accomplished is to remove one awkward case of a word used in two meanings and to substitute the similar awkward use of another. To be sure, the two occurrences are not quite so close together, but the difference between eight and five lines is hardly enough to warrant the choice of one over the other. Nor could the proper cure be to substitute *πρόκριτοι* in 1298 a 36, for by no stretch of the imagination would the word make sense there. A glance at Aristotle's text will show that in this section he has used *αἰρετοί* so often that it is better to believe that he used

it once too often and that the awkwardness belongs in the text. "When in doubt leave the text as it is" would seem to be sound maxim. Finally, it may be noted that, after all, Immisch has removed *αἰρετοί* in a place in which it is used with a normal meaning and let it stand where it is used with an unusual meaning.

8. The best interpretation of the passage is Barker's translation.

9. Cf. Larsen, *CP*, XLIV (1949), 170 f.

10. When I speak of omission of discussion of the subject, I do not mean that there are no other passages in the *Politics* that have a bearing on representation and delegation of authority but merely that I have dealt with the clearest passages which have come to my attention. Other specific forms of delegation of authority, such as to ambassadors and to the Athenian dicasteries, have less direct bearing on the question before us and are too well known to require discussion.

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#### DIDACTIC PURPOSE IN THE ORESTEIA

The first system of the first stasimon of the *Choephoroi*<sup>1</sup> presents a contrast between two causes of distress in human life. The strophe deals with what we should call natural phenomena. It may be paraphrased as follows:

Earth nourishes many terrible things which are sources of fear. The waves of the sea are full of hostile beasts. There come near also fiery objects in the sky between two realms. Both winged and creeping things can mark for one's notice the gusty ill-will of whirlwinds.

That is to say: the four realms of nature (earth, water, fire, and air) give rise to things which cause human misfortune or distress.<sup>2</sup> They all belong to one class (*μὲν*). Common to all four is the fact that there are things in the natural world which mark the effect of these baneful influences, so that they can be noted (*φράσαι*). These are contrasted<sup>3</sup> in the antistrophe with misfortunes which have their origin in human thought and emotions. Aeschylus makes a division between *ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα* and *γυναικῶν* . . . *ἔρωτας* and then goes on to speak of the latter in greater detail. At the beginning of the antistrophe, Aeschylus asks, "Who can discuss these matters?" (*τίς λέγοι*).<sup>4</sup> The answer is the ode itself; the poet can and does. Or the chorus does, for on this point no distinction can be drawn between them.

In these lines we find, I believe, a clear

statement of the didactic function of the tragic poet. The *Oresteia* deals among other things with the problem of the moral responsibility of the individual for his acts as external facts in the external world of experience and of life. The problem of moral choice is made explicit in the cases of Agamemnon and of Orestes.<sup>5</sup> In the first strophe of this ode, Aeschylus implies that natural phenomena give indications from which one can forecast results. By the rhetorical question in the antistrophe he asserts that it is the function of the tragic poet to discuss the possibilities of human intention (*φρόνημα*) and human emotions (*ἔρωτας*) for doing harm.

The contrast between the aorist *φράσαι* and the present *λέγοι* seems significant. The aorist suggests that scientific knowledge of nature is possible. Thus Aeschylus emphasizes a contrast between two things, first, the area of experience where knowledge is possible by noting phenomena and, second, the type of problem tragedy deals with, human intention and emotions. Aeschylus discusses such problems as they form the proper subject matter of his poetry; but he does not pretend to have final answers to the problems raised.<sup>6</sup>

The lines at the beginning of the second strophe pose some difficult textual problems in details of phrasing, but the necessary sense of

the passage as a whole seems to be adequately paraphrased by Tucker:<sup>7</sup>

Let him who is not fledged with (ready) thought know (this truth) by learning what a deed . . . , i.e. let anyone whose own apprehension (reflection or experience) is not ready (to supply instances), perceive the truth by taking as his lesson the crime of Althaea.

The words ἴστω δ' ὅστις are sound, and the mythological examples which follow are to form the basis for the understanding Aeschylus promises. He cites the stories of Althaea, of Scylla, of Clytemestra herself, and of the Lemnian women. The last of these he says is the standard example of utter female wickedness (*Cho.* 633-34: ἤκασεν δέ τις τὸ δεινὸν αὐτῶν Λημνίαισι πῆμασιν). The principle of retribution is then stated directly (*Cho.* 635-37):

θεοστύγῃ τ' ὅς' ἄχει  
βροτῶν ἀτιμωθὲν οἴχεται γένος.  
σέβει γὰρ οὐ τις τὸ δυσφιλὲς θεοῖς.

Aeschylus makes two points here. In the divine sphere retribution overtakes the evildoer,<sup>8</sup> and he is also subject to the social disapproval of his fellow men.<sup>9</sup> Myth and statement comprise the means Aeschylus employs to discuss the moral problems which he treats. The ode ends on the theme of justice in the world of gods and men, which is a leading idea in the whole trilogy and becomes the main problem treated in the *Eumenides*.

In the *Oresteia*, the realm of Zeus and the new gods is identified with Hellas. This identification is most clearly made in the scene between Apollo and the Chorus in the *Eumenides*, where Apollo bids the Chorus leave his shrine at Delphi.<sup>10</sup> One great characteristic of the realm of Zeus is that one can learn by experience.<sup>11</sup> This is one of the contrasts between the world of the new gods and that of the old in the *Eumenides*, where the chorus says that its victim is destroyed without knowing why (*Eum.* 377: πίπτων δ' οὐκ οἶδεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄφρονι λύμῳ).<sup>12</sup>

These ideas are made specifically relevant to the *Oresteia* as a whole by the choral ode in the *Choephoroi* in which Aeschylus says that it is possible to learn the consequences of human

intention and emotions by the presentation of those consequences in myths. A small example of just this sort of thing occurs in the prologue of the *Eumenides*, where the priestess says that she is careful to mention Bromius because of the fate of Pentheus.<sup>13</sup> The point, then, of the first stasimon of the *Choephoroi* is that an understanding of certain terrifying aspects of men's actions can come from a consideration of the actions of characters in myth as examples of possible conduct, where action and result are both known. The presentation of such myths lies especially within the province of the tragic poet. The poet does not necessarily solve the moral problems presented by myth, but he does treat them in such a way that the community can understand the results of certain actions by means of the poetic representation of both action and result.

Aeschylus' conception of the didactic function of poetry as expressed in the *Oresteia* seems very similar to what later becomes standard literary theory.<sup>14</sup> The same idea is found in an amusing passage of the *Dionysiazousae* of Timocles (Fr. 6, 5-9 Kock):

ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβὼν  
πρὸς ἄλλοτρίῳ τε ψυχαγωγῆθεις πάθει,  
μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀπῆλθε παιδευθεὶς ἅμα.  
τοὺς γὰρ τραγῳδοὺς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, σκόπει  
ὡς ὠφελούσι πάντας.

The speaker then goes on to say that the beggar will find Telephus more beggarly and so on. But the idea itself is older. It is implicit, for example, in Pindar's conception of his own poetry.<sup>15</sup> It is a rare point of agreement between Aeschylus and Euripides in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes.<sup>16</sup>

In this note I have been more concerned with the specific use Aeschylus makes of the idea in the *Oresteia* than with its history. The principle that one learns by experience is employed by Aeschylus in two ways. First, the character in the drama is said to learn by his own experience; and, second, since one can also learn by the experience of others, the audience is made to participate actively in the drama presented in the theater, for it does concern them.

## NOTES

1. Aesch. *Cho.* 585-601. I cite line numbers according to the text of Gilbert Murray, *Aeschyli . . . Tragoediae* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937). The text of this whole ode is in a very unsatisfactory condition especially in regard to details of language; but the interpretation I am offering is not dependent upon any one solution to the textual problems. It is based rather on the parts of the ode on which there is general agreement among editors.

2. For the sentiment one may compare *Ag.* 1407-8. In *Eum.* 904-5 the realms of the four elements are mentioned as sources of good.

3. Cf. 585  $\mu\upsilon\nu$ , 594  $\delta\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ .

4. The construction of the optative here is discussed by A. Sidgwick, in his edition of Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), Part II, 80-81. Sidgwick considers this optative a "remote deliberative." It is usually taken as potential, cf. Raphael Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, revised by B. Gerth, Teil II, Vol. I (3d ed., 1898), 230.

5. *Ag.* 205-17; *Cho.* 299-305.

6. I do not feel certain about the significance of lines 599-601. Apparently Aeschylus means that female animals act in an unusually bold manner under the stimulus of sexual instinct, and this perception helps explain similar conduct on the part of women.

7. T. G. Tucker, *The Choephoroi of Aeschylus* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1901), p. 139. Substantially the same view of this passage is taken by Walter Headlam in George Thomson, *The Oresteia of Aeschylus* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1938), II, 207.

8. *Cho.* 639-51.

9. *Cho.* 637, cf. 613 and 632-34.

10. *Eum.* 185-97 and 229.

11. *Ag.* 177, 250.

12. Cf. *Eum.* 328-32; contrast *Eum.* 521. The second stasimon and the conclusion of the drama (cf. esp. 933) show that the world of the new gods and that of the old differ more in practice than in basic principles.

13. *Eum.* 24-26.

14. Max Pohlenz, "Die Anfänge der griechischen Poetik," *Nachrichten von der k. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1920, pp. 142-78.

15. Alfred Croiset, *La poésie de Pindare* (Paris: Hachette, 1880), pp. 152-53.

16. Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

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## THREE ACCOUNTING TERMS OF ROMAN EGYPT

The theory advanced by Mr. Verne B. Schuman in the article with the above heading in the October 1949 number of *Classical Philology* is not merely unfounded, but in most of its applications demonstrably wrong. To discuss all the evidence in detail, with full references, would entail a long article, but a brief summary is enough to prove the point.

Mr. Schuman quotes *P Fay.*, 355, in which  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$  of 10 obols are added to 20 drachmas for poll tax. In the same volume there are twenty instances of the same principal sum for poll tax, and in every instance the  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$  are 10 obols (*P Fay.*, 50, 52, 196-99, 279-84, 350-57). On his theory 20 drachmas could be paid in a number of different combinations of silver (i.e. billon) tetradrachms (staters) and copper drachmae of varying value, and each combination would occasion a different sum for  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ . It is inconceivable that in all twenty instances the tax happened, by chance, to be paid in three staters and eight 6-obol drachmae; I leave it to the mathematicians to calculate the odds against it. It is equally inconceivable that

the people were bound to pay in exactly these coins. It is evident that here the  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$  are levied at the fixed rate of 2 obols per stater, or 1/12. The rate is the same in *P Fay.*, 49, 349 and 358, in which the totals, presumably instalments, are different.

The Strassburg poll tax ostraca make the matter clearer still. In thirteen instances (*O Strass.*, 60 seq. etc.) the  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$  are described as "at the rate of 1½ ob.," and in *O Strass.*, 54 and 71, more explicitly, as "at the rate of 1½ ob. to the stater" (i.e. 1/16). Mr. Schuman quotes *O Strass.*, 55 only, the one instance in which the amount, and not the rate, of the  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$  is mentioned. But this is only another example of the same fixed rate.

In other examples of  $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$  (found, e.g., in considerable numbers in the Fayum and Rylands papyri) the rate varies, but is constant for a given tax at a given time and place. Rates of 1/5, 1/10, and 1/13 are found, as well as the 1/12 and 1/16 already mentioned. In some cases the figures are only approximately correct; since the smallest coin was the dichalcum (Milne, "Catalogue of

Alexandrian Coins in the Ashmolean Museum," Introduction), smaller fractions were counted as 2 chalci, giving government the benefit of the approximation.

The *αἰ καὶ* documents present similar facts. Seven times in six different documents 4 drachmas is equated to 3 drachmas  $4\frac{1}{2}$  obols (*O Theb.*, 34, 36, 38, 39, *O Mey.*, 37, 43). In *O Theb.*, 37, 2 drachmas 6 chalci is twelve times equated to 2 drachmas. However Mr. Schuman would explain these (presumably by postulating a 6-chalcus obol), he is once more up against the laws of chance. Here again we have a fixed rate,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  obols to the stater. The great majority of the *αἰ καὶ* examples can be explained (allowing for approximation of fractions) by this rate. A few perhaps show a different rate.

The *ῥυπαρά* documents are useless as evidence, since only one sum is mentioned in each case. Mr. Schuman's illustrations are based on the unproved premise that the sum written is the smaller or *αἰ καὶ* value. It might equally well be the nominal value of the coins.

Thus as regards two of his three accounting terms Mr. Schuman is demonstrably wrong. There is no evidence that he is right about the third. There remain his other examples to be considered.

*P Lond.*, 131:—This is clear enough, and needs no comment.

*P Lond.*, 1177, 73:—276 drachmas probably means 69 staters. At 29 obols (cf. *P Lond.*, 131) 69 staters equals 2001 obols, or 2000 obols equals 69 staters less one obol. Presumably either the 69 staters or the 2000 obols is a round figure, the odd obol being neglected.

*P Teb.*, 589:—36 drachmas, 5 obols minus 24 drachmas, 25 obols equals 8 drachmas, 7 obols. The drachma-figures are all multiples of

four, and therefore presumably represent staters, while the obol-figures in two cases exceed a drachma, in one exceeding 4 drachmas (though not a stater). This is a way of distinguishing the two metals. If the writer of *P Lond.*, 131 had used this device, he would have written 68 drachmas, 19 obols instead of 71 drachmas, 1 obol. The equation may be written:—9 staters, 5 obols minus 6 staters, 25 obols equals 2 staters 7 obols. Treated algebraically this gives:—1 stater equals 27 obols; a result I reached independently, though I see from Mr. Schuman's article that West and Johnson reached it before me. Indeed it is obvious.

To conclude, there is evidence that the billon stater was sometimes reckoned at more than its nominal value in the copper coinage. Rates of 29 and 27 obols to the stater are indicated, and, since the rate varied, others are possible. The variation in the rate of *προσδιαγραφόμενα* between different taxes at the same time and place, even in the same document (e.g., *P Fay.*, 41), throws considerable doubt on the connection, suggested by various scholars, between these and the billon-copper exchange rate; though it remains possible that some *προσδιαγραφόμενα* (e.g., perhaps the  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ob. rate from a  $25\frac{1}{2}$  ob. stater, or the 2 ob. rate from a 26 ob. stater) had this origin, and others a different origin, or that, at first imposed as a result of the exchange-rate, the *προσδιαγραφόμενα* remained "frozen" at the different rates at which they were imposed, regardless of changes in the exchange-rate. On the other hand a connection between the  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ob. *προσδιαγραφόμενα* for poll tax and the *αἰ καὶ* deduction at the same rate remains very probable.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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*The Philosophy of Anaxagoras: An Attempt at Reconstruction.* By FELIX M. CLEVE. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1949. Pp. 167+24.

*La Filosofia di Anassagora.* By DAVIDE CIURNELLI. ("Problemi d'oggi: Collana di filosofia e storia della filosofia," Series III, Vol. IV.) Padova: CEDAM, 1947. Pp. 77.

The title of Zafiropulo's book is misleading because only the second of its two parts deals with Anaxagoras. The first part, or "Introduction," twice as long, is an essay on Pythagoreanism with the title "The Traditional Greek Myth from Thales to Plato." One of its purposes, and a commendable one, is to refute those who take the presocratic philosophers for fledgling physicists in the modern sense of the term rather than for metaphysicians who were trying, as the author puts it (pp. 226 and 265 f.), to harmonize the spiritual and the material. The essay is at first baffling, but eventually the guiding lines emerge clearly. We are told that "the traditional Greek myth" originated from primitive totemistic (p. 220 and later) and animistic (p. 223 and later) views, which were step by step rationalized and refined. Pythagoras, reforming Orphism, established the Myth in its canonic form, and in that form it was adopted and implicitly believed in by all Greek thinkers and poets from the sixth to the fourth century; only the Sophists rebelled against it. Plato gave the Myth its final perfection, while Aristotle abandoned it altogether. The substance of the Myth is, briefly, the following. The world has a divine soul (hence Anaxagoras' theory of *Nous*, p. 233), and all things likewise have souls. The aggregate of these souls consti-

tutes a spiritual world, which is in constant interaction with the material world. Every event in the material world is caused by a spiritual power as well as by a material force; and from each event, be it material or spiritual, issue consequences on both planes. Harmony is the supreme law, and man has to live a holy life because whatever he does becomes automatically operative also on the spiritual plane. The Myth produced absurd superstitions but also real science (p. 193); the latter because Pythagoreanism required from the individual, for his own purification and improvement (pp. 202 f.), devotion to research. The existence of the Myth explains, in short, the fact that the Greeks, their sound realism notwithstanding, indulged in abstract speculations, and the main purpose of the essay is to establish a solution for this "psychological problem."

The theory which we summarized is presented with some good sense and even occasional wisdom (e.g., on p. 74), but it has more than one fatal defect. Too much of it rests on mere assertion; too many of the assumptions are as implausible as they are arbitrary; and the scanty attempts at documentation are too often unsuccessful.

Three examples will show how the author mishandles quotations from Plato; for one thing, the context is entirely ignored.

1. A sentence from the *Sophist* (238a), ἀριθμὸν δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν ("we reckon number among the things that are"), is rendered by Zafiropulo "according to us, number in its entirety is identical with Being (*c'est l'Être*)," and is taken as "a definition of Being" (pp. 88 f. and 245); that makes Plato a Pythagorean pure and simple.

2. In the *Phaedo* (37c), after ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν . . . , we read ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ . . . . The latter clause is translated by the author "when the soul examines itself (*s'examine*) in and by itself," and we are told that it refers to an examination of



conscience (pp. 109 and 147); that imputes to Plato a Pythagorean practice. The same quotation from the *Phaedo* is further declared to imply a supposedly Pythagorean "acceptance (of one's lot) with all the shades of love and effort which this word (i.e., acceptance?) connoted for the Greeks" (p. 130).

3. Again in the *Phaedo* (115e), Socrates warns his disciples not to use the expression "we are going to bury *Socrates*" but rather to speak of his *body* that is to be laid to rest; for the loose way of putting it, so he says, is not only incorrect but also harmful to the souls (scil., because it suggests mortality of the self). Zafropulo uses the sentence τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν . . . κακὸν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς as evidence for the alleged belief that "every word is a more or less magic formula" and "leaves in the spiritual world an indelible trace with the evolution of which one will henceforth have to reckon" (p. 154).

The theory of an all-pervasive Myth allows the author to exploit for his purposes any passage from any philosopher or poet of the period, and it also crowds out a more direct treatment of the actual history of Greek philosophy. Some incidental remarks do not seem helpful, as when we are told, without elaboration, on p. 54 that "both Leucippus and Democritus stem from Anaxagoras," or on p. 248 that "Plato's concept of 'forms' stems directly from Anaxagoras' theory of the *Nous*."

The preface, short but cryptic, to the "Introduction" declares that it will deal exclusively with ancient psychology; nowhere will the author play the part of a historian or Hellenist; wherever facts are to be summarized or some special points to be established, he will take cover behind the authority of those few (modern) writers whose opinions are generally recognized; the thesis of the "Introduction" is of a sweeping nature; detailed polemic will be reserved for the second part, which may be properly called a study of Anaxagoras.

The second part, though likewise full of mistakes, is on a higher level and includes material which would deserve a full discussion, were it not for the fact that the issues are too complex to argue out here. Suffice it to say that Zafropulo follows Paul Tannery (*Pour l'histoire de la science hellène* [Paris, 1887]) rather closely, and on that basis attempts a

rigorous reconstruction of the Anaxagorean system. In any such venture, a correct understanding of the fundamental concepts is crucial. The term σπέσματα is rendered by the author "quality points" and is said to refer to material points, infinitely small, of an individual quality; this is a precarious assumption because Anaxagoras explicitly refuses to acknowledge a "smallest" (Frag. B 3). To the plural χρήματα Zafropulo assigns the meaning "quality fluids," while the singular χρήμα is supposed to refer, with equal fixity, to any "thing in general"; this is impossible in the light of Frags. B 9 and B 17, in which Anaxagoras uses singular and plural in direct correlation.

With all its imperfections the book contains one delightful chapter (II 5) on "The Theory of Anaxagoras in Modern Language." The ten-page chapter elaborates a remark of Tannery's (pp. 285 f.) which, while admittedly transposing one of the ideas of the ancient Ionian into a vastly different medium, yet brilliantly illuminates that particular aspect of his theory of substances. "Let us suppose for a moment," so Zafropulo begins his discussion, "that we have managed to define  $n$  independent qualities which represent all observable qualities of matter (density, temperature, etc.). If we give these  $n$  coefficients such values as have been determined for a certain point, we shall have defined exactly the nature and condition of the matter occupying that point." Although Anaxagoras did not operate with points, yet he contended that every quality is present everywhere, with its amount or concentration varying from place to place, but never reduced to zero.

None of the three authors under review has availed himself of the Göttingen dissertation by Otto Jöhrens (*Die Fragmente des Anaxagoras* [Bochum-Langendreer, 1939]), in which the authentic fragments are studied with good results. The present difficulties in obtaining books may also be responsible for the fact that neither Cleve nor Ciurnelli used the fifth edition of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, edited by Walther Kranz. All three books refer to doxographic material without adding the number under which the text is printed in the

*Vorsokratiker*, an all too common practice which compels the reader to waste a considerable amount of time in consulting the *Stellenregister* by Kranz. There are too many errors in reference numbers and too many misprints in Zafropulo's and Ciurnelli's books, including, in the latter, the insidious mistake "im-moto" for "in moto" (p. 28, n. 22). These two works also lack an index. The elaborate typographical arrangement in Cleve's book merits a special commendation.

According to Cleve, what Anaxagoras taught was as follows: The primary constituents of the universe are a great but not infinite number of qualities, such as the wet and the dry, the hot and the cold, the dense and the rare, the light and the dark, and even the great and the small. There is no underlying substance in which the qualities are inherent, but they are themselves substances with spatial extension, interpenetrating mutually. They are organized in molecules (= *συγκρινώμενα*) for which Cleve coins the term *mereias* (*μέρειαι*). There is no void because the molecules are imbedded in Mind, which likewise has spatial extension and fills the interstices of the molecules. Mind, "the ruler element and construction engineer," utilizes for the creation of worlds two natural forces that exist independently: it employs gravity for stratification according to specific weight as between center and periphery of the sphere; and through the centrifugal force which results from the whirl, Mind keeps the heavenly bodies from falling on the earth. The angular velocity of the whirl, however, and the ensuing centrifugal force are lesser near the periphery than in the center because otherwise the stars would recede farther and farther from the earth. Anaxagoras assumed that the earth revolves also, although he did not dare say so openly because he feared to give offense. By virtue of centrifugal force, the earth flattened out and received a drum-like shape. Mind keeps building simultaneously an infinite number of equidistant worlds, starting from the centers and expanding them continuously; as soon as the worlds will be on the point of overlapping, the process will be reversed, and so on *ad infinitum*.

The above is only a partial summary, but even so it will show the author's ingenuity and the spirit in which he reconstructs the teachings of Anaxagoras. Cleve's suggestion that the qualities interpenetrate is probably correct; many others, like the assumption of molecules, seem unacceptable. His rotation mechanics, based on an intricate interplay of gravity and centrifugal force, collapses if, with Ciurnelli (p. 58) and others, we prefer to follow the lead which Aristotle gives in *De Caelo* 295a 9-14 (*Vorsokr.* A 88). The creation mechanics of earlier philosophers, says Aristotle, were founded on the observation that heavier and bulkier bodies in whirling air or in a rotating liquid tend to collect and settle near the center. This is indeed the case; sand in a whirling gust of wind, or vegetables in a dish of soup which we stir, do behave in that fashion, and, to all appearances, a centripetal force develops under these conditions.

Ciurnelli's book is an essay on Anaxagoras' fundamental philosophy rather than on the details on his cosmogony and astronomy, and it deals with its subject on adequate terms. The author ponders the various possible interpretations for the fragments we possess; he formulates the problems which Anaxagoras believed to have solved with his contentions; he looks for coherence or lack of it in the system; and he asks the pertinent question: How far did the thinker pursue his own thoughts, and where did he arrest them? Special emphasis is put on a historical understanding of Anaxagoras' philosophy: What previous views he adopted, what views he surmounted, and what views he could afford to ignore at the stage then reached. There are, however, some omissions. Parmenides' theory of elemental mixture in the lower reaches of the phenomenal world is not mentioned, and it does not seem to have been recognized that Anaxagoras in Frag. B 5 directly refers to Frag. B 3 of his contemporary Zeno, and in Frag. B 3 to the end of Zeno's Frag. B 1. No one will probably assent to all Ciurnelli's opinions, and yet every reader will feel benefited by his competent discussion of significant issues. Of the five chapters, three (on the life of Anaxagoras, on his theory of souls, and on his epistemology)

lean too heavily on incomplete and unreliable evidence, but the two longest chapters, on "Mind" and on "Nature," give a penetrating analysis of Anaxagoras' teachings in the light of the history of Greek philosophy.

The general historical picture is somewhat overdrawn. As Ciurnelli sees it, Anaxagoras had two purposes in mind when he constructed his system (p. 19). He tried, not with full success, to consolidate into one doctrinal body the various traditional "motifs" of presocratic naturalism; and he also attempted for the first time to explain the world by a principle of a rational nature. But Ciurnelli feels that it was a mistake to put the new wine into old bottles. "The nous remains simply nous, that is, without a content to mediate its activity . . . ; Mind in its nakedness could not be in immediate contact with brute matter, could not operate on it except in a mechanical manner, because it had nothing of its own to devolve on matter, to realize in matter" (pp. 38 f.). That statement does not do justice to Anaxagoras. For him, nature in the raw is primarily indiscriminate, and Mind is primarily the faculty of discrimination (hence his predilection for compounds of *κρίνειν*: *ἀπο-, ἐκ-, δια-, συγ-*; perhaps also *είσ-*, A 93, and *κρίνειν* itself, A 92. 28). Boldly and naïvely, Anaxagoras fuses the intellectual power of distinction and choice with the mechanical force of separation and sifting (hence the defects of his system which Plato and Aristotle criticized, Frag. A 46). Since discriminating Mind is bent on constructive purposes, the selecting, sundering, and taking apart of the material goes hand in hand with the putting together of the things-to-be (Frag. B 17). It is through severing and recombining that the world of inanimate things is brought about. For the production of viable organisms, the seed or semen is differentiated (*διακρίνεσθαι*) into the several stuffs that make up a plant or body (Frag. B 10, A 107), and for their growth and maintenance, the nourishment is similarly broken up into its several components: wood, bark, fruits, etc.; or bone, flesh, hair, etc. (Frag. A 45). Finally, Mind creates civilization and a social order, also by virtue of intelligent picking out and gathering in, by segregation and congregation.

The last point, civilization by means of some sort of *ἀπόκρισις* and *σύγκρισις*, stamps the Anaxagorean system as anthropocentric rather than physiocentric: the final triumph of Mind is human civilization. This important fact, which escaped the authors here reviewed, has been recognized by some scholars (W. Graf Uxkull-Gyllenband, *Griech. Kulturentstehungslehren* [Berlin, 1924], pp. 6 ff.; G. Vlastos, *Philosoph. Rev.*, 1946, pp. 53 f. and *Amer. Journ. Philol.*, 1946, 57 f.); but they could not arrive at a full fruition of their own discovery because with the consensus of opinion they thought that Anaxagoras assumed plural worlds and/or plural mankind. The matter can be dealt with here only in summary fashion, but even so a brief discussion may be in order. The evidence is Frag. B 4a, that is, the first paragraph of what is printed in the *Vorsokratiker* as Frag. B 4; a continuity with the second paragraph is neither attested nor probable. What other world "just like ours" has Anaxagoras in mind here—the same Anaxagoras who in another context (Frag. B 8) speaks of "the one kosmos"? The much disputed problem can be settled, I believe, by a close grammatical analysis of the beginning and the end of the text; as to the latter, the optative with *ἂν* is the standard form of expression for a mental experiment. What Anaxagoras claims is, in effect, this: "On the basis of the principles which I have just set forth, we are compelled to draw certain conclusions (*Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, χρὴ δοκεῖν . . .*) with respect to any thing, and any world, in process of construction (*πάντα τὰ συγκρινόμενα*); and step by step, with logical cogency, there will emerge before the eye of the mind a perfect duplicate of the world as we know it. . . ; that, then, was what I wanted to explain with regard to *ἀπόκρισις*, namely, that the *ἀπόκρισις* as I describe it would have taken place in the same manner not only in our own world but anywhere else as well (*οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἡμῖν μόνον ἀποκριθείη ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῃ*: for our paraphrase of *καὶ ἄλλῃ* in connection with the optative and *ἂν*, cf. *Od.* iv. 649: *τί κεν ῥέξειε καὶ ἄλλος, κτλ.*, 'any one else would have done exactly the same thing'; xvii. 580: *ἂν πέρ κ' οὔοιτο καὶ ἄλλος*, 'any one else would have felt the same way about

it'; *Il.* vi. 329)." In other words: A postulated world, no matter where, as deduced from Anaxagoras' basic premises is identical in every respect with the actual world as we have it here, and the correspondence guarantees the correctness of his fundamental assumptions.

In order to demonstrate the correspondence between theory and fact, Anaxagoras surveys in *Frag. B 4a* what evidently must be for him the salient points of his system, using ἀπόκρισις and συγκρίνεσθαι as lead notions. When Mind assembled the world (τὰ συγκρινόμενα) for man to live in, it contained, thanks to the all-in-all mixture (ἐνείναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα), the "seeds" for everything that was wanted; men and the animals were synthesized (ΣΤΜπαγῆναι); man has congregated in communities (πόλεις ΣΤΝοικημέναι); sun, moon, and stars are separated off for his benefit (αὐτοῖσιν εἶναι); he uses the constructive powers of his mind (ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα); the earth offers him an indiscriminate variety of all things (πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα), from which he sorts out and gathers into his household what is most serviceable (ὧν τὰ ὀνήιστα ΣΤΝενεγκάμενοι εἰς τὴν οἴκησιν χρώνται).—The concept of civilization through separation is further illustrated, with amusing detail, by *Frag. B 21b*. In this fragment, which can now be appreciated in its original purport, Plutarch sets forth how man exploits the animal kingdom: ἐμπειρία δὲ καὶ μνήμη καὶ σοφία καὶ τέχνη, κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν, σφῶ (σφῶ scripsi: σφῶν libri) τε (var. *l.* *τι*) αὐτῶν χρώμεθα, καὶ βλῖττομεν καὶ ἀμέλγομεν, καὶ φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες. That is, we methodically plunder and appropriate the animals (φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν), seizing and collecting what we can use (ΣΤΛαμβάνοντες, cf. τὰ ὀνήιστα συνενεγκάμενοι κτλ. in *Frag. B 4a*), robbing bees of their honey, milking sheep, goats, and cows, and generally taking what is by right theirs (σφῶ αὐτῶν χρώμεθα). All this extracting and abstracting may very well be included in the broad term ἀπόκρισις.

If our tradition yields scanty evidence for the general perspective of Anaxagoras' system, with human civilization at its apex, the reason is the one-sided interest of our main sources.

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*Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy.* By JOHN F. CALLAHAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. Pp. xii+210. \$3.00.

Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and St. Augustine are the four ancient thinkers whose "views of time" have been chosen by Mr. Callahan for presentation. His monograph consists of a short Preface; four chapters—"Plato: Time, the Moving Image of Eternity," "Aristotle: Time, the Number of Motion," "Plotinus: Time, the Life of Soul," and "Augustine: Time, a Distention of Man's Soul"—a summarizing Conclusion; and a Select Bibliography.

The author is puzzled by the seemingly irreconcilable differences of these four "views" of one problem, a problem that he justly calls "one of the most important in the history of philosophy." True, one could try to understand those four positions as phases in one development, as phases in the biography, as it were, of the problem itself that appears to have, as problems usually do, a history of its own that begins after a long previous period of problem blindness. But the author is not inclined to take this attitude. He considers the four theories just various patterns of solution, just "points of view," and finally, in his Conclusion (page 188), even declares outright "that the problem of time is an entirely different problem for each of the four ancient philosophers." It is only in harmony with this surprising result that there is in the whole book no formulation, by the author himself, of what the "problem of time" is, philosophically.

Despite this somewhat questionable conclusion, however, the book is dedicated to demonstrating that the differences of the "different approaches" to "the" problem stem from the different "philosophical methods" of those thinkers and their different "views of reality as a whole." In order to prove this assumption, which no doubt is very valuable heuristically, the author reproduces the pertinent presentations by those philosophers.

This handy juxtaposition in one volume of most of the contexts in which these Big Four deal with the problem of time is one of the greatest merits of this meritorious book. For the "paraphrases" and "summaries" are, in

the main, translations of whole paragraphs, and even chapters, of the contexts. The reader's enjoyment of this fact is lessened, however, by the failure of the author to make these translations recognizable as such either by quotation marks or any other typographical means. For an occasional "says Timaeus" or "continues Aristotle" can earmark a paraphrase as well as a translation. The reader's enjoyment of this diligent and assiduous work is further dampened by the fact that the translations are not always correct.

The four chapters are of varied value. In the Plato chapter the author has unnecessarily multiplied the difficulties of his task by repeating the whole discussion in *Timaeus* "leading up to the entrance of time into the dialogue." Thus, not only is the impression given that the main purpose of the dialogue is the discussion of time, but also a great many pitfalls would have been avoided by omitting this lengthy presentation.

Hypnotized by Plato's brilliant allegorical designation of time as a "moving image of eternity"—which he takes more or less literally, disregarding that Plato himself says "something like (*τινα*) a moving image"—the author, when he finally gets to the topic, fails to penetrate to the core of Plato's conceptions about time.

Plato distinguishes "parts of time" and "sorts of time." Day, night, month, year are the *parts of time*. Since these cannot exist before there is a heaven with celestial bodies, there is no time without the heaven. *Χρόνος δ' οὐν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν* (38B). No whole can exist unless its parts exist.

This lucid, though naïve,<sup>1</sup> argumentation is obscured by the author in his translation (page 16) of the first of the decisive passages (37 D, E):

So he [the Demiurge] thought to make a moving image of eternity and in the very act of ordering the universe he made an image of eternity

<sup>1</sup> Here we have a clear and genuinely Platonic confounding of time with so-called time measurement, this latter not being a measuring of time at all, but always of something produced by time. Cf. the chapter, "Die unechte Zeitlänge oder die Protenität und die Chronogene," in the section, "Die sukzessive Apperzeption und die sukzessive Rejektion der Empfindungen in der Form der Zeit," in Adolf Stöhr's *Psychologie*, 2d ed.; Leipzig, 1922, pp. 250-54.

abiding as it were [?] in unity, an eternal image proceeding according to number. This image we call time. Days, nights, months, and years did not exist before the creation of the universe, but came into being when it was fashioned. All these are parts of time.

But the Greek text says:

εἰκὼ δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινήτῳ τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν לוῦσαν αἰῶνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὀνομάκαμεν. ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνιστάμενῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρος χρόνου κτλ.

The author has overlooked that *διακοσμῶν* needs no object necessarily (cf. Plato, *Phaedon* 97 C; Hippol. *Ref.* i. 8. 1 f.; and elsewhere); that *οὐρανόν* can be, and here obviously is, the object of *ποιεῖ* and means "world of celestial bodies" or "heaven," and not, "the universe"; that the word *δὴ* has to be heeded, too; and that *γάρ* must by no means be dropped in such a context. He ought, therefore, to have rendered that passage rather as follows:

But he intends to make something like a moving image of eternity, and when building up the world (*διακοσμῶν*) he simultaneously makes heaven a numerically (*κατ' ἀριθμὸν*) proceeding, eternal [or—if one prefers Cornford's<sup>2</sup> really tempting conjecture *ἀέναον*—eternally fleeting] image of in oneness staying eternity, that image which we just (*δὴ*) call time. For (*γάρ*) days and nights and months and years, not existing before heaven originates, he engineers into their origination at that same time when it [heaven] is put together. These, however, are the parts of time.

But then Plato also speaks of *sorts of time*: the "it is," which alone is correctly applied to the eternal being (*ἀίδιος οὐσία*) according to the "correct speech" (*κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον*, namely, of Parmenides, who is not mentioned with a word in the whole book), and the two *γεγονότα εἶδη*, the two mortal, evanescent sorts, the "it was" and the "it will be." Here Plato touches the real problem, though more in the direction toward the Parmenidean time-

<sup>2</sup> F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, London, 1937, p. 98, annot. 1.



lessness of the *μένων αἰών ἐν ἐνί*, the *semper stans aeternitas*, than toward the one of the problems of time, the seeming nonexistence of past and future.

All this is missing in Mr. Callahan's Plato chapter. There is no mention either of another problem of time, its irreversibility,<sup>3</sup> that half jokingly is dealt with by Plato in his *Politikos* (270 E).<sup>4</sup>

The Aristotle chapter carefully follows "the argument in the order laid down by Aristotle" in his extensive treatment of time in the *Physics* iv, chapters 10-14. Here, too, the author abstains, in an excess of modesty, from any critical evaluation of the Aristotelian views and restricts his remarks, which are interspersed in his (not always meticulous) translations, mainly to clarifying the details of Aristotle's discussion.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, there is no mention of the fact that Aristotle is the first

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. Eibl, "Das Problem der Zeit bei den alten Denkern," in: *Archiv f. system. Philosophie*, XXVII (1922/23), 67-87 and 153-70.

<sup>4</sup> A few other examples of objectionable translations or interpretations in the Plato chapter:

"Apprehended by thought together with a definition" is not the same as *νόησει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν* nor is "conjectured by opinion together with perception but without a definition" a correct translation of *δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν*.

"The universe is the fairest of created things" perfectly misses the meaning of *ὅδε ὁ κόσμος κάλλιστος τῶν γενομένων*.

To translate *γεγονός* and *γεννητός* as "created" is misleading. It leads to smuggling Biblical conceptions into Greek thought.

The explanation of the *ψυχὴ περιελαίπτουσα* is unsatisfactory.

The position of the Demiurge is misunderstood: by no means is he merely an "analogy" or a "metaphor." On the whole, to take the *Timaeus* for a heap of metaphors and simply to say, "Now comes a new metaphor," whenever the meaning is hard to interpret, does not do justice to Plato.

All celestial bodies are gods to Plato, not only the "stars," as the author seems to believe (p. 26).

That "the Greeks thought of the orbit of the heavenly body as itself revolving" (here as everywhere in the book "revolution" is confounded with "rotation") "and carrying the body with it, as a ring carries the stone that is set in it" is simply not true. The Pythagoreans, or, to be specific, Philolaos, and Plato who adopted that conception, are not "the Greeks." (Cf. Cleve, *The Philosophy of Anaxagoras*, New York, 1949, p. 73.) But in this Mr. Callahan is merely quoting the opinion of Taylor.

<sup>5</sup> On pp. 79 and 80 the author has spared the whole lengthy elaboration on the meaning of *γνωρίσματος* (223 b 20) if he had just consulted a good dictionary. He would have found out that "knowable" is the first and basic meaning of *γνώριμος*, anyway, while "known" is only its secondary meaning.

to see clearly, and formulate expressly, the basic problems (217 b 30 ff.): the peculiarity of the "now" and the puzzle involved in the seeming nonexistence of future and past. Nor is there a discussion of why Aristotle nevertheless misses a satisfactory solution.

The longest and, to me, best chapter is the one about Plotinus. It consists in the main of translations from the seventh treatise of the third Ennead, "On Eternity and Time." The author should have emphasized more strongly that Plotinus is of the Big Four the one who for the first time strictly and with the sharpest clearness distinguishes between time and time measurement, thus with a mighty jump bringing the problem nearer to a solution by rejecting pseudo-problems that merely lead away from the real issue.

Here also, however, the translation, following for the most part the French version by Bréhier, is not always quite adequate. But it seems worthwhile mentioning only that the terms "this sensible universe" and "the intelligible universe" or "the intellectual realm" are more of an interpretation than a translation. Why not faithfully translate the lively, plastic terms Plotinus employs himself who merely says, *τὸδε τὸ πᾶν* and *ὁ κόσμος ὁ ἐκεῖ*?

The presentation of St. Augustine's profound speculation on time, as contained in those famous chapters 11-31 in the eleventh book of his *Confessions*, is unfortunately the least gratifying part of the monograph. It does not reach the heart of St. Augustine's ingenious analysis. Even the title of the chapter is unfounded. The author has overlooked that time as a distention of man's consciousness (not, "soul"; it says "animus," not "anima," in the pertinent passages!) is also merely one of those positions tried, analysed, and rejected by St. Augustine. The whole elaboration about the alleged equating by Augustine of the past and memory, the present and attention, and the future and expectation is a misunderstanding of the unmistakable, clear-cut statement that all so-called past and future are merely present items within our consciousness (*praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de praesentibus contuitus, praesens de futuris expectatio* [chapter 20]).

In chapter 27 the author could have found

St. Augustine's final conclusion. While Plotinus had made the strict distinction between time and time measurement, Augustine's analysis ends with the insight that so-called time measurement is no measuring of time at all: "*affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in te [anime meus] faciunt et, cum illae praeterierint, manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non ea quae praeterierunt, ut fieret; ipsam metior, cum tempora metior. ergo aut ipsa sunt tempora, aut non tempora metior.*" (Italics are mine.)

Neither is it St. Augustine's intention "to reconcile the indivisible present with the fact that time is usually thought of as passing in an extended succession" (p. 177). Nor is it true that for him time is "the measuring activity of the soul" (p. 203). Nowhere does Augustine say any such thing.

The most amazing lapse, however, is that the author makes no mention of the answer given by St. Augustine to the question concerning the "hidden place" from which the future emerges into our present and the "hidden place" of the past into which this future immediately after having become present is rejected ("traicitur"). He is silent about Augustine's answer that the real future for us and the real past for us—not their vicariates present in us—are ever present in God's eternal "today": "et quoniam anni tui non deficiunt, anni tui hodiernus dies: et quam multum iam dies nostri et patrum nostrorum per hodiernum tuum transierunt et ex illo acceperunt modos et utcumque extiterunt, et transibunt adhuc alii et accipient et utcumque existent. tu autem idem ipse es et omnia crastina atque ultra omniaque hesternae et retro hodie facies, hodie fecisti." (*Confessions*, Book i, chapter 6; cf. also Book xi, chapter 13.)

In all philosophy and psychology there is no topic more profound, and difficult, than the elusive problem of time. An endeavor, therefore, to wrestle with this task, even though only in the form of presenting the attempts at solution made by others, is deserving of consideration and respect.

The "elusive" problem of time, I have said. Yes, indeed. There is a sentence of comment

in the Plotinus chapter of this book: "Only by substituting a temporal existence for the eternal is this power of soul able to translate perfect being into a world of division and multiplicity." Transform this sentence, almost word for word, into its strict reverse, and you will touch the solution of one of the deepest *Welträtsel*.

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*Fra Oriente e Occidente: Ricerche di storia greca arcaica.* By SANTO MAZZARINO. ("Il Pensiero storico.") Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1947. Pp. viii+412. L. 1200.

Professor Mazzarino has set for himself a very difficult problem in this book. Through a series of related studies he attempts a synthesis of the relations between the Near East and the Greek world in the archaic period. After a brief but able summary of the historiography of the subject from the eighteenth century the author sets forth his own conception of the problem: it should be a concrete historical account of the occasions and manner in which Greece entered into relations with the Orient and a definition of their respective positions. The field for the study is primarily Ionia, in the broad sense of Hellenism in Asia Minor, but the author is no Panionist. In one respect the book is very timely—there are indications not only of the perennial curiosity about western Asia Minor but of some steps being taken to satisfy it.<sup>1</sup> Yet the state of our knowledge of Greek and "native" Asia Minor in the archaic period scarcely permits of an adequate synthesis being written so that the greater part of Mazzarino's book tends rather to be a minutely detailed discussion of certain problems. Whether the author's conclusions and details of argument are accepted or not—and, from the nature of the evidence, there is much that

<sup>1</sup> Professor Mazzarino's book was too early to take into account such recent surveys as that of R. M. Cook, "Ionia and Greece in the Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.," *JHS*, LXVI (1946), 67-98; the Homeric studies in *AJA*, LII (1948), 1-198; in particular that of G.M.A. Hanfmann, "Archaeology in Homeric Asia Minor," on pp. 135-55. The latter's view that Ionia was colonized by Greeks only after 800 B.C. (p. 155) has very interesting implications for the development of the polis.

is questionable and more that is speculative—his work has the merit of focussing attention on the growth of political and social institutions. Their study, as well as that of the art products, will need some attention in the developing interest being paid to the period between 1100 and 500 B.C.

The problem is attacked primarily by two chapters concerned with tracing the growth of the respective geographical and political conceptions which Greeks and Asiatics formed of each other. Next, the relations of Ionia and Lydia are examined: first, in connection with the Heraclid dynasty of Lydia which is concluded to be a product of the Hellenization of the country so far as the name and imputed importance are considered; second, and at some length, with regard to political relations and institutions. The author concludes that there was no borrowing of political institutions from Lydia. Since there is no perceptible political influence from eastern states on Greek institutions, the Asiatic influences are of a general cultural nature. In the concluding chapters Mazzarino attempts to define the respective influences on the Greek world of the two channels through which contact was made; the seaway from the Levant to Crete, the southern islands, and continental Greece, by which the alphabet and the orientalizing influences stimulative of Greek commerce and industry were brought—in these continental Greece was ahead of Ionia; the landway by Asia Minor which was characterized by a cultural exchange between Greeks and Asiatics which influenced mythical traditions, cultural experiences, and certain military institutions like the use of hoplite armament and cavalry. The two ways are thus complementary, not exclusive. The author's treatment of the relations between Greek areas themselves is necessarily incidental although there are some interesting remarks on Ionian political development in relation to that of Greece (pp. 223 ff.).

It is regrettable that the book is not more convenient to use. It has no index and the material is presented in two sizes of type without subheadings as a guide to the matter under discussion. The author's general conclusions are set in large type and the detailed argument

on which they rest in small print. Since the detailed discussion of points is by far the greater part of the book, it is a larger volume than the number of pages might suggest. The notes, too, (pp. 323–408) contain much interesting material and bibliography—although the latter would seem to be antiquated on certain problems (e.g., the alphabet). Probably the conditions of publication in postwar Italy are to be blamed, but it is unfortunate that a provocative and suggestive book should have its use impaired.

To notice some points in detail:

In the second chapter Mazzarino attempts to trace the process by which the concept "Asia" developed into the Herodotean usage in which it denoted the entire western part of the Asiatic continent. The connotation of the name is studied in the *Iliad*, the lyric poets and the Ionic geographers. The conclusions are, in brief, that "Asia" was in origin a toponym limited to the Lydian region; that the geographical concept grew with the political power of Lydia to become equivalent to Asia Minor (a reflection of this stage may be seen in Sappho, Mimnermus and the Pseudo-Hippocratean *Hebdomad* 11); finally, as a result of the Persian conquests, the name came to denote the whole of western Asia (as in Darius' letter to Gadatas [Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I, No. 10], in Hecataeus, if it was his map which Aristagoras showed to Cleomenes, and in Herodotus). While this schematic summary does not do justice to the author's reservations and qualifications, his method seems open to some objections. The possibility of pre-political contacts of a cultural or commercial nature is not given enough weight. For example, we know that there was commercial intercourse between east Greece and Syria at an early date from the geometric pottery found at Al Mina. Thus, Greek geographical and intellectual horizons may have expanded more rapidly than the purely political contacts, on which stress is laid, would indicate. Again, I am unable to see a precise connotation of "Asia" in the passages examined by the author. Aside from the difficulty of dating the lyric poets satisfactorily for the establishment of this process of growth (the author prefers

the lower dates of Theognis, Mimnermus and Sappho) the only passage in which "Asia" is used with some geographical detail seems to be Sappho's "Marriage of Hector and Andromache" (Frag. 55a; Diehl<sup>2</sup>). Yet, its authenticity is open to grave doubts (cf. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 236 ff.), which the author's arguments do not dispel. On the other hand his treatment of the letter of Darius, of Hecataeus, and of the concept of *barbaroi* is good.

Similar criticism might be made of the third chapter in which the Asiatic concept of *Yauna* is treated, for the author considers that the Asiatics saw Greece through the Hellenism of Asia Minor and has to grapple with such controversial documents as the "Register of Peoples" in Genesis. Here again it seems possible from the existence of Al Mina that the geographical concept may have developed before the political relationships of which we have knowledge, and developed by sea-trading contacts rather than by land routes. The author argues that only in the first half of the sixth century was there a flourishing intercourse between Asia Minor and the states of western Asia. Later, Persia rediscovered Greece by a gradual process setting out from Asia Minor. In this connection a proposed revision of the chronology of Cyrus' conquests seems open to objection. It is argued that the date of the taking of Sardis should be lowered from the traditional 547 B.C. to 541 B.C. on the general grounds that Herodotus' account indicates a shorter time interval between the capture of Sardis and that of Babylon than 547-38. The late Professor Olmstead retained the traditional chronology in his recent *History of the Persian Empire* (pp. 38 ff.; the chronology of Cyrus' reign is based as far as possible on the tables of Parker and Dubberstein in *Babylonian Chronology, 626 B.C.-A.D. 45*, which Mazzarino does not appear to know).

The section of the book dealing with Greco-Lydan political relationships and political evolution in the Ionian cities is somewhat provocative and by no means entirely convincing. The view that the Lydan kings offered a precedent to the Persians in controlling the Ionian cities by means of tyrants is rejected;

the means of their influence is found in the support of noble "Lydizing" families. Evidence of such families is found in the case of Colophon, Mitylene, Cyme, Miletus and Ephesus. No regular use of such families, however, can be demonstrated and even their identification as "Lydizing" seems to strain the evidence. It does not seem justifiable, for example, to assume from the use of royal Lydan names in families of Colophon in the Hellenistic and Roman periods the existence of the same families as "Lydizers" in the archaic period (pp. 194-95). Again (p. 196) a "Lydizing" family is recognized in the reference to Kikon (Hipponax, Frag. 5), a priest of Ephesus, by reading *Kavδάλητος*, son of Kandaules, while the text would seem to have *πανδάλητος* (see the editions of Bergk and Diehl<sup>2</sup>).

The commonly held view that the name, tyrant, and possibly some element of the institution were Lydan in origin is rejected (pp. 201-3). The name is explained as of general Asianic origin, not Lydan, which does not clarify the situation greatly, while the institution is considered to be a purely Greek political development. The author's interpretation of Archilochus' well known disclaimer of mankind's usual ambitions (Frag. 22; Diehl<sup>2</sup>) as not establishing a connection between Gyges and the title, tyrant, is probably correct, but Mazzarino fails to account satisfactorily for the emphasis on violent revolution in the stories of Gyges' accession to the throne and for the fact that "tyrant" would seem to have a political connotation when first used and to have been first used in Greek Asia Minor. Further, the views that Ionian society was tenaciously conservative, that the political phenomena of tyrannies and lawgivers arose in Ionia from the mutual rivalries of noble families rather than from any strong popular element in the situation there, and that the Ionian cities lagged behind those of continental Greece (or at least did not lead) seem open to objection. While there is no clear evidence that tyranny was earlier in Ionia than in continental Greece, perhaps the reverse, there is evidence of an early development of institutions usually connected with growing popular influence. It seems wilful to minimize the interpre-

tation of the early Chian law (Tod, *Greek Inscriptions*, I, No. 1) which sees in it a considerable popular voice in the direction of the community's affairs (p. 239; see Tod's commentary and the remarks of Ehrenberg, *JHS*, LVII [1937], 152). This document, however, is dated only conjecturally *ca.* 600 B.C., but the recently published fragments of Alcaeus attest the existence of an organized agora and boule in Lesbos at least (*P Oxyrh.*, XVIII, 2165; C. Gallavotti, *Riv. Fil.*, XXI [1942], 161-81, No. III). Alcaeus complained of his exile from the agora and boule which his father and grandfather had enjoyed and were still enjoying under Pittakos. Even if Alcaeus' lower chronology is adopted these institutions were functioning before 600 B.C.—and they needed time for development. Thus, it seems unwise to lay too much stress on the aristocratic conservatism of Ionian cities; in this connection it might also be pointed out that the phenomenon of eastern Greeks entering mercenary service may be rather connected with economic and political difficulties in their own states than with any chivalric love of adventure (p. 140).

In the concluding chapters Mazzarino considers the two channels by which Asiatic influences were brought to the Greek world and distinguishes their respective contributions. His setting of Phoenician trading ventures in the Aegean in the tenth to eighth centuries will seem perhaps rather too early in the light of recent work on the problem of the alphabet (cf. R. Young, *AJA*, XLIV [1940], 6-9; can it be stated [p. 261] that "the dating [of the adoption of the Greek alphabet] to the ninth century, even if towards the close, cannot be doubted?") and on archaeological evidence from Crete (on the Cretan shields see S. Benton, *BSA*, XXXIX [1938-39], 52 ff.). The estimate of the nature of Phoenician trading, however, seems sound and the discussion of the transmission of certain military institutions, cavalry and chariot tactics and of the round hoplite shield is of considerable interest. The significance, however, of the hoplite formation being introduced into Asia Minor is not developed. If it was first used there in the Greek world it might be inferred that also in Greek Asia

Minor the middle class first began to make its influence felt in society.

While Mazzarino's emphasis throughout the book is on his conclusions, the guiding lines in this complex problem of Asiatic-Greek influences, he found apparently that considerable detailed discussion of certain problems was necessary to draw the lines. The general impression left on the reader is the need for more careful study of individual problems so that the general conclusions may be accepted with more assurance. Signor Mazzarino has cleared some valuable ground. Perhaps we can hope not only for more archaeological evidence but for a correlation of that which exists and the views being based on it with historical and philological studies.

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*The Excavations at Dura-Europos Conducted by Yale University and the French Academy of Inscriptions and Letters. Final Report VI, ed. M. I. ROSTOVITZEFF et al. The Coins, by A. R. BELLINGER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. x+214+42 pls. \$5.00.*

We have here a volume which might well serve in the future as a model for the publication of ancient coins, since it is certainly an inspiration to the numismatist. It is high time that coins recovered from the excavation of ancient sites be published and interpreted as fully and as handsomely as are these from Dura-Europos (1928-36). Yale University is fortunate in claiming as her own a scholar who was not only willing and eager but unusually able to preserve the story of the Dura coins.

In his method of presenting his material as well as in thoroughness of treatment Professor Bellinger breaks new ground. His catalogue proper, adjusted to the nature of excavation material, is a bare skeleton, giving serial number of coin, date, mint, denomination where necessary (in the case of a large group like the Syrian tetradrachms the denomination is given at the beginning of the list), obverse and reverse types in as few words as possible, reference to a standard catalogue, number of plate on which illustration of coin is found, the



number of specimens of that particular type of coin identified, and, finally, indication of how many, if any, of the type were found in one or more hoards. The author's reasons for this kind of catalogue are amply stated in his "Preliminary Note." Types not found "in the more detailed works to which reference is made" are described in a "Commentary on the Catalogue" (pp. 108-64). These two features together—a full commentary separated from the catalogue, and a catalogue in which information on each coin is cut to the bone—form the apparatus which make up Professor Bellinger's new method of presenting numismatic material. We welcome this method with great satisfaction, for Bellinger shows us here a solution, if we accept some limitations of the method, to the problem of publishing large numbers of coins where full description would be painfully repetitive in many cases, while in others full description and/or commentary are required if the treatment of single pieces is to be of any use. Labor is saved, clarity preserved, new information reaches us without repetition of old, familiar data, and publication costs are cut.

After this rather long statement on Bellinger's method, I should like to point out some drawbacks. First of all, it is obvious at once that separation of catalogue and commentary requires more turning of pages than a catalogue with notes which follow the description of the coins or are placed at the bottom of the page. This, however, is a limitation we can easily brook. But in this volume the same information sometimes appears in both catalogue and commentary (descriptions of types, fuller in commentary; dates and denominations—see, e.g., the Seleucid coins). On the other hand, measurements, surely proper to a catalogue, appear in the commentary only (cf., however, p. 195). A conflict in constructing the two apparatus for fullest use is evident. One cannot have everything. This reviewer notes and regrets no mention of die-positions (the printing of which to be sure entails additional expense), and questions the application of Roman imperial denominational names to the local coinage. On the former point, I feel that we should know whether any deviations from the normal die-positions occur, since such

data may indicate changes in mint practices, as do style and legend forms, or may betray a difference in mints, where no such difference was suspected. We simply do not yet know what die-positions may have to teach us. As for the second point, the author makes a good case for using these denominational names in his "Preliminary Note" and in the section on currency (pp. 195, 196), but I fear that the use of these names in the catalogue at this stage will lead many to accept as fact a theory which, though interesting, has yet to be established. But the advantages of Bellinger's method so far outweigh the drawbacks that I hope it will be sufficiently appreciated to be widely used in the publication of collections as well as of excavation coins. Because of long habit in working with catalogues which have gradually come to include die-positions as well as measurements, and weights, where useful, I find myself hoping that in the future this method will be used, with items of technical importance in the catalogue, nothing but commentary in the "Commentary."

The Commentary itself, a mine of numismatic, historical, and bibliographical information, is gripping to read. Bellinger's ease in writing notes, long or short; the expression of his own views on a particular coin or series; his use of the views of other scholars (he quotes, for example, letters from Mattingly, Seyrig, and others, adding an unusual warmth to a scholarly treatise, and makes, of course, where pertinent, constant reference to, and checks on, Newell); his posing of questions (e.g., p. 119); all these are fresh and enlightening. He does not hesitate to express a view which cannot be proved (thus opening up fields for further search) or to retreat from a position which he once held (see particularly p. 132).

Following the two main parts of the book—catalogue and commentary—there are articles on the twenty-two Dura hoards (pp. 165-87, incorporating previously published material and subsequent changes: Hoards 3 and 4, for instance, are now combined as one); on the denominations (pp. 188-94); on the countermarks (pp. 192-94); on the currency of Dura (pp. 195-210). The more technical sections on hoards and countermarks I shall pass over

here, merely recommending them to the reader who wishes to keep abreast of what is being done in ancient numismatic studies.

The summary presented below is drawn from Bellinger's sections on denominations and currency. Only silver and bronze coins were found, no gold. Dura itself struck no coins except briefly under Antiochus I (and here we get types that are new *per se* or for bronze) and perhaps under the Parthians (see pp. 195 and 197). Dura lived under Seleucid, Parthian, and Roman dominion, and her coinage reflects all these periods, as we see in Bellinger's detailed historical treatment in the section on currency. The denominations are introduced within the framework of an analysis of the Seleucid coinage, its mintage and denominations being presented in a simple table (as the author indicates, the construction of this would have been impossible without the work of E. T. Newell) relating to the silver and bronze of Ecbatana, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, and Antioch (p. 198). The individuality of the mints is stressed, denominations and metals being affected by current prices as well as by the supply of a particular denomination. Dura was in the economic orbit of Antioch (pp. 189, 198) yet did not use all the denominations that Antioch could supply and did not need or seek denominations which Antioch lacked. And Dura did not get her money exclusively from Antioch (p. 196). Under Parthia Dura was not in Antioch's orbit to the same extent that she had been under the Seleucids (p. 190), small silver Parthian coins and small bronze from Seleucia supplying the denominations that Antioch lacked. Under Rome the coinage shows a closer integration of mints; imperial plans for currency and control were broader, "transcended provincial limits," and Rome "made its economic plans on broader lines than the Greek kings had ever conceived."

It may be helpful to indicate the subjects treated in the author's section on currency: how the coins found at Dura got there; money changers and exchange; mints which provided Dura's coinage; Dura as a mint and explanation as to why she struck at all; numismatic history to end of the coinage under Valerian, on evidence of identified pieces.

Finally, the book has a map of eastern mints (frontispiece), a list of abbreviations (pp. vii-viii), indexes of mints and emperors (pp. 211-13); large drawings of countermarks and symbols preceding the plates (both consist of monograms, single letters, or abbreviations of emperor's names, often in ligature; here the author is concerned only with this kind of "symbol," and for conventional symbols such as crescent, altar, bull, star, etc., one must search through the catalogue or plates, there being no general index or index of types and symbols); and forty-two useful plates which illustrate over 900 coins of the total of 14,017, an impressive selection of material worthy of illustration, considering the generally poor quality of excavation coins.

For new types other than those of Dura itself mentioned above, and for new varieties, I eagerly recommend Bellinger's commentary and plates.

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*Répertoire des bibliothèques et des catalogues de manuscrits grecs.* By MARCEL RICHARD. (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, "Publications de l'Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes," No. 1.) Paris: Centre de documentation du C.N.R.S., 1948. Pp. xvi+131.

This is an important publication which will be indispensable from now on to all who concern themselves with the pursuit of Greek manuscripts.

Preliminary information about manuscripts must ordinarily be obtained from printed catalogues, which often appear only as articles in learned journals. Since the number of these catalogues and lists of manuscripts has been steadily increasing in modern times, and since the libraries that they represent are widely scattered geographically and often little known, it has become necessary, for obvious reasons, to catalogue the catalogues. This was first done in a comprehensive way by Victor Gardthausen in 1903 (*Sammlungen und Cataloge griechischer Handschriften*), and similar

*répertoires* have been given us by O. Schissel in 1924 (*Kataloge griechischer Hss.*) and by W. Weinberger in 1930 (*Wegweiser durch die Sammlungen altphilologischer Hss.*). Gardthausen sought to bring together all the documentation necessary for a history of the manifold collections of Greek manuscripts past and present; hence he lists many old catalogues. Schissel confines his list to catalogues of Greek manuscripts in libraries of the present day, omitting mention of the older catalogues when they have been replaced by more recent ones. Weinberger aims at much the same thing as Gardthausen, but the scope of his work is more than doubled by the inclusion of Latin collections, and the wealth of information that he supplies is sometimes difficult to use owing to the extreme brevity with which it is presented. Richard's plan is essentially the same as Schissel's in principle; but he freely departs from its limitations whenever he thinks that it will be of practical advantage to the reader to have before him additional information of an historical character. Thus his *Répertoire* supercedes that of Schissel, not only because it is more up-to-date in the same line, but also because it gives the scholar more practical help. The works of Gardthausen and Weinberger, on the other hand, remain indispensable by virtue of their different and much wider historical scope.

In the Introduction Mr. Richard explains the limitations necessarily inherent in a work of this kind. What are the actual resources of the various libraries at the present time? Even a complete file of the latest printed catalogues, nearly all of which the author has seen, falls far short of giving us that information. Some of the catalogues indeed have never been adequate or complete—those of the *Vaticani graeci*, for instance, or of the libraries of Lenin-grad, St. Mark's, Meteora, Chalki; and the collections of Greek manuscripts described in many of the other catalogues have been substantially increased or diminished since the printing of those catalogues. The libraries of western Europe have remained fairly stable even during the recent war, but in eastern Europe, the Balkans, Russia, and Turkey, the disturbances caused by war and revolution be-

tween 1914 and 1923 were such that the consequences were only partially known to scholars even in 1939, to say nothing of what has since happened in those regions. Naturally Mr. Richard had to describe the various collections in the light of what was known about them on the eve of the recent war, but in a few cases he is able to supply more recent information, and a note on page ix tells us something in general about the effect of the war on the libraries of western Europe. The loss or displacement of Greek manuscripts in Germany cannot yet be estimated, but there seems to have been no loss in Italy and England, and only nine are missing, we are told, in France.

The bibliographical titles, numbered 1-529, are divided into four sections, the first three of which are concerned respectively with general bibliography (Nos. 1-11), catalogues of manuscripts on special subjects (12-23), and regional catalogues (24-29). The contents of the main part of the book, section IV, are arranged alphabetically by place names, usually that of a city or an island, but occasionally that of a mountain or a province. Under many of these place names the only entry, necessarily, is a cross reference to one of the regional catalogues. Papyri are excluded. When Greek manuscripts are catalogued along with other kinds of manuscripts, their numbers in the catalogue are listed. This will save the researcher much time when he comes to consult such complicated series of catalogues as those of Oxford and Cambridge. The approximate number of Greek manuscripts contained in a library is nearly always stated, and occasionally some information is added about their age or character. Probably the most valuable part of the book is that which relates to libraries in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey, concerning which much new bibliographical information has been assembled. Most of this material is scattered about in modern Greek publications, which in themselves are often very difficult of access. The American scholar will probably find as much of it at the University of Cincinnati as anywhere else, or in the White Collection of the Cleveland Public Library.

Mr. Richard's *Répertoire* is excellent on the whole and all scholars must be grateful for the

abundance of new data that he has brought together. Nevertheless a number of things are missing that one would expect to find in a book of this scope. Something should have been said about the existence, or nonexistence, of Greek manuscripts at La Cava, at Malta (La Valetta), and at Kasan, since all three of these are mentioned by Gardthausen and the last two also by Schissel. Weinberger mentions La Cava and Kasan; but Cantarella, in *Aevum* XIX (1945) p. 380, states that there are no Greek manuscripts at La Cava except a palimpsest fragment of the *O.T.* (s. IV). Concerning the important, though still uncatalogued Khudov collection in the Historical Museum at Moscow, about which our author is silent, see A. Turyn, *The Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Aeschylus*, p. 31, note 43, and the references there given. Further information concerning the Public Library at Leningrad, including reference to a report of the Manuscript Division for 1914-38 and the acquisition of the manuscripts formerly belonging to Papadopoulos-Kerameus, will be found in the same scholar's "Manuscripts of Sophocles" in *Traditio* II p. 21. Mr. Turyn, who in recent years has gone many ways in the quest of Greek manuscripts, calls attention to the following items, among others, which he thinks should have been included: On page 76, under Moscow, add Sabas, episcopus Mojaisky, *Specimina palaeographica codicum graecorum et slavonicorum Bibliothecae Mosquensis Synodalis*, saec. VI-XVII, Moscow 1863. On page 92 mention should be made of an excellent survey of the Vatican collections by Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, which appears in an article in the *Dictionnaire de Sociologie* entitled "Bibliothèques Pontificales," Paris 1936. From this source we learn that the number of manuscripts listed as *Vaticani graeci* in 1936 was 2608, an increase of 109 over Richard's figure for 1931. Some contributions by Turyn to the history of the Zamoyski Library at Warsaw appear in *Eos* 31 (1928) 505-11, and in a monograph entitled *De Aelii Aristidis codice Varsoviensi atque de Andrea Taranowski et Theodosio Zygomala* ("Archivum Filologiczne," No. 9, Cracow 1928). On page 99, under Sinai, add V. N. Bénéchévitch, *Les manuscrits grecs du*

*mont Sinaï et le monde savant de l'Europe depuis le XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle jusqu'à 1927* ("Byz. Neugriech. Jahrb., Texte und Forschungen," No. 21, 1927). Concerning the National Library at Vienna, reference should be made to the important article by Hans Gerstinger entitled "Johannes Sambucus als Handschriftensammler," which appears in *Festschrift der Nationalbibliothek in Wien herausgegeben zur Feier des 200-jährigen Bestehens des Gebäudes*, Wien 1926, pp. 251-400. Mr. Turyn notes further that the two manuscripts at Lwow have presumably been transferred to Breslau, and that there is at least one Greek manuscript at Jena, namely Bos. q. 7 of the 14th century, containing two plays of Sophocles.

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*Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch.* By ALOIS WALDE, third edition, revised by J. B. HOFMANN. Parts 12, 13, 14 (Vol. II, pp. 1-256). Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1940, 1948, 1949. Price not stated.

It is impossible not to welcome the continuation of the third edition of Walde, with all its virtues and faults. The lapse of eight years between two parts has produced no changes in the plan of the book, and Hofmann is still unable to distinguish between a gloss cited from an ancient writer and the approval or disapproval of an etymology by a modern one. In reviews of earlier parts I have said all that I have to say about the merits, which are great, and the demerits, which are not inconsiderable, of the work as a whole. I shall, therefore, content myself with comments on a few particular points.

*maccus* (a stock Atellan character) hails from the South Italic *φλαξ*, see *Foundations of Roman Italy* p. 391. The fragment of Blaesus *μοκκάνωσις* (glossed as *περιφρονείς*), if correctly quoted, has *δ:δ* like *longère, tongitio*: Osc. *tanginud*. The precise relationship is not clear (*δ* may be South Italic or even Messapic, the variants with *δ* hyperurbanisms, or conceivably Central Italic). But the gemination is characteristic in words of this type, and the alternation *δ:δ* not rare (cf. *mamma: momma*; and, on terra sigillata, *Satto* and *Sottu, Sacco* and *Socco, Mamm(i)us* and *Mommo*).

*man(n)isnauus*.—It will not do to say "vl. etruskisch." What is the alleged "Etruscan" word (or words) in point of which the assertion is made? If there are none, the assertion is pointless. If they exist, what do they mean? How did the word *man(n)isnauus* get into a Latin inscription? Have the *nymphae Augustae* (also at *Arusna*, like *mannisnauus*) and the *udisna augusta* no bearing on the matter? Readers who accept Hofmann's ipse dixit are likely to be deceived. More than the mere presence of the consonant group -sn- is required to prove a word Etruscan. The weight of evidence is also against accepting *marō* as Etruscan. Did Etruscan make no borrowings at all from Italic, or only Italic from Etruscan? So soon as the tail begins to wag the dog, but not before. Meanwhile *man(n)isnauus* and *udisna*, *Arusna* must be added s.v. *no*.

*marrubium* ('hoarhound, marjoram') "unbekannter Herkunft, wohl Fremdw." The form recalls Gaulish *uidubium* "pruning hook" (-bio-said to be cognate with *φύρος* and English *bill*). Names of plants do derive from names of implements—Latin *pastinaca* "parsnip" from *pastinum* "dibble," and the Greek for *marrubium* is *λυόστροφον*. Does *marru-* itself conceal a plant name? Names such as *larkspur*, *foxglove*, *stock*, *dandelion*, *cozomb*, *gladiolus*, *snappedragon*, *schizanthus*, *honesuckle* and many others have literal meanings of which the application to flora is merely secondary. The words *marrucina* (-g) "Christ's thorn" and *marruria* "tenera folia" can hardly be unconnected, and *marra* "hoe" may well be a curtailed form.

*mattus*.—More likely "dizzy" than "drunk"; see my note on Gaulish *uimpi* (*Language*, XXV [1949], 391).

*mettica* (uitis, uua) suggests the curtailed *Met(t)is* (5th cent., N.D., Fortunatus) which underlies modern *Metz*; this cannot represent directly the ancient *Mediomatrici*, and is hardly the personal name *Mettius*. On *Mettis* see Vendryes *MSL* XXIII (1930-35), p. 52.

*moneo* has a perfect subjunctive *moneris*, *monerint*, apparently from the simple stem *mon-*, or (possibly) *moni-* (as in *monitus*). Ernout-Meillet as confidently accept *Monēla* here as Hofmann rejects it.

*nassa*.—At Heddernheim (*nassas faciunt piscatores* [Riese, 4476]) an early Germanic form (cf. Goth. *nati*) may be concealed beneath the Latin equivalent. There is also a personal name (*terra sigillata*), common in East Gaul, *Nasso*, which need not therefore be connected with the Roman *Naso*; accordingly *nassiterna*, which owes

its suffix to *cisterna*, *lanterna* (but cf. *maderna* "siphon") is not "Schnabelkanne" (which the definition of Festus would make absurd) but rather, at least in origin, "corded ware."

*naupreda*.—Cf. *CP* XXXVII (1942), 155.

*neo*.—Ir. *snáthe* "Faden," *náthat* "Nadel." Cf. *nata* "threads, spinning" (not "daughter") on Gaulish spindle-whorls.

*noctua*.—For the formation cf. Osc. *éitu(v)ō*.

*nodus*.—Add Umb. *nūpener*, cf. *AJP* LIX (1938), 252 (*nudipineum* in Placidus, R, Deuerling), and perhaps *Nodens*, *Nudus* (*Scott. Gael. Stud.*, 2, Feb. 1928, 224), Lith. *naudā* (Tolkien, ap. *Antiqu. Soc. Reports*, 9, 1932, 132-37).

*nurus*.—Cf. Raet. *šnušur* (Kretschmer, *Danielsson Festschr.* 139).

*obba*.—Varro's *obbas Calenas* (ap. Non. 146.) makes Niedermann's comparison with the African local name *Obba* farfetched, and Stokes' with Ir. *uibne* not unlikely.

*opto*.—Cf. Umbrian *opeter*, *upetu*, *upetuta*.

*ornus*.—For *Ὠρκία* see also Meyer-Lübke *ZONF*, IV (1928), 128.

*pacisco*.—If *toilesia* in the Duenos insc. has I. Ev. -s-, *pakari* is difficult to interpret as a passive infinitive. Can it show -a- by anaptyxis, i.e., dat. sg. fem. of the *i*-stem adj. (dial.) *pacri*?

*paltis* (-ūdis).—Note *paloscaria*, an epithet of Juno in an inscription of Praeneste; see *CIL*, I, p. 718 (addendum to 2439).

*pandus*.—To *dea Panda* the Osc. *patanaī* must stand in the same relation as *patensins* to *pandere*.

*panicum*.—First in Cesar (*BC* ii. 22. 1, cf. Str. iv. 190 C) who speaks of it at Massilia (Strabo puts it in Aquitania). The suggestion of E. Gwynn, accepted by Vendryes, *RC*, XLVII (1930), 200 (cf. Lewis *EC*, I [1936], 320) is worth mention (W. *pan*, *panog*, L. *canicae*, Ir. *canach*). But what about *canecosedlon* in the insc. of Aōtun?

*panna* (La Graufesenque).—In view of the Germanic *channa* it is possible to accept *panna* as Celtic.

It is but in the nature of things that some of the words, and they are very many, which appear in Hofmann but not in Walde's second edition, are etymologically difficult. Hofmann usually offers some suggestions, even for these, which, although not always convincing, are never impossible; many of them are plausible and some probable.

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*The Odyssey of Homer.* Edited with General and Grammatical Introduction, Commentary, and Indexes by W. B. STANFORD. London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1947, 1948. Vol. I (Books i-xii), pp. lxxxvi+432; Vol. II (Books xiii-xxiv), pp. xciv+452. \$2.75 a volume.

As a specimen of the bookmaker's craft this edition is a masterpiece. The preface suggests—and there is abundant confirmation later—that the work has been planned largely for those who have studied Attic, but have had no contact with Homer.<sup>1</sup> For this purpose it is the best I know, and will probably continue unequalled for a long time—until we deserve better.

The defect of the book is something for which the editor is not responsible. It is something deeply rooted in the way of life of the English-speaking peoples.

Ever since the battle of Waterloo there has been going on a steady accumulation of knowledge about languages and about language. Those who did the work, worked in the spirit of scientists; and, even before the nineteenth century ended, the stockpile was large and valuable. Speakers of English were in the lamentably "thin line of heroes" who built it up. But the English-speaking way of life has been and is to turn one's back, and play that the stockpile isn't there.<sup>2</sup>

The editor has grown up in this environment; but, of course, does not go to this extreme. He has looked at the stockpile and can name a number of items in it. How much he has profited, may be inferred from his assumption (p. ix): "that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were both composed by a single poet named Homer."

Fortunately I can quote Professor Joshua Whatmough:<sup>3</sup> "No one with a competent knowledge of the Greek language and its history, judging the matter on purely linguistic

<sup>1</sup> Some are not expected to maintain contact long. For their sake each volume has been made—chiefly by reprinting the Introduction—a self-contained unit. Even those who wish to read but a single book are cared for.

<sup>2</sup> A brilliant attempt to show the general public how this attitude hurts them is *Leave your Language alone!* by Robert A. Hall Jr., preliminary edition Ithaca 1948. The revised edition is in press.

<sup>3</sup> *Am. Journ. Arch.*, LII (1948), 45, 46.

grounds, which in this matter are and must be paramount, escapes the conclusion of a multiple origin and a long tradition."—"I repeat, I know no competent linguist or comparative philologist whose knowledge of Greek and Greek dialects I respect enough to quote his name, who holds any other opinion on this particular matter."

Such statements could have been made by any competent linguist who has worked at Homer; but to Professor Whatmough belongs the credit for the bravery of stating frankly an unpalatable truth, and for the tact with which the infliction of needless pain has been avoided.

GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING

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*Einführung in die alte Geschichte.* By HERMANN BENGTON. Munich: Biederstein Verlag, 1949. Pp. 185.

This excellent book is an ideal introduction not only to the sources and literature for ancient history but also to the general problems which its study raises. It will not only save the beginner a good deal of time but also fire his imagination, and it includes many observations for which experienced workers will be grateful. Bengtson begins with a discussion of the range in time and space of ancient history and an account of its study since the Renaissance. He passes to the *Grundlagen*, chronology, geography, and anthropology, and from these to a comprehensive survey of the literary and monumental evidence. The next chapter is devoted to epigraphy, papyrology, and numismatics, and its successor to the relations of ancient history to the neighboring disciplines of the philologist, archaeologist, Orientalist, and mediaevalist. Bengtson concludes with an account of works of reference and periodicals and a select bibliography.

Skilful selection and presentation have produced a book as readable as it is useful. Ancient time-reckoning and problems of language and nationality and natural environment are no less well treated than historiography proper, and the illustrations here given of the gain to knowledge from inscriptions, coins, and papyri are perfectly adapted to arouse intellectual curiosity. I hope that this work will

run through repeated editions;<sup>1</sup> a translation into English would be welcome.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK

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*Clésias, La Perse, l'Inde: Les Sommaires de Photius.* By R. HENRY. ("Collection Le-bègue," 7th ser., No. 84.) Brussels: Office de publicité, S.C., 1947. Pp. 99 with plate and map. Belgian Fr. 25.

This pamphlet offers us a new text of Codex 72 of Photius' *Bibliotheca* with apparatus based on photographs of the two Venetian manuscripts shown by Martini to be the only primary ones for that work. The author is following the lead of his teacher, A. Severyns, who edited Photius' Codex 239 (Proclus' *Chrestomathies*) in 1938. Will anyone *οἷοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἶσι* ever edit the whole *Bibliotheca* again? The rising standards of textual criticism tend to produce piecemeal editions of larger works.

The text is accompanied by a French translation. The brief Introduction includes a proper appreciation of Ctesias as an *hableur* who had the effrontery to call Herodotus a liar. The notes at the end, though not exhaustive, are useful for pointing out the agreements and contradictions in the parallel tradition. A collation of the first few pages of the text with Bekker's and with the translation raises doubts about the care with which it has been constructed: 35b39, *καὶ ιγ'*, is omitted; 36a35, *ἄλωσιν*, should be *ἄλλων*, etc. There is no index.

AUBREY DILLER

Indiana University

*Libellus de regionibus urbis Romae.* Recensuit

ARVAST NORDH. ("Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom," 8<sup>o</sup>, III.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1949. Pp. 113. Sw. Cr. 10.00.

The brief and bare catalogue of buildings in the fourteen regions of Rome, composed in the fourth century, is preserved in two interpolated recensions in several very old manu-

<sup>1</sup> On p. 3 the reference to Cass. Dio LXIII 29 should be corrected to LXVIII 29. On p. 125 a reference to Chr. Blinkenberg, *Lindos, Fouilles de l'Acropole*, II (1941), would be useful.

scripts. There is also an imitation from Constantinople, and unique traces of it are found in Syriac in the late sixth century via a lost Greek translation. Nordh laid the foundations for a new edition in his *Prolegomena* (Göteborg dissertation, 1936, in Swedish), in which he examined all the manuscripts and determined their relations and also dealt with the problems of origin, purpose, interpolations, etc. Meanwhile, Valentini and Zuchetti brought out a new edition with elaborate commentary (Rome, 1940-42). Nordh now gives us his own text of the two recensions in parallel columns, together with his *Prolegomena* (in Latin) abridged and revised. Since he has studied the sources very carefully, his texts are more correct than their predecessors and clarify somewhat the evidence for the other obscure problems of the work. He seems to have overlooked P. Schnabel, *Der verlorene Speirer Codex* ("Berliner Sitzungsberichte" [1926]).

AUBREY DILLER

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*Herodotus.* Translated by J. ENOCH POWELL. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1949. Vol. I, pp. xxxii+353; Vol. II, pp. 354-773. \$6.00.

Mr. Powell's translation of Herodotus is the culmination of a series of Herodotean studies: a lexicon to Herodotus, a critical analysis of the history, and an edition of Book viii. He has brought, then, to the task of translation a critical knowledge of the text and a thorough familiarity with the language and style of his author. The result is an unusually accurate translation with due regard for later additions by Herodotus and for interpolations. It also has the virtue of being very readable. The basic text used is that of Hude in the *Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*, but departures from it, those of other editors and of the translator, are listed in a critical appendix (pp. 687-722). Aids to the general reader are an index of proper names, which gives a minimum of explanation as well as references to the text, and an introduction, which gives a brief analysis of the history and an estimate of Herodotus' place in historiography. It contains a table (pp. xiv-xv)

which shows the interweaving of the original "Persian History," written, according to the translator, in 448-42 B.C., with the later conceived theme of general Greek history, which afforded Herodotus the opportunity of expansion and remodelling. There are also two maps marking the places mentioned by Herodotus. The format of the book, small and compact, and the quality of the paper and printing are pleasing.

The language selected by the translator as a fitting medium for Herodotus' original Ionic Greek is, in the main, that of the authorized version of the Bible. It is presumably still sufficiently familiar to readers to make somewhat the same impression as that made by Herodotus' Ionic dialect and simple style in the twenties of the fifth century B.C. in Athens. Its use apparently involved, however, some unfortunate equivalents: *pitthoi*—cruses (i. 51. 3); *proedria*—solemn seats (i. 54. 2); *tripous*—cauldron (i. 92. 1); *leiotatos*—plainest (vii. 9b. 1). In some cases the choice of reading has resulted in the disappearance of an effective metaphor: *ἐπαυέσας* rather than *ἐπιλέηντας* (vii. 10a. 1). There are, of course, turns of phrase and grotesqueries to which readers will take exception in varying degree: e.g., *προθυμίην πλείστην παρείχετο*—"did much diligence" (i. 61. 4); *δικας δέ . . . δικαιοτάτας κρίνειν*—"judged the justest judgements" (ii. 129. 1). Yet, misleading inaccuracies appear to be rare. One example is afforded by the translation of *ξενικός* as "hired strangers" (i. 77. 4) to describe the forces of the Greek allies of Croesus. As Herodotus' general account indi-

cates, the relationship between the East Greek cities and Croesus was some form of alliance which involved specified military aid rather than the hiring of mercenaries (for which Herodotus normally uses the word *ἐπικούροι*). A few unfortunate slips are to be noted: Aeolic for Argolic (iv. 152. 4); Aristaphernes for Artaphernes (v. 35. 1). The general impression made, however, by a reading of the translation and occasional checking with the original text is one of uniform accuracy and readability.

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*Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus*. By KAREL JANÁČEK. ("Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis," Vol. IV.) Olomouc, Czechoslovakia: Palacký University, n.d. Pp. 64.

This is an investigation of the relation between *Adversus mathematicos* vii-xi and the *Pyrroneian Hypotyposeis*. It shows that the former can be called an improved and enlarged edition of the latter. The changes, classified by the author as lexical, formal, and pedagogical, seem to be the result of Sextus' attempt to improve the clarity of his expression. A sample of J.'s findings: *ἵνα δὲ καί, ὅτι μὴ, ἐπεὶ μὴ, ἀλλ' οὐδέ*, all present in the *Hypotyposeis*, have disappeared in the later work. Another: the partitive genitive of adjectives like *ἀτοπον, ἀπορον, ἀδύνατον, ἀμήχανον*, frequent in *Adversus mathematicos*, is rare in the *Hypotyposeis*.

The author expects to continue his studies.

PHILIP MERLAN

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## BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Offprints from periodicals and parts of books will not be listed unless they are published (sold) separately. Books submitted are not returnable.]

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